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«Sino-Russian relations since 1991» redirects here. For the state of Sino-Russian relations before 1991, see History of Sino-Russian relations.

China–Russia relations

Russia	China
Diplomatic mission
Russian Embassy, Beijing	Chinese Embassy, Moscow
Envoy
Ambassador Igor Morgulov	Ambassador Zhang Hanhui

China–Russia relations, are the international relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Diplomatic relations between China and Russia improved after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991.^[a] American scholar Joseph Nye states:

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that de facto US-China alliance ended, and a China–Russia rapprochement began. In 1992, the two countries declared that they were pursuing a «constructive partnership»; in 1996, they progressed toward a «strategic partnership»; and in 2001, they signed a treaty of «friendship and cooperation.»^[2]

The two countries share a land border which was demarcated in 1991, and they signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001, which was renewed in June 2021 for five more years.^[3] On the eve of a 2013 state visit to Moscow by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked that the two nations were forging a special relationship.^[4] The two countries have enjoyed close relations militarily, economically, and politically, while supporting each other on various global issues.^[5][6][7] Commentators have debated whether the bilateral strategic partnership constitutes an alliance.^[8][9][10] Russia and China officially declared their relations ‘Not allies, but better than allies’.^[11]

Country comparison[edit]

Common name	China	Russia
Official name	People’s Republic of China	Russian Federation
Flag
Coat of arms
Area	9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi) (including Hong Kong and Macao)	17,125,191 km2 (6,612,073 sq mi) (including the Crimean Peninsula)
Population	1,418,669,490	146,793,744
Population density	145/km2 (375.5/sq mi)	8.4/km2 (21.8/sq mi)
Capital	Beijing	Moscow
Largest city	Shanghai (26,317,104)	Moscow (~12.5 million)
Government	Unitary one-party socialist republic	Federal semi-presidential republic
First leader	CCP Chairman Mao Zedong	President Boris Yeltsin
Current leaders	CCP General Secretary & President Xi Jinping Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang	President Vladimir Putin Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin
Established	1 October 1949 (Proclamation of the People’s Republic) 4 December 1982 (current constitution)	25 December 1991 (Russian Federation formed) 26 December 1991 (Soviet Union dissolved)
Official languages	Standard Chinese	Russian
Currency	Renminbi	Russian ruble
GDP (nominal)	$19.911 trillion (2022)	$2.133 trillion (2022)
External debt (nominal)	$1.843 trillion (2018 Q4)	$539.6 billion (2017)
GDP (PPP)	$30.177 trillion (2022)	$4.365 trillion (2022)
GDP (nominal) per capita	$12,970 (2022)	$14,665 (2022)
GDP (PPP) per capita	$21,364 (2022)	$31,967 (2022)
Human Development Index	0.768 (high)	0.822 (very high)
Expatriates	~75,631 Russians in China	~200,000–400,000 Chinese in Russia
Foreign exchange reserves	3,088,000 (millions of USD)	126,026 (millions of USD)
Military expenditures	$228.0 billion (1.9% of GDP) (2018)	$61.0 billion (3.1% of GDP) (2018)
Military personnel	(0.23% of population) 2,000,000 (active) 14,510,000 (reserve) 18,660,000 (paramilitary)	(4.09% of population) 1,413,628 (active) 2,572,500 (reserve) 0 (paramilitary)
Nuclear warheads	350[12]	4500[12]

• Leaders of China and Russia from 1991
  • General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
  • President of the Russian Federation

History[edit]

The relations between China and Russia go back to the 17th-century, when the Qing dynasty tried to drive Russian settlers out of Manchuria, ended by the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. During the Cold War, China and the USSR were rivals after the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, competing for control of the worldwide Communist movement. There was a serious possibility of a major war between the two nations in the early 1960s; a brief border war took place in 1969. This enmity began to lessen after the death of Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, but relations were poor until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

On December 23, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin made his first official visit to China, where he met with CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin and Chinese president Yang Shangkun.^[13] In December 1996, at the end of Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to Moscow, Russia and China issued a joint communique pledging to build an «equal and reliable partnership.»^[14] This reinforced the China-Russian view that the United States was their main competitor in the global political scene.

In 2001, the close relations between the two countries were formalized with the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, a twenty-year strategic, economic, and – controversially and arguably – an implicit military treaty. A month before the treaty was signed, the two countries joined with junior partners Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Still active as of 2022, the organization is expected to counter the growing influence of the United States military outreach program in Central Asia. The PRC is currently a key purchaser and licensee of Russian military equipment, some of which have been instrumental in the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army. The PRC is also a main beneficiary of the Russian Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline.

When China attempted to build closer relations with Russia in 2013, the Russian government initially had reservations.^[15] However, the United States sanctions against Russia for its 2014 annexation of Crimea helped push Russia to a warmer relationship with China.^[15]

Liam Carson, an emerging European economist at Capital Economics, said in 2019:

Policymakers in both countries have actively tried to strengthen trade ties in recent years. And it’s no coincidence that this surge in Russia-China trade has come at the same time that the US has tightened sanctions on Russia and concerns about the US-China trade war have intensified.^[16]

By 2019, both nations had serious grievances with the United States. For China, the issues were control of the South China Sea, trade policies, and technology policy. For Russia, the main issue was severe economic penalties imposed by the U.S. and Europe to punish its seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. China and Russia do, however, differ on some policies. China does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and Russia does not support China’s claims in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, China and Russia currently enjoy the best relations they have had since the late 1950s. Although they have no formal alliance, the two countries do have an informal agreement to coordinate diplomatic and economic moves, and build up an alliance against the United States.^[17][18] Yaroslav Trofimov, the chief foreign-affairs correspondent of The Wall Street Journal, argued in 2019:

Though there is no overt ideological alignment between Russia and China today, the two governments share a hostility to dissent, deep suspicion of Western interference and a strong desire to impose tighter controls over their own societies. Mr. Xi has presided over a push to stamp out corruption and bolster the Communist party’s role in the economy and the society at large—a campaign akin to Mr. Putin’s earlier effort to tame Russian oligarchs and crush political opposition. China was inspired by Russia’s legislation cracking down on nongovernmental organizations, while Russian officials have expressed admiration for China’s comprehensive internet censorship and “social credit” plan to rank citizens based on their loyalty and behavior.^[19]

Russian invasion of Ukraine[edit]

Xi and Putin met on February 4, 2022, during the run up to the 2022 Beijing Olympics during the massive Russian build-up of force on the Ukrainian border, with the two expressing that the two countries are nearly united in their anti-US alignment and that both nations shared «no limits» to their commitments.^[20][21] Western Intelligence reports said that China had asked Russia to wait to invade Ukraine until after the Beijing Olympics ended on February 20.^[21] Shortly before the invasion, Chinese media would repeat Russian statements that Russia’s troops were being pulled away from the border with Ukraine.^[22]

On February 22, two days prior to the invasion of Ukraine, a leaked post The Beijing News‘ Horizon News on Weibo detailed instructions on how to report on a crisis in Ukraine; the post asked editors to monitor unfavorable comments, to only use tags shared by Chinese state media and stated «Do not post anything unfavorable to Russia or pro-Western. Let me review your words before posting».^[22][23] On February 25, 2022, one day following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Putin told Xi during a phone call that Russia is eager to engage in high-level negotiations with Ukraine, according to China’s foreign ministry.^[24]

China refused to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, repeated Russian propaganda about the war, opposed economic sanctions against Russia, and abstained or sided with Russia in UN votes on the war in Ukraine.^[25]

In 2022, Russia added Taiwan to a list of foreign states and territories that commit «unfriendly actions» against its military invasion of Ukraine.^[26] Chinese leader Xi Jinping has assured Vladimir Putin of China’s support on Russian “sovereignty and security” in May.^[27][28]

In April 2022, in an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov, who is considered close to Vladimir Putin, said that Russia «will be more integrated and more dependent on China», further stating that «Chinese are our close allies and friends and the biggest source of Russian strength after Russian people themselves.»^[29]

In June 2022, Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping had a call with Putin where he reaffirmed support for Russia on security issues while saying that «all parties should responsibly push for a proper settlement of the Ukraine crisis».^[30][31]

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that China has the economic leverage to pressure Putin to end the war, adding «I’m sure that without the Chinese market for the Russian Federation, Russia would be feeling complete economic isolation. That’s something that China can do – to limit the trade [with Russia] until the war is over.» In August 2022, Zelenskyy said that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping had refused all his requests for direct talks with him.^[32]

Border[edit]

On May 29, 1994, during the visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Beijing, Russian and Chinese officials signed an agreement on the Sino-Russian Border Management System intended to facilitate border trade and hinder criminal activity.^[13] On September 3 of that year, a demarcation agreement was signed, fixing the boundary along a previously–disputed 55-km stretch of the western Sino-Russian border. After the final demarcation carried out in the early 2000s, it measures 4,209.3 kilometres (2,615.5 mi), and is the world’s sixth-longest international border.^[33]

The 2004 Complementary Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Eastern Section of the China–Russia Boundary^[34] stated that Russia agrees to transfer a part of Abagaitu Islet, all of Yinlong (Tarabarov) Island, about a half of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island, along with some adjacent islets, to China. A border dispute between Russia and China, standing since Japanese invasion of Manchuria of 1931, was thus resolved. These Amur River islands were, until then, administered by Russia and claimed by China. The event was meant to foster feelings of reconciliation and cooperation between the two countries by their leaders. The transfer has been ratified by both the Chinese National People’s Congress and the Russian State Duma. The official transfer ceremony occurred on-site on October 14, 2008.

Rival claims over Vladivostok settled[edit]

In 2005, Beijing and Moscow ratified an agreement that ended more than three and half centuries of their struggle over territory and for dominance.^[35]

Economic relations[edit]

This article needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (September 2021)

Economic relations between Russia and China demonstrate mixed trends. Trade between the two countries was running between $5 billion and $8 billion per year in the 1990s, but grew steadily from then onwards. It was on course to hit $100 billion – the previous goal – until the 2008 crisis interceded. Trade slumped back to around $60 billion in 2015 and 2016 but started to recover again in 2017.^[36] Both countries are expecting to raise the trade volume to $200 billion by 2024.^[37]

Between 2008 and 2009, when Russia experienced a financial crisis, there was a sharp increase in borrowing from China. This trend, however, did not last. Starting in 2013, borrowing started to grow steadily.^[38]

The main form of cooperation in the complex economic relations between Russia and China is trade. From 2003 until 2013, mutual trade increased 7.7 times; in 2014 the scale of bilateral operations increased even more. The aggravation of relations between Russia and Western countries contributed to the expansion of economic ties with China. By 2020, the parties planned to increase bilateral trade to $200 billion. According to the Federal Сustoms Service (FCS) of the Russian Federation, in 2016 the foreign trade turnover of Russia and China amounted to $66.1 billion (in 2015 – $63.6 billion). Russia has a negative trade balance with China: in 2016 exports amounted to 28 billion, whereas imports totaled 38.1 billion (in 2015, 28.6 and 35.9 billion, resoectively). The share of China in foreign trade with Russia grew from 12.1% in 2015 to 14.1% in 2016. Since 2010, China is the largest trading partner of Russia.^[39]

Most of Russia’s exports to China originate from the mining and petrochemicals sectors.^[40] More than half of Russia’s exports to China come from mineral fuels, oil, and petroleum products (60.7%), followed by wood and wood products (9.4%), non-ferrous metals (9%), fish and seafood (3.5%), and chemical products (3.3%). The main categories of imports to Russia from China are machinery and equipment (35.9%), clothing (13.7%), chemical products (9.1%), fur and fur products (5.6%), footwear (5.3%), and furniture (3%). According to the General Сustoms Administration of China, bilateral trade in January–May 2017 increased by 26.1% in annual terms, amounting to $32.3 billion, and mutual trade in 2017 may exceed $80 billion According to the Ministry of Commerce of China, as of January 1, 2016, the volume of accumulated direct Russian investments in China amounted to $946.9 million and Chinese investments totaled ten times more, estimated at $8.94 billion.^[39]

Participation in such organizations as BRICS and RIC (Russia-India-China) has significant importance for Russian-Chinese economic relations. At the Russian-Chinese summit held in Shanghai^[when?], Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping stressed that «Russia and China stand for the transformation of BRICS into a mechanism of cooperation and coordination on a wide range of global financial, economic and international political problems, including the establishment of a closer economic partnership, the early establishment of the BRICS development Bank and the formation of a; for the expansion of joint efforts of representation and voting rights of States with emerging markets and developing countries in the system of global economic governance, for the formation of an open world economy; for the deepening of cooperation in the field of foreign policy, including in the settlement of regional conflicts».^[41]

To facilitate financial transactions in the regions, China and Russia will conduct a currency swap. Central banks, with whom China has signed currency swaps, are able to issue loans to their banks in yuan. A currency swap agreement was signed with Russia in the amount of 150 billion yuan ($25 billion). Currency swaps will make the ruble and the yuan more stable, which in turn will have a positive impact on the stability of the global financial system. Additionally, the expansion of currency trading may facilitate investment processes. By investing in an economy that is now facing certain problems due to the fall of the ruble and oil prices, China is carrying out soft expansion and supports one of its main partners. China and Russia have long advocated reducing the role of the dollar in international trade, and both aim to create conditions for the development of bilateral trade and mutual investment. The rate of de-dollarization chosen by the countries is due to the rapid growth of the RMB’s share in international payments and settlements (Oct. 2013. – 0.84%, Dec. 2014. – 2.17%, Feb. 2015. – 1.81%).^[42] The conclusion of a currency swap makes it possible to facilitate payments, as there is an imitation of the internal currency, which speeds up the transfer procedure and minimizes the cost of conversion.^{[citation needed]}

In 2013, China initiated the creation of a new economic initiative – the «New silk road» or the Belt and Road Initiative. This project is designed primarily to strengthen economic ties and cooperation and to attract investors from Asia and other parts of the world to actively participate in the creation of the «silk road economic belt of the XXI century». The zone should extend from China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia, as it is an important transit logistical link between China and Europe, in which the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may play a significant role.^[43] In recent years, China and Russia have stepped up cooperation in the construction of cross-border infrastructure. New Eurasian transport routes are being built as well, including the «Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe» railway and the «Western Europe – Western China» route, which will pass through Russia. In northeast China and the Russian far East, both countries are actively promoting the construction of bridges, ports, and other projects. It is planned to increase the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia to $200 billion by the end of 2020.

Russia has also shown interest in cooperating with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The creation of the EAEU is posed to serve as an important platform for multilateral cooperation in the region, as all participants are friendly neighbors and partners with Russia, as well as traditional partners with China. Russia is interested in creating a free trade zone of the EAEU and China, as well as the use of the national currency in this region.^[44]

Following the implementation of international sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War, China provided economic relief to Russia.^[22] China’s total trade with Russia was a record $190 billion in 2022.^[45] In the same year, China accounted for 40% of Russia’s imports.^[46]

Trade in national currencies[edit]

On November 23, 2010, at a meeting of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, it was announced that Russia and China have decided to use their own national currencies for bilateral trade, instead of the U.S. dollar. The move was aimed to further improve the relations between Beijing and Moscow and to protect their domestic economies during the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The trading of the Chinese yuan against the Russian ruble started in the Chinese interbank market, while the yuan’s trading against the ruble started on the Russian foreign exchange market in December 2010.^[47][48]

In coordination with other emerging economies, the 2010 BRIC summit was held in Brasília in April 2010.

In 2014, Beijing and Moscow signed a 150 billion yuan central bank liquidity swap line agreement to avoid and counter American sanctions.^[49]

In December 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged to offer financial support to Russia and support the Ruble, if needed, in light of the currency’s depreciation.^[50]

Tourism & cultural exchanges[edit]

Tourism, especially from China to Russia, has seen a massive spike over the years. More than 2 million Chinese tourists visited Russia in 2019, compared to 158,000 a decade ago. China is one of the most important tourist markets for Russia. Support for cooperation between Russian and Chinese investment organizations in tourism industry is provided in the context of the Joint Action Plan by the Russian Federal Agency for Tourism and China’s State Administration of Tourism.^[51] More than 2.3 million Chinese tourists flew into Moscow’s Sheremetyevo – Alexander S. Pushkin international airport in 2019, including 1.26 million who transferred via the airport. Sheremetyevo, which offers flights to 29 Chinese cities served by eight Chinese airlines, expects their number to grow by 30 per cent a year in the years to come. Russia has played into this tourism boom by expanding capacity of Moscow’s largest airport. “Russia has also allowed more flights from regional Chinese air companies to Moscow, which helps to turn the Russian capital into an air hub for Europe-bound Chinese tourism.” Sheremetyevo is looking to capitalise on that growth. Pǔtōnghuà or standard Chinese is among the languages displayed on Sheremetyevo’s signs and announcements, while duty-free stores accept popular Chinese payment methods, including UnionPay cards and online systems WeChat Pay and Alipay. As many as 70 per cent of tax-free receipts handed out at Russia’s airports go to Chinese citizens. By 2019, Russia has become among the top 3 travel destinations for Chinese tourists.^[52]

Energy relations[edit]

Since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, energy relations between China and Russia have been generally marked by cooperation and regard for mutual geopolitical and strategic interests. China’s fast-growing economy places increasing pressure on itself to secure energy imports, while Russia’s economy is largely driven by the demand for the export of natural resources. China became a petroleum importer for the first time in 1993, had become the world’s second-largest oil-consuming country as of 2011, and the world’s largest overall energy consumer as of 2010.^[53][54] In a report released in January 2012, the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation estimated that the country’s crude oil consumption would increase to 480 million tonnes in 2012, or 9.6 million barrels per day. The group also forecast that natural gas consumption would rise 15.3 percent to 148.2 billion cubic meters (bcd).^[55] Given its geographical proximity to China and position as one of the world’s largest oil producers and natural gas exporters, Russia has been an obvious candidate for meeting this increased demand.^[56] While energy relations have primarily related to oil, gas, and coal, there have also been partnerships with regard to nuclear and renewable (wind and water) energy technology.^[57]

From the mid-1990s, when the tightening of global energy markets coincided with his rise to power, Russian President Vladimir Putin has signaled the importance of, oil and particularly natural gas, for Russia’s emergence as a global power.^[58] Long-term prospects for Russian gas exports to China will be affected by several global pricing trends.^[59] Surges in liquefied natural gas (LNG) capacity, the increasingly competitive nature of Central Asian gas supplies, advances in shale gas technology, and potential greenhouse gas policies may all impact Chinese consumption.^[60]

Despite frequent declarations of goodwill and bilateral energy cooperation, Chinese-Russian energy relations since 1991 have been limited by mutual suspicions, pricing concerns, inadequate transportation infrastructure, and competition for influence in Eurasia.^[61][62]

In 2014, Russia and China signed a 30-year gas deal worth $400 billion. Deliveries to China started in late 2019.^[64] The Power of Siberia pipeline is designed to reduce China’s dependence on coal, which is more carbon intensive and causes more pollution than natural gas.^[65] For Russia, the pipeline allows another economic partnership in the face of resistance to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.^[65] The proposed western gas route from Russia’s West Siberian petroleum basin to North-Western China is known as Power of Siberia 2 (Altai gas pipeline).^[66]

In 2022, China’s imports of discounts of up to 30% oil from Russia rose 55% in May, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s biggest oil provider in recent months.^[67][68]

History[edit]

The official relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation has been upgraded three times since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1991. Beginning as “good-neighborly and mutually beneficial” in December 1992, it evolved into a “constructive partnership” in September 1994, and finally a “strategic partnership of coordination” in April 1996.^[69] In September 1999, the two countries began joint construction of a nuclear power station at Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province with an installed capacity of 2 million kW, one of the first situations of mutual energy cooperation.^[70]

The late 1990s also marked the beginning of feasibility studies for natural gas and oil pipeline projects in Western and Eastern Siberia. In 2001, Russian company Yukos proposed the unprecedented Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) Oil Pipeline Project, which would link Yukos’s oil refinery in Angarsk to Daqing, in northern China.^[71] At the time, rail routes were the only means of transporting oil into the growing Chinese market. The project stalled in October 2003 when Yukos chief executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested on charges including tax evasion and fraud, and the Russian government launched an immediate investigation into the company.^[72][73] Many speculated that the series of events were politically motivated, given that Mr. Khodorkovsky had been a vocal opponent of President Putin.^[74] A week after Mr. Khodorkovsky’s arrest, China Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue publicly announced that the Kremlin investigation would not impact the proposed China-Russia oil pipeline project.^[75]

In September 2004, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov in Moscow, where the two heads of government signed agreements affirming Russia’s promise to set the route of a proposed pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific, with priority given to laying a pipeline spur to China, as well as increasing rail oil exports to China to 10 million tons (200,000 b/d) in 2005 and 15 million tons (300,000 b/d) in 2006.^[76] Four days before Wen’s visit, Yukos, then the largest supplier of Russian oil to China and Russia’s biggest oil producer, publicly announced that rail shipments of crude oil to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) would end beginning on September 28, 2004. The Kremlin had begun auctioning off the troubled company’s operating assets a month prior in August.^[77]

Gazprom, Soyuzneftegaz and the Chinese Embassy in Moscow all expressed interest in Yuganskneftegaz, a main arm of Yukos.^[78] The subsidiary was ultimately acquired by Russia’s state-owned oil company Rosneft for roughly $9.3 billion. In February 2005, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin revealed that Chinese banks provided $6 billion in financing the Rosneft acquisition. This financing was reportedly secured by long-term oil delivery contracts between Rosneft and the CNPC.^[79] In the same month, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied that China provided «funds» for the deal. The Foreign Ministry could not confirm whether there were any «loans» involved, ministry spokesman Kong Quan said.^[80]

State-owned Lukoil became China’s largest Russian oil supplier when CNPC reached a strategic cooperation agreement with the company in September 2006.^[81] As promised during Premier Wen’s visit to Moscow in 2004, construction on a direct pipeline spur to China began in March 2006, when CNPC signed an agreement providing state oil producer Transneft $400 million for constructing a pipeline from Skovorodino, about 70 km (43 mi) from the Chinese border. In the same month, CNPC agreed to a set of principles establishing future joint ventures with Rosneft.^[82][83]

In 2006, Gazprom was made responsible for all exports of gas from Russia’s eastern Siberian fields, outside of sales made through production sharing agreements (PSAs). This was another move widely seen to be politically motivated, since successful commercial development of these fields and export to Asian markets would be impossible without Gazprom – and therefore Kremlin – involvement.^[84][85] In an annual shareholder report two years prior, Gazprom acknowledged a plan for supplying natural gas to China. Two routes, roughly equal in capacity, would be constructed, with a total volume of 68 billion cubic meters of gas per annum. An Altai pipeline would link West Siberian fields with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China, while the eastern pipeline would run from Yakutia into northeastern China.^[86][87]

Chinese domestic natural gas consumption roughly matched domestic production in 2004. Since then, however, its rate of growth and more sustainable energy profile compared to oil inevitably led to a surge in Chinese natural gas imports.^[87] In March 2006, CNPC signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Gazprom for the delivery of natural gas to China, which officially began pricing negotiations between Gazprom chief executive Alexei Miller and Chen Geng, then head of the CNPC. In September 2007, the Russian Federation Industry and Energy Ministry approved a development plan for an integrated gas production, transportation, and supply system in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, taking into account potential gas exports to China and other Asia-Pacific countries. Gazprom was appointed by the Russian Government as the Eastern Gas Program execution coordinator.^[88]

Russia’s desire to diversify its export markets has been matched by China’s willingness to invest in Russian energy production and infrastructure. Russian policymakers, however, have expressed reserve about increased Chinese influence in the energy sector. In 2002, CNPC attempted to bid for Russian oil firm Slavneft, but withdrew just weeks later.^[89][90] International news sources suggested the bid failed partly due to anti-foreign sentiment in the Duma, Russia’s lower parliamentary house.^{[91][92][93][94]} Slavneft was privatized by parity owners TNK (later OAO TNK-BP) and Sibneft (later OAO Gazprom Neft) soon afterwards. In 2004, Slavneft was then acquired by TNK-BP, the product of a merger between the Alfa Access Renova Consortium (AAR, Alfa Group) and British Petroleum (BP).^[95] In 2006, Russia denied CNPC a significant stake in OAO Rosneft. When the Russian company went public, CNPC was allowed to purchase $500 million worth of shares, one-sixth of the $3 billion it had sought. The financial crisis triggered in 2008 gave China its opportunity to invest in Russia on a grander scale through a loans for oil program.^[96] In 2009 and 2010, China’s long-term energy-backed loans (EBL) extended large sums of capital to companies and entities not only in Russia, but also in Brazil, Ecuador, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.^[97][98]

Growing Chinese investment is speculated to be about more than energy security for China. Chinese news agency Xinhua reported in 2010 that many Chinese enterprises believe the Russian market will allow them to become truly global.^[99] Gao Jixiang, Associate Research Fellow of the Russian Economy Research Office of the Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, reported that China’s investments in Russia totaled $1.374 billion as of 2007, and were projected to reach $12 billion by 2020.^[100] In 2008–09 alone, total investments rose 25.4% to $2.24 billion and direct investment went from $240 million to $410 million.^[101]

2009 marked the 60th anniversary of established diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing, and also coincided with the signing of over 40 contracts worth roughly $3 billion.^{[citation needed]} Chinese leader Hu Jintao and President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia conferred three times in four days during mid-June at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Yekaterinburg, at the first-ever heads-of-state meeting of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), and again when Hu made a state visit to Moscow from June 16–18, representing what many saw to be a high-water mark in Chinese-Russian relations.^[102]

Growing economic closeness also seemed to suggest a growing political alliance. A joint statement released by the two heads of state expanded upon how the two governments usually pledge mutual support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Russian government explicitly affirmed that Tibet, along with Taiwan, are «inalienable parts of the Chinese territory», while the Chinese supported «Russia’s efforts in maintaining peace and stability in the region of Caucasus.»^[103] During Hu’s visit, however, Gazprom announced it could not begin delivering natural gas to China in 2011 as planned because of pricing disagreements. Construction of the Western Siberian Altai pipeline, which could deliver over 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to China, was originally scheduled to begin in 2008.^{[citation needed]}

September 27, 2010 marked the completion of the 1,000-kilometre (620 mi) Russia-China Crude Pipeline. Stretching from Russia’s Skovorodino station to China’s Mohe station, it was the first pipeline ever built between China and Russia.^[104] In April 2009, Rosneft and Transneft had signed deals with CNPC guaranteeing the pipeline’s production of 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day for twenty years as part of a $25 billion loan-for-oil agreement.^[105] Upon the pipeline’s completion in 2010, CNPC also signed a general agreement with Transneft over the operation of the pipeline, a framework agreement with Gazprom to import natural gas to China from 2015 onwards, an agreement with Rosneft on extending oil supply to the Russia-China Crude Pipeline, and an agreement with Lukoil on expanding strategic cooperation. Both sides hailed the series of agreements as a «new era» in cooperation, and Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin told reporters in Beijing that Russia was «ready to meet China’s full demand in gas» going forward.^[106]

In September 2010, President Putin reaffirmed the potential nuclear future of Russia and China’s energy relations, saying «Of course, our cooperation with China is not limited to just hydrocarbons … Russia is China’s main partner in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy, and equipment supplies here amount to billions of dollars».^[107] As of 2011, however, Russian officials have remained reluctant to transfer nuclear energy technologies and other knowledge products to Chinese partners. Industry experts have pointed out that while proprietary technology would protect Russian exports from being displaced by lower-cost Chinese products in third-party markets, such an approach may reinforce Chinese doubts about Russia’s reliability as a long-term energy partner.^[62]

The Russian oil industry has not only been burdened by corporate struggles such as with Yukos and political disagreements between the countries, but also by the reoccurring breaches in safety. Some difficulties stem from the Kazakh riots^[108] to endless environmental concerns,^{[109][110][111]} but most recently the capsizing of an oil platform that was allowed to operate in the north late in the season, while towed under adverse maritime conditions.^[112] Incidents such as these cannot help but give potential foreign investment, which the region needs, pause as to the reliability of Russian energy supplies.^{[according to whom?]}

Russian Far East (RFE)[edit]

In 1996, the Russian Federation completed two production sharing agreements (PSA) for oil and gas exploration off the northeast coast of the Sakhalin Islands. The Sakhalin-I project, operated by Exxon Neftegas Limited (ENL), has estimated potential recoverable reserves at 307 million tons of oil (2.3 billion bbn) and 485 billion cubic meters of gas as of 2002.^[113][114] ENL, a subsidiary of US-based ExxonMobil, holds a 30 percent interest in the project, while Rosneft holds 20 percent via its affiliates RN-Astra (8.5 percent) and Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf (11.5 percent). Japanese consortium SODECO and the Indian state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Ltd. holds the remaining 50 percent (30 and 20 percent, respectively).

The Sakhalin-II project is managed by the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. (Sakhalin Energy). As of 2011, Russian state monopoly Gazprom holds 50% plus 1 share, RoyalDutch Shell 27.5%, Mitsui 12.5% and Mitsubishi 10%.^[115] Gazprom purchased its majority stake from Sakhalin-2 operator Royal Dutch Shell in 2006. The project had been placed permanently on hold by environmental regulators, but moved forward after the sale.^[116] The series of events led to widespread speculation that environmental violations may have been used as a bargaining chip in the deal.^[117] Sakhalin-II consists of two 800-km pipelines running from the northeast of the island to Prigorodnoye (Prigorodnoe) in Aniva Bay at the southern end. The consortium built Russia’s first liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant at Prigorodnoye. Industry sources speculated that «some in Russia hope to sell China gas from Sakhalin-2’s or other facilities’ future LNG holdings now that it has mastered the technology».^[118]

In December 2003, CNPC and Sakhalin Energy signed a frame agreement on exploration and development in Russia’s Sakhalin oilfield.^[119] ExxonMobil also looked towards the Chinese market, making preliminary agreements on supplying Sakhalin-I gas to China as early as 2002. On November 2, 2004, CNPC began negotiations with ExxonMobil for possible long-term gas deliveries from Sakhalin-1.^[120] Negotiations were then concluded in October 2006, when Exxon and CNPC officially announced an agreement. Under the deal, Sakhalin-1 could sell up to 10 billion cubic meters of gas to China over 20 years by pipeline. The plan met strong opposition from Gazprom, which has a rival pipeline project and controls all Russian gas exports apart from sales through PSAs such as Sakhalin-1.^[121] In August 2006, Sakhalin-I’s De-Kastri oil terminal began exporting processed petroleum to markets including China, Japan, and South Korea.^[122]

The influence of Russia’s regional energy trade has led to a sense of local uneasiness about foreign countries’ influence in the sector. In 2000, President Putin warned a Siberian audience that unless Russia intensified the region’s development, the Russian Far East would end up speaking Chinese, Japanese and Korean.^[123][124] In 2002, the Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Vladimir Potapov, expressed serious concerns about the region’s combined remoteness, weak infrastructure, declining population, and wealth «in very diverse resources».^[125][126] Political figures like Viktor Ozerov, Chairman of the Federation Council’s Defense and Security Committee, warned of military threats in the Far East and decried the predatory use of the region’s resources, and large-scale illegal immigration, though scholars pointed out that no imminent threat was visible.^[127] Dmitri Trenin stated that, ‘the principal domestic reason is the situation of eastern Russia, especially East Siberia and the Russian Far East. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the territories have been going through a deep crisis. The former model of their development is inapplicable; a new model is yet to be devised and implemented. Meanwhile, the vast region has been going through depopulation, deindustrialization, and general degradation. … The quality of Moscow’s statesmanship will be tested by whether it can rise up to the challenge in the East.»^[128] The RFE has been one of the most difficult areas to transition between the structure of the Soviet Union and the still developing Russian state due to the lack of economic self-sufficiency in the region or any prospects of stable growth.

In September 2005, the Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref promised a doubling of state support for the RFE to $612 million in 2006, and the consideration of allocating a new $2.5 billion infrastructure fund for projects in the region.^[129] A year later, at the end of 2006, Putin reiterated that the socio-economic isolation of the RFE represented a threat to national security, and advocated yet another new socioeconomic commission and regional development strategy to be formed. He specifically pointed to the perceived threat of foreign immigration in the Far East.^[130] Scholars and regional experts have suggested that China’s rapid economic growth (especially relative to Russia’s GDP growth rate) lies at the root of anxieties concerning the RFE. While the Russian and Chinese economies were roughly the same size in 1993, China’s grew to over 3.5 times larger than Russia’s by 2008. Even since 1998, when Russia began a rapid economic recovery, China has grown at a faster rate; the gap has only widened since the global economic crisis and falling energy prices of the late 2000s. China’s growth has led to the creation of new productive capacity, whereas Russia’s recovery has been based largely on reutilizing Soviet-era capacity that had idled in the early 1990s.^[131][132]

Russian officials have repeatedly reiterated their opposition to being merely China’s natural resources storehouse.^[133] As early as 2001, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin warned that if Russia failed to become «a worthy economic partner» for Asia and the Pacific Rim, «China and the Southeast Asian countries will steamroll Siberia and the Far East.»^[134][135] At the start of his presidency in September 2008, Dmitri Medvedev echoed similar concerns, warning a Kamchatka audience that if Russia fails to develop the RFE, it could turn into a raw material base for more developed Asian countries and «unless we speed up our efforts, we can lose everything.»^[136][137] Regional experts have pointed out that despite these increasingly vocal concerns, the local economy of the RFE has become increasingly reliant on Chinese goods, services, and labor over the past decade; furthermore, local out-migration shows little sign of reversing. For all the early promises under Putin, Moscow’s policy towards the RFE has not seemed effective as of 2008.^[138]

Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow branch of the Carnegie Endowment has argued that Siberia’s development could become Russia’s most urgent challenge.^[139] Failure to develop the region into more than a raw material outpost could lead to what he calls a «Chinese takeover of the region, not by migration but rather by economic means of trade and tourism.»

Russia’s plans for this region have revolved around building energy infrastructure to leverage exports and attracting investment so that the capital will be available for modernizing regional infrastructure.^[140][141] These plans largely depend on foreign investments, which Russian companies have grudgingly acknowledged. In 2008, a consortium of Chinese engineering firms led by Harbin Turbine signed an agreement with Russian power producer OGK to produce coal-fired turbines in the RFE, adding 41,000 megawatts of new generating capacity by 2011. Stanislav Nevynitsyn, executive director of OGK, admitted, «It is simply a necessity for us to work with the Chinese – we will not get the capacity built otherwise.»^[142] Through loans to Russia’s Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs, Vnesheconombank (VEB), China became a major stockholder in Lukoil in 2009.^[143] In the same year, after having excluded foreign firms from bidding on the huge Udokan copper mine in Southeast Siberia, Moscow welcomed Chinese, South Korean, and Kazakh miners and refiners back into the bidding process.^[144][145]

As part of the ‘Russia’s Energy Strategy till 2020’ program, the Russian government launched a program of creating a unified gas production, transportation, and supply system in Eastern Siberia and the RFE in 2006. The program would ultimately provide affirmation of an all-Russia gas system from the Baltic Sea up to the Pacific Ocean.»^[146] Russian policymakers have also suggested building an international center for spent fuel and nuclear energy in the RFE, hoping to raise the profile in the export of nuclear energy to the global market.^[147]

In 2009, Gazprom was awarded subsurface licenses for the Kirinsky, Vostochno-Odoptinsky and Ayashsky blocks to begin the Sakhalin-III project.^[148] Geological exploration has been underway at the Kirinskoye field and, as of 2009, natural gas production is scheduled for 2014. The field will become one of the natural gas sources for the Sakhalin–Khabarovsk–Vladivostok gas transmission system (GTS). The first GTS start-up complex will be 1,350 km, with a capacity of 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year.^[149]

Central Asia[edit]

China and Russia generally cooperate with each other regarding Central Asia affairs.^[150] While they sometimes compete in Central Asia, those competitions are typically focused on economic matters and proceed in an orderly way within established norms.^[150] Where competition in Central Asia does occur between the two powers, it typically arises as a product of the circumstances rather than as an intentional effort to contain the other country.^[150]

In 1996, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan formed the Shanghai Five, a collaborative body that was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001.^[151] As members of the SCO, China and Russia have cooperated in military exercises, such as counterterrorism drills in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and similar exercises in Kazakhstan and China in 2003.^[152]

Russian and Chinese leaders regularly call for greater cooperation and coordination through the SCO between their two countries in the context of their broader goal of promoting multilateral diplomacy.^{[153][154][155]} In a joint statement issued on May 23, 2008, Russia and China asserted that “International security is comprehensive and inalienable, and some countries’ security cannot be guaranteed at the cost of some others’, including expanding military and political allies.”^[156] Zhao Huasheng, Director of Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University’s Shanghai Cooperation Center, has argued that economic cooperation will ensure the long-term relevance of the SCO, as current security threats recede.^[157] While China and Russia do enjoy some bilateral energy cooperation, which experts predict will continue to grow in the future, the two countries have emerged as rivals for Central Asian oil and gas supplies.^[158] With the rising oil prices in the mid-2000s, Russia has sought to renew its influence in Central Asia, in particular the region’s southern flank, to guarantee access to gas supplies for reexport to Europe and for its own domestic needs. As China’s energy needs have grown and its policymakers have sought to develop its western provinces, China, too, has sought to expand its influence in Central Asia.^[152]

In 2007, at a meeting of SCO prime ministers in Tashkent, Russian Premier Viktor Zubkov reiterated Moscow’s desire to forge a Central Asian energy «club» within the SCO, comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The SCO energy club could be set up as soon as 2008, Russian Deputy Industry and Energy Minister Ivan Materov announced in Tashkent. Materov insisted, however, that the club would not amount to a sort of mini-OPEC. Political and economic analysts in Moscow believe the Kremlin is keen to establish an energy club as a means to prevent a possible clash with China over Central Asia’s energy resources.^[159]

At a May 2007 SCO summit in Turkmenbashi, Russian, Kazakh and Turkmen leaders announced the expansion of the Prikaspiisky gas pipeline from Turkmenistan into Russia.^[160] The plan has stalled due to several obstacles, including price disagreements and the economic recession of the late 2000s.^[161][162]

Uncertainty over the Prikaspiisky route has given China an opening into the region, especially in Turkmenistan. During a brief visit to Ashgabat, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called for efforts «to step up bilateral trade cooperation to a new level.» Berdymukhamedov, in turn, expressed interest in «working closely» with China on a natural gas pipeline project, Xinhua News Agency reported. In December 2005, Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev inaugurated the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline to ship oil to China. The $800 million Atasu-Alashankou route still needs Russian crude oil from Western Siberia, transported via the Omsk-Pavlodar-Shymkent pipeline, to reach its full annual capacity of 20 million tons by 2010.^[163] Although China and its Central Asian partners view their expanding cooperation as a means of diversifying their energy partnerships, Russia has enjoyed success in other major energy projects. In November 2007, two Russian companies (TNK-BP and GazpromNeft) signed an agreement with KazTransOil to ship up to 5 million tons of oil annually to China via the Omsk-Pavlodar-Atasu-Alanshakou pipeline. In the first quarter of 2008, 300,000 tons of Russian crude oil were exported to China along this route.^[164] Moreover, a Russian engineering company, Stroytransgaz, won a tender to build Turkmenistan’s section of the gas pipeline to China.^[165]

China and Russia announced in May 2014 that they had reached a 30-year gas deal where «Russia would supply 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year to China».^[166] These developments continue to show Russia and China’s attempts to work together outside of USA confinements.

Military relations[edit]

After the EU arms embargo on China imposed as a consequence of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, China became a reliable client for Russian military exports, making up 25–50% of all foreign military sales.^[167] On November 9, 1993, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian signed a five-year defense cooperation agreement paving the way for an increase in the number of military attachés stationed in their respective capitals. On July 12, 1994, the Russian and Chinese defence ministers signed a border security agreement designed to prevent potentially dangerous military incidents, such as unintentional radar jamming and airspace violations. In December 1996, Russia finalized «the sale of SU-27 fighters and related production technology to China.»^[14]

On October 19, 1999, Defence Minister of China, General Chi Haotian, after meeting with Syrian Defence Minister Mustafa Tlass in Damascus, Syria to discuss expanding military ties between Syria and China, flew directly to Israel and met with Ehud Barak, the then Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Israel where they discussed military relations. Among the military arrangements was a $1 billion Israeli-Russian sale of military aircraft to China, which were to be jointly produced by Russia and Israel.^[168]

In 2004, the Russian Foreign Ministry blocked both the sale of the Su-35 and Tupolev Tu-22M bombers to China over concerns about the arrangements for Chinese production of the Sukhoi Su-27SK (known as the Shenyang J-11).^[169] Originally, the licensing agreement required that engines and avionics be sourced by Russian suppliers; however, by 2004 these components were being produced domestically.^{[citation needed]}

Currently, China focuses on domestic weapon designs and manufacturing, while still importing certain military products from Russia, such as jet engines. China sought to become independent in its defence sector and become competitive in global arms markets; its defence sector is rapidly developing and maturing. Gaps in certain capabilities remain, including development of electronic and reliable propulsion systems, although China’s defense industry production has improved significantly, providing an advantage over other militaries in the Asia-Pacific region.^[170] China’s 2015 Defense White Paper called for «independent innovation» and the «sustainable development» of advanced weaponry and equipment.^[170]

In September 2018, Russia hosted the militaries of China and Mongolia as a part of the Vostok 2018 military exercise to improve ties between the countries, making them the first two countries outside of the former Soviet Union to join the exercise.^[171][172]

In December 2019, Rostec officials accused China of intellectual property theft of a range of military technologies.^[173] In June 2020, Russia charged one of its Arctic scientists of passing sensitive information to China.^[174]

In July 2019, and again in December 2020, Russia and China flew joint bomber patrols over the Pacific.^[175][176]

In November 2022, Russian and Chinese warplanes including the Tupolev-95 and XIAN H-6K long range strategic bombers conducted joint patrols over the Sea of Japan and East China sea.^[177]

As early as February 2022, according to US authorities, Russia asked China for advanced military weaponry, in particular, armed drones for use in their invasion of Ukraine.^[178][179] China and Russia have both denied these allegations.^[180]

Media communication agreements[edit]

In March 2013, the Voice of Russia and the People’s Daily Online signed a news sharing agreement as Xi and Putin presided.^[181][182] On October 13, 2014, Russia Today and the People’s Daily signed a cooperation agreement.^[182] In July 2021, the Russian-Chinese Commission for Humanitarian Cooperation agreed to mass-media cooperation.^[183][184]

Mutual perceptions[edit]

Since 1995, Russians have consistently held positive views of China. As of September 2022, 88% of Russians surveyed by the Levada Center view China favorably, with only 5% expressing a negative opinion.^[185]

According to a 2017 BBC World Service poll, 74% of the Chinese view Russia’s influence positively, with 18% expressing a negative view, while 44% of Russians view China’s influence positively and 23% negatively.^[186]

According to a 2019 survey by the Pew Research Center, 71% of Russians have a favorable view of China, with 18% expressing an unfavorable view.^[187] A YouGov survey conducted in the same year found that 71% of the Chinese think Russia has a positive effect on world affairs, while 15% view it negatively.^[188]

During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, many social media users in China showed sympathy for Russian narratives due in part to distrust of US foreign policy.^[189][190] Chinese company NetEase has published videos critical of Russia from Chinese in Ukraine and Ukrainians in China.^[191][192]

According to a Genron NPO poll released in November 2022 asking about Chinese peoples’ views on the Russian invasion, 39.5% of respondents said the Russian actions «are not wrong», 21.5% said «the Russian actions are a violation of the U.N. Charter and international laws, and should be opposed», and 29% said «the Russian actions are wrong, but the circumstances should be considered.»^[193][194]

See also[edit]

• Foreign relations of China
• Foreign relations of Russia
• Embassy of China, Moscow
• Ambassadors of China to Russia
• Ambassadors of Russia to China
• China–Soviet Union relations
• Russia–Taiwan relations
• History of Sino-Russian relations
• Russia’s turn to the East

Notes[edit]

References[edit]

Further reading[edit]

• Bernstein, Thomas P. and Hua-Yu Li, eds. China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present (2010).
• Blank, Stephen. «Is Russia a great power in Asia?.» in Great Powers and Geopolitics (Springer, Cham, 2015) pp. 161–182. online
• Blank, Stephen. «Russo-Chinese relations in strategic perspective.» in International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier (Palgrave, Singapore, 2018) pp. 93–108.
• Blank, Stephen, and Younkyoo Kim. «Does Russo-Chinese partnership threaten America’s interests in Asia?.» Orbis 60.1 (2016): 112–127.
• Contessi, Nicola P. «China, Russia and the Leadership of the SCO: A Tacit Deal Scenario» China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 8, 4 (2010): 101–123.
• Efremenko D. «New Russian Government’s Foreign Policy towards East Asia and the Pacific» Journal of East Asian Affairs (2012) 26#2 (Seoul: Institute for National Security ) metaCode=en_m_pub&boardId=a57b3ef8b2bff73bb9e00084&pkey=1 online
• Fravel, M. Taylor. Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton University Press, 2019) online reviews
• Garver, John W. Foreign relations of the People’s Republic of China (1992) online
• Herbst, John. «The Coming Russian-Chinese Clash» The National Interest Aug. 21, 2020.
• Hsu, Jing-Yun, and Jenn-Jaw Soong. «Development of China-Russia Relations (1949–2011) Limits, Opportunities, and Economic Ties.» Chinese economy 47.3 (2014): 70–87. online
• Jersild, Austin. The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (U of North Carolina Press, 2014).
• Kim, Younkyoo, and Stephen Blank. «Rethinking Russo-Chinese Relations in Asia: Beyond Russia’s Chinese Dilemma.» China: An International Journal(2013) 11#3 pp: 136–148. online
• Kim, Younkyoo; Indeo, Fabio (2013). «The new great game in Central Asia post 2014: The US «New Silk Road» strategy and Sino-Russian rivalry». Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 46 (2): 275–286. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2013.03.005.
• Korolev, Alexander. «The Strategic Alignment between Russia and China: Myths and Reality.» Singapore: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper #15–19 (2015). online
• Kuliabin A. Semine S. Russia — a counterbalancing agent to the Asia. Zavtra Rossii, #28, 17 July 1997. RUSSIA IN THE PACIFIC REGION SYSTEM:
• March, G. Patrick. Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific (1996) online
• Marsh, Christopher. Unparalleled Reforms. China’s Rise, Russia’s Fall and the Interdependence of Transition (2005).
• Maxwell. Neville. «How the Sino-Russian boundary conflict was finally settled: From Nerchinsk 1689 to Vladivostok 2005 via Zhenbao Island 1969.» Critical Asian Studies 39.2 (2007): 229–253. online
• Moshes, Arkady and Matti Nojonen, eds. Russia-China relations: Current state, alternative futures, and implications for the West FIIA Report 30, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (September 2011)
• Nye, Joseph. «A New Sino-Russian Alliance?» Project Syndicate 12 January 2015
• Quested, Rosemary K.I. Sino-Russian relations: a short history (Routledge, 2014) online
• Rozman, Gilbert. The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East versus West in the 2010s (2014) online review
• Rozman, Gilbert. The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985 (Princeton UP, 1987).
• Rozman, Gilbert and Sergey Radchenko, eds. International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier (Palgrave, Singapore, 2018) excerpt
• Shen, Zhihua. A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991 (Springer Singapore;Palgrave Macmillan, 2020)
• Tian, Hao. «Sino-Russian Relations: Conflict and Cooperation.» (Lehigh University, 2016), bibliography pp 55–60; online
• Trenin, Dmitri. Challenges and Opportunities: Russia and the Rise of China and India in Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers – China and India (September 2011)
• Urbansky, Sören. Beyond the Steppe Frontier: A History of the Sino-Russian Border (2020) a comprehensive history; excerpt
• Weitz, Richard. China-Russia security relations: strategic parallelism without partnership or passion? (Maroon Ebooks, 2015)
• Wishnick, Elizabeth. Mending Fences. The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (2001)
• Zubok, Vladislav. «The Soviet Union and China in the 1980s: reconciliation and divorce.» Cold War History 17.2 (2017): 121–141.

«Sino-Russian relations since 1991» redirects here. For the state of Sino-Russian relations before 1991, see History of Sino-Russian relations.

China–Russia relations

Russia	China
Diplomatic mission
Russian Embassy, Beijing	Chinese Embassy, Moscow
Envoy
Ambassador Igor Morgulov	Ambassador Zhang Hanhui

China–Russia relations, are the international relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Diplomatic relations between China and Russia improved after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991.^[a] American scholar Joseph Nye states:

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that de facto US-China alliance ended, and a China–Russia rapprochement began. In 1992, the two countries declared that they were pursuing a «constructive partnership»; in 1996, they progressed toward a «strategic partnership»; and in 2001, they signed a treaty of «friendship and cooperation.»^[2]

The two countries share a land border which was demarcated in 1991, and they signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001, which was renewed in June 2021 for five more years.^[3] On the eve of a 2013 state visit to Moscow by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked that the two nations were forging a special relationship.^[4] The two countries have enjoyed close relations militarily, economically, and politically, while supporting each other on various global issues.^[5][6][7] Commentators have debated whether the bilateral strategic partnership constitutes an alliance.^[8][9][10] Russia and China officially declared their relations ‘Not allies, but better than allies’.^[11]

Country comparison[edit]

Common name	China	Russia
Official name	People’s Republic of China	Russian Federation
Flag
Coat of arms
Area	9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi) (including Hong Kong and Macao)	17,125,191 km2 (6,612,073 sq mi) (including the Crimean Peninsula)
Population	1,418,669,490	146,793,744
Population density	145/km2 (375.5/sq mi)	8.4/km2 (21.8/sq mi)
Capital	Beijing	Moscow
Largest city	Shanghai (26,317,104)	Moscow (~12.5 million)
Government	Unitary one-party socialist republic	Federal semi-presidential republic
First leader	CCP Chairman Mao Zedong	President Boris Yeltsin
Current leaders	CCP General Secretary & President Xi Jinping Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang	President Vladimir Putin Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin
Established	1 October 1949 (Proclamation of the People’s Republic) 4 December 1982 (current constitution)	25 December 1991 (Russian Federation formed) 26 December 1991 (Soviet Union dissolved)
Official languages	Standard Chinese	Russian
Currency	Renminbi	Russian ruble
GDP (nominal)	$19.911 trillion (2022)	$2.133 trillion (2022)
External debt (nominal)	$1.843 trillion (2018 Q4)	$539.6 billion (2017)
GDP (PPP)	$30.177 trillion (2022)	$4.365 trillion (2022)
GDP (nominal) per capita	$12,970 (2022)	$14,665 (2022)
GDP (PPP) per capita	$21,364 (2022)	$31,967 (2022)
Human Development Index	0.768 (high)	0.822 (very high)
Expatriates	~75,631 Russians in China	~200,000–400,000 Chinese in Russia
Foreign exchange reserves	3,088,000 (millions of USD)	126,026 (millions of USD)
Military expenditures	$228.0 billion (1.9% of GDP) (2018)	$61.0 billion (3.1% of GDP) (2018)
Military personnel	(0.23% of population) 2,000,000 (active) 14,510,000 (reserve) 18,660,000 (paramilitary)	(4.09% of population) 1,413,628 (active) 2,572,500 (reserve) 0 (paramilitary)
Nuclear warheads	350[12]	4500[12]

• Leaders of China and Russia from 1991
  • General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
  • President of the Russian Federation

History[edit]

The relations between China and Russia go back to the 17th-century, when the Qing dynasty tried to drive Russian settlers out of Manchuria, ended by the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. During the Cold War, China and the USSR were rivals after the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, competing for control of the worldwide Communist movement. There was a serious possibility of a major war between the two nations in the early 1960s; a brief border war took place in 1969. This enmity began to lessen after the death of Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, but relations were poor until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

On December 23, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin made his first official visit to China, where he met with CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin and Chinese president Yang Shangkun.^[13] In December 1996, at the end of Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to Moscow, Russia and China issued a joint communique pledging to build an «equal and reliable partnership.»^[14] This reinforced the China-Russian view that the United States was their main competitor in the global political scene.

In 2001, the close relations between the two countries were formalized with the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, a twenty-year strategic, economic, and – controversially and arguably – an implicit military treaty. A month before the treaty was signed, the two countries joined with junior partners Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Still active as of 2022, the organization is expected to counter the growing influence of the United States military outreach program in Central Asia. The PRC is currently a key purchaser and licensee of Russian military equipment, some of which have been instrumental in the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army. The PRC is also a main beneficiary of the Russian Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline.

When China attempted to build closer relations with Russia in 2013, the Russian government initially had reservations.^[15] However, the United States sanctions against Russia for its 2014 annexation of Crimea helped push Russia to a warmer relationship with China.^[15]

Liam Carson, an emerging European economist at Capital Economics, said in 2019:

Policymakers in both countries have actively tried to strengthen trade ties in recent years. And it’s no coincidence that this surge in Russia-China trade has come at the same time that the US has tightened sanctions on Russia and concerns about the US-China trade war have intensified.^[16]

By 2019, both nations had serious grievances with the United States. For China, the issues were control of the South China Sea, trade policies, and technology policy. For Russia, the main issue was severe economic penalties imposed by the U.S. and Europe to punish its seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. China and Russia do, however, differ on some policies. China does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and Russia does not support China’s claims in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, China and Russia currently enjoy the best relations they have had since the late 1950s. Although they have no formal alliance, the two countries do have an informal agreement to coordinate diplomatic and economic moves, and build up an alliance against the United States.^[17][18] Yaroslav Trofimov, the chief foreign-affairs correspondent of The Wall Street Journal, argued in 2019:

Though there is no overt ideological alignment between Russia and China today, the two governments share a hostility to dissent, deep suspicion of Western interference and a strong desire to impose tighter controls over their own societies. Mr. Xi has presided over a push to stamp out corruption and bolster the Communist party’s role in the economy and the society at large—a campaign akin to Mr. Putin’s earlier effort to tame Russian oligarchs and crush political opposition. China was inspired by Russia’s legislation cracking down on nongovernmental organizations, while Russian officials have expressed admiration for China’s comprehensive internet censorship and “social credit” plan to rank citizens based on their loyalty and behavior.^[19]

Russian invasion of Ukraine[edit]

Xi and Putin met on February 4, 2022, during the run up to the 2022 Beijing Olympics during the massive Russian build-up of force on the Ukrainian border, with the two expressing that the two countries are nearly united in their anti-US alignment and that both nations shared «no limits» to their commitments.^[20][21] Western Intelligence reports said that China had asked Russia to wait to invade Ukraine until after the Beijing Olympics ended on February 20.^[21] Shortly before the invasion, Chinese media would repeat Russian statements that Russia’s troops were being pulled away from the border with Ukraine.^[22]

On February 22, two days prior to the invasion of Ukraine, a leaked post The Beijing News‘ Horizon News on Weibo detailed instructions on how to report on a crisis in Ukraine; the post asked editors to monitor unfavorable comments, to only use tags shared by Chinese state media and stated «Do not post anything unfavorable to Russia or pro-Western. Let me review your words before posting».^[22][23] On February 25, 2022, one day following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Putin told Xi during a phone call that Russia is eager to engage in high-level negotiations with Ukraine, according to China’s foreign ministry.^[24]

China refused to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, repeated Russian propaganda about the war, opposed economic sanctions against Russia, and abstained or sided with Russia in UN votes on the war in Ukraine.^[25]

In 2022, Russia added Taiwan to a list of foreign states and territories that commit «unfriendly actions» against its military invasion of Ukraine.^[26] Chinese leader Xi Jinping has assured Vladimir Putin of China’s support on Russian “sovereignty and security” in May.^[27][28]

In April 2022, in an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov, who is considered close to Vladimir Putin, said that Russia «will be more integrated and more dependent on China», further stating that «Chinese are our close allies and friends and the biggest source of Russian strength after Russian people themselves.»^[29]

In June 2022, Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping had a call with Putin where he reaffirmed support for Russia on security issues while saying that «all parties should responsibly push for a proper settlement of the Ukraine crisis».^[30][31]

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that China has the economic leverage to pressure Putin to end the war, adding «I’m sure that without the Chinese market for the Russian Federation, Russia would be feeling complete economic isolation. That’s something that China can do – to limit the trade [with Russia] until the war is over.» In August 2022, Zelenskyy said that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping had refused all his requests for direct talks with him.^[32]

Border[edit]

On May 29, 1994, during the visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Beijing, Russian and Chinese officials signed an agreement on the Sino-Russian Border Management System intended to facilitate border trade and hinder criminal activity.^[13] On September 3 of that year, a demarcation agreement was signed, fixing the boundary along a previously–disputed 55-km stretch of the western Sino-Russian border. After the final demarcation carried out in the early 2000s, it measures 4,209.3 kilometres (2,615.5 mi), and is the world’s sixth-longest international border.^[33]

The 2004 Complementary Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Eastern Section of the China–Russia Boundary^[34] stated that Russia agrees to transfer a part of Abagaitu Islet, all of Yinlong (Tarabarov) Island, about a half of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island, along with some adjacent islets, to China. A border dispute between Russia and China, standing since Japanese invasion of Manchuria of 1931, was thus resolved. These Amur River islands were, until then, administered by Russia and claimed by China. The event was meant to foster feelings of reconciliation and cooperation between the two countries by their leaders. The transfer has been ratified by both the Chinese National People’s Congress and the Russian State Duma. The official transfer ceremony occurred on-site on October 14, 2008.

Rival claims over Vladivostok settled[edit]

In 2005, Beijing and Moscow ratified an agreement that ended more than three and half centuries of their struggle over territory and for dominance.^[35]

Economic relations[edit]

This article needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (September 2021)

Economic relations between Russia and China demonstrate mixed trends. Trade between the two countries was running between $5 billion and $8 billion per year in the 1990s, but grew steadily from then onwards. It was on course to hit $100 billion – the previous goal – until the 2008 crisis interceded. Trade slumped back to around $60 billion in 2015 and 2016 but started to recover again in 2017.^[36] Both countries are expecting to raise the trade volume to $200 billion by 2024.^[37]

Between 2008 and 2009, when Russia experienced a financial crisis, there was a sharp increase in borrowing from China. This trend, however, did not last. Starting in 2013, borrowing started to grow steadily.^[38]

The main form of cooperation in the complex economic relations between Russia and China is trade. From 2003 until 2013, mutual trade increased 7.7 times; in 2014 the scale of bilateral operations increased even more. The aggravation of relations between Russia and Western countries contributed to the expansion of economic ties with China. By 2020, the parties planned to increase bilateral trade to $200 billion. According to the Federal Сustoms Service (FCS) of the Russian Federation, in 2016 the foreign trade turnover of Russia and China amounted to $66.1 billion (in 2015 – $63.6 billion). Russia has a negative trade balance with China: in 2016 exports amounted to 28 billion, whereas imports totaled 38.1 billion (in 2015, 28.6 and 35.9 billion, resoectively). The share of China in foreign trade with Russia grew from 12.1% in 2015 to 14.1% in 2016. Since 2010, China is the largest trading partner of Russia.^[39]

Most of Russia’s exports to China originate from the mining and petrochemicals sectors.^[40] More than half of Russia’s exports to China come from mineral fuels, oil, and petroleum products (60.7%), followed by wood and wood products (9.4%), non-ferrous metals (9%), fish and seafood (3.5%), and chemical products (3.3%). The main categories of imports to Russia from China are machinery and equipment (35.9%), clothing (13.7%), chemical products (9.1%), fur and fur products (5.6%), footwear (5.3%), and furniture (3%). According to the General Сustoms Administration of China, bilateral trade in January–May 2017 increased by 26.1% in annual terms, amounting to $32.3 billion, and mutual trade in 2017 may exceed $80 billion According to the Ministry of Commerce of China, as of January 1, 2016, the volume of accumulated direct Russian investments in China amounted to $946.9 million and Chinese investments totaled ten times more, estimated at $8.94 billion.^[39]

Participation in such organizations as BRICS and RIC (Russia-India-China) has significant importance for Russian-Chinese economic relations. At the Russian-Chinese summit held in Shanghai^[when?], Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping stressed that «Russia and China stand for the transformation of BRICS into a mechanism of cooperation and coordination on a wide range of global financial, economic and international political problems, including the establishment of a closer economic partnership, the early establishment of the BRICS development Bank and the formation of a; for the expansion of joint efforts of representation and voting rights of States with emerging markets and developing countries in the system of global economic governance, for the formation of an open world economy; for the deepening of cooperation in the field of foreign policy, including in the settlement of regional conflicts».^[41]

To facilitate financial transactions in the regions, China and Russia will conduct a currency swap. Central banks, with whom China has signed currency swaps, are able to issue loans to their banks in yuan. A currency swap agreement was signed with Russia in the amount of 150 billion yuan ($25 billion). Currency swaps will make the ruble and the yuan more stable, which in turn will have a positive impact on the stability of the global financial system. Additionally, the expansion of currency trading may facilitate investment processes. By investing in an economy that is now facing certain problems due to the fall of the ruble and oil prices, China is carrying out soft expansion and supports one of its main partners. China and Russia have long advocated reducing the role of the dollar in international trade, and both aim to create conditions for the development of bilateral trade and mutual investment. The rate of de-dollarization chosen by the countries is due to the rapid growth of the RMB’s share in international payments and settlements (Oct. 2013. – 0.84%, Dec. 2014. – 2.17%, Feb. 2015. – 1.81%).^[42] The conclusion of a currency swap makes it possible to facilitate payments, as there is an imitation of the internal currency, which speeds up the transfer procedure and minimizes the cost of conversion.^{[citation needed]}

In 2013, China initiated the creation of a new economic initiative – the «New silk road» or the Belt and Road Initiative. This project is designed primarily to strengthen economic ties and cooperation and to attract investors from Asia and other parts of the world to actively participate in the creation of the «silk road economic belt of the XXI century». The zone should extend from China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia, as it is an important transit logistical link between China and Europe, in which the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may play a significant role.^[43] In recent years, China and Russia have stepped up cooperation in the construction of cross-border infrastructure. New Eurasian transport routes are being built as well, including the «Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe» railway and the «Western Europe – Western China» route, which will pass through Russia. In northeast China and the Russian far East, both countries are actively promoting the construction of bridges, ports, and other projects. It is planned to increase the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia to $200 billion by the end of 2020.

Russia has also shown interest in cooperating with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The creation of the EAEU is posed to serve as an important platform for multilateral cooperation in the region, as all participants are friendly neighbors and partners with Russia, as well as traditional partners with China. Russia is interested in creating a free trade zone of the EAEU and China, as well as the use of the national currency in this region.^[44]

Following the implementation of international sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War, China provided economic relief to Russia.^[22] China’s total trade with Russia was a record $190 billion in 2022.^[45] In the same year, China accounted for 40% of Russia’s imports.^[46]

Trade in national currencies[edit]

On November 23, 2010, at a meeting of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, it was announced that Russia and China have decided to use their own national currencies for bilateral trade, instead of the U.S. dollar. The move was aimed to further improve the relations between Beijing and Moscow and to protect their domestic economies during the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The trading of the Chinese yuan against the Russian ruble started in the Chinese interbank market, while the yuan’s trading against the ruble started on the Russian foreign exchange market in December 2010.^[47][48]

In coordination with other emerging economies, the 2010 BRIC summit was held in Brasília in April 2010.

In 2014, Beijing and Moscow signed a 150 billion yuan central bank liquidity swap line agreement to avoid and counter American sanctions.^[49]

In December 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged to offer financial support to Russia and support the Ruble, if needed, in light of the currency’s depreciation.^[50]

Tourism & cultural exchanges[edit]

Tourism, especially from China to Russia, has seen a massive spike over the years. More than 2 million Chinese tourists visited Russia in 2019, compared to 158,000 a decade ago. China is one of the most important tourist markets for Russia. Support for cooperation between Russian and Chinese investment organizations in tourism industry is provided in the context of the Joint Action Plan by the Russian Federal Agency for Tourism and China’s State Administration of Tourism.^[51] More than 2.3 million Chinese tourists flew into Moscow’s Sheremetyevo – Alexander S. Pushkin international airport in 2019, including 1.26 million who transferred via the airport. Sheremetyevo, which offers flights to 29 Chinese cities served by eight Chinese airlines, expects their number to grow by 30 per cent a year in the years to come. Russia has played into this tourism boom by expanding capacity of Moscow’s largest airport. “Russia has also allowed more flights from regional Chinese air companies to Moscow, which helps to turn the Russian capital into an air hub for Europe-bound Chinese tourism.” Sheremetyevo is looking to capitalise on that growth. Pǔtōnghuà or standard Chinese is among the languages displayed on Sheremetyevo’s signs and announcements, while duty-free stores accept popular Chinese payment methods, including UnionPay cards and online systems WeChat Pay and Alipay. As many as 70 per cent of tax-free receipts handed out at Russia’s airports go to Chinese citizens. By 2019, Russia has become among the top 3 travel destinations for Chinese tourists.^[52]

Energy relations[edit]

Since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, energy relations between China and Russia have been generally marked by cooperation and regard for mutual geopolitical and strategic interests. China’s fast-growing economy places increasing pressure on itself to secure energy imports, while Russia’s economy is largely driven by the demand for the export of natural resources. China became a petroleum importer for the first time in 1993, had become the world’s second-largest oil-consuming country as of 2011, and the world’s largest overall energy consumer as of 2010.^[53][54] In a report released in January 2012, the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation estimated that the country’s crude oil consumption would increase to 480 million tonnes in 2012, or 9.6 million barrels per day. The group also forecast that natural gas consumption would rise 15.3 percent to 148.2 billion cubic meters (bcd).^[55] Given its geographical proximity to China and position as one of the world’s largest oil producers and natural gas exporters, Russia has been an obvious candidate for meeting this increased demand.^[56] While energy relations have primarily related to oil, gas, and coal, there have also been partnerships with regard to nuclear and renewable (wind and water) energy technology.^[57]

From the mid-1990s, when the tightening of global energy markets coincided with his rise to power, Russian President Vladimir Putin has signaled the importance of, oil and particularly natural gas, for Russia’s emergence as a global power.^[58] Long-term prospects for Russian gas exports to China will be affected by several global pricing trends.^[59] Surges in liquefied natural gas (LNG) capacity, the increasingly competitive nature of Central Asian gas supplies, advances in shale gas technology, and potential greenhouse gas policies may all impact Chinese consumption.^[60]

Despite frequent declarations of goodwill and bilateral energy cooperation, Chinese-Russian energy relations since 1991 have been limited by mutual suspicions, pricing concerns, inadequate transportation infrastructure, and competition for influence in Eurasia.^[61][62]

In 2014, Russia and China signed a 30-year gas deal worth $400 billion. Deliveries to China started in late 2019.^[64] The Power of Siberia pipeline is designed to reduce China’s dependence on coal, which is more carbon intensive and causes more pollution than natural gas.^[65] For Russia, the pipeline allows another economic partnership in the face of resistance to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.^[65] The proposed western gas route from Russia’s West Siberian petroleum basin to North-Western China is known as Power of Siberia 2 (Altai gas pipeline).^[66]

In 2022, China’s imports of discounts of up to 30% oil from Russia rose 55% in May, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s biggest oil provider in recent months.^[67][68]

History[edit]

The official relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation has been upgraded three times since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1991. Beginning as “good-neighborly and mutually beneficial” in December 1992, it evolved into a “constructive partnership” in September 1994, and finally a “strategic partnership of coordination” in April 1996.^[69] In September 1999, the two countries began joint construction of a nuclear power station at Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province with an installed capacity of 2 million kW, one of the first situations of mutual energy cooperation.^[70]

The late 1990s also marked the beginning of feasibility studies for natural gas and oil pipeline projects in Western and Eastern Siberia. In 2001, Russian company Yukos proposed the unprecedented Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) Oil Pipeline Project, which would link Yukos’s oil refinery in Angarsk to Daqing, in northern China.^[71] At the time, rail routes were the only means of transporting oil into the growing Chinese market. The project stalled in October 2003 when Yukos chief executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested on charges including tax evasion and fraud, and the Russian government launched an immediate investigation into the company.^[72][73] Many speculated that the series of events were politically motivated, given that Mr. Khodorkovsky had been a vocal opponent of President Putin.^[74] A week after Mr. Khodorkovsky’s arrest, China Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue publicly announced that the Kremlin investigation would not impact the proposed China-Russia oil pipeline project.^[75]

In September 2004, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov in Moscow, where the two heads of government signed agreements affirming Russia’s promise to set the route of a proposed pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific, with priority given to laying a pipeline spur to China, as well as increasing rail oil exports to China to 10 million tons (200,000 b/d) in 2005 and 15 million tons (300,000 b/d) in 2006.^[76] Four days before Wen’s visit, Yukos, then the largest supplier of Russian oil to China and Russia’s biggest oil producer, publicly announced that rail shipments of crude oil to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) would end beginning on September 28, 2004. The Kremlin had begun auctioning off the troubled company’s operating assets a month prior in August.^[77]

Gazprom, Soyuzneftegaz and the Chinese Embassy in Moscow all expressed interest in Yuganskneftegaz, a main arm of Yukos.^[78] The subsidiary was ultimately acquired by Russia’s state-owned oil company Rosneft for roughly $9.3 billion. In February 2005, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin revealed that Chinese banks provided $6 billion in financing the Rosneft acquisition. This financing was reportedly secured by long-term oil delivery contracts between Rosneft and the CNPC.^[79] In the same month, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied that China provided «funds» for the deal. The Foreign Ministry could not confirm whether there were any «loans» involved, ministry spokesman Kong Quan said.^[80]

State-owned Lukoil became China’s largest Russian oil supplier when CNPC reached a strategic cooperation agreement with the company in September 2006.^[81] As promised during Premier Wen’s visit to Moscow in 2004, construction on a direct pipeline spur to China began in March 2006, when CNPC signed an agreement providing state oil producer Transneft $400 million for constructing a pipeline from Skovorodino, about 70 km (43 mi) from the Chinese border. In the same month, CNPC agreed to a set of principles establishing future joint ventures with Rosneft.^[82][83]

In 2006, Gazprom was made responsible for all exports of gas from Russia’s eastern Siberian fields, outside of sales made through production sharing agreements (PSAs). This was another move widely seen to be politically motivated, since successful commercial development of these fields and export to Asian markets would be impossible without Gazprom – and therefore Kremlin – involvement.^[84][85] In an annual shareholder report two years prior, Gazprom acknowledged a plan for supplying natural gas to China. Two routes, roughly equal in capacity, would be constructed, with a total volume of 68 billion cubic meters of gas per annum. An Altai pipeline would link West Siberian fields with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China, while the eastern pipeline would run from Yakutia into northeastern China.^[86][87]

Chinese domestic natural gas consumption roughly matched domestic production in 2004. Since then, however, its rate of growth and more sustainable energy profile compared to oil inevitably led to a surge in Chinese natural gas imports.^[87] In March 2006, CNPC signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Gazprom for the delivery of natural gas to China, which officially began pricing negotiations between Gazprom chief executive Alexei Miller and Chen Geng, then head of the CNPC. In September 2007, the Russian Federation Industry and Energy Ministry approved a development plan for an integrated gas production, transportation, and supply system in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, taking into account potential gas exports to China and other Asia-Pacific countries. Gazprom was appointed by the Russian Government as the Eastern Gas Program execution coordinator.^[88]

Russia’s desire to diversify its export markets has been matched by China’s willingness to invest in Russian energy production and infrastructure. Russian policymakers, however, have expressed reserve about increased Chinese influence in the energy sector. In 2002, CNPC attempted to bid for Russian oil firm Slavneft, but withdrew just weeks later.^[89][90] International news sources suggested the bid failed partly due to anti-foreign sentiment in the Duma, Russia’s lower parliamentary house.^{[91][92][93][94]} Slavneft was privatized by parity owners TNK (later OAO TNK-BP) and Sibneft (later OAO Gazprom Neft) soon afterwards. In 2004, Slavneft was then acquired by TNK-BP, the product of a merger between the Alfa Access Renova Consortium (AAR, Alfa Group) and British Petroleum (BP).^[95] In 2006, Russia denied CNPC a significant stake in OAO Rosneft. When the Russian company went public, CNPC was allowed to purchase $500 million worth of shares, one-sixth of the $3 billion it had sought. The financial crisis triggered in 2008 gave China its opportunity to invest in Russia on a grander scale through a loans for oil program.^[96] In 2009 and 2010, China’s long-term energy-backed loans (EBL) extended large sums of capital to companies and entities not only in Russia, but also in Brazil, Ecuador, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.^[97][98]

Growing Chinese investment is speculated to be about more than energy security for China. Chinese news agency Xinhua reported in 2010 that many Chinese enterprises believe the Russian market will allow them to become truly global.^[99] Gao Jixiang, Associate Research Fellow of the Russian Economy Research Office of the Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, reported that China’s investments in Russia totaled $1.374 billion as of 2007, and were projected to reach $12 billion by 2020.^[100] In 2008–09 alone, total investments rose 25.4% to $2.24 billion and direct investment went from $240 million to $410 million.^[101]

2009 marked the 60th anniversary of established diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing, and also coincided with the signing of over 40 contracts worth roughly $3 billion.^{[citation needed]} Chinese leader Hu Jintao and President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia conferred three times in four days during mid-June at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Yekaterinburg, at the first-ever heads-of-state meeting of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), and again when Hu made a state visit to Moscow from June 16–18, representing what many saw to be a high-water mark in Chinese-Russian relations.^[102]

Growing economic closeness also seemed to suggest a growing political alliance. A joint statement released by the two heads of state expanded upon how the two governments usually pledge mutual support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Russian government explicitly affirmed that Tibet, along with Taiwan, are «inalienable parts of the Chinese territory», while the Chinese supported «Russia’s efforts in maintaining peace and stability in the region of Caucasus.»^[103] During Hu’s visit, however, Gazprom announced it could not begin delivering natural gas to China in 2011 as planned because of pricing disagreements. Construction of the Western Siberian Altai pipeline, which could deliver over 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to China, was originally scheduled to begin in 2008.^{[citation needed]}

September 27, 2010 marked the completion of the 1,000-kilometre (620 mi) Russia-China Crude Pipeline. Stretching from Russia’s Skovorodino station to China’s Mohe station, it was the first pipeline ever built between China and Russia.^[104] In April 2009, Rosneft and Transneft had signed deals with CNPC guaranteeing the pipeline’s production of 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day for twenty years as part of a $25 billion loan-for-oil agreement.^[105] Upon the pipeline’s completion in 2010, CNPC also signed a general agreement with Transneft over the operation of the pipeline, a framework agreement with Gazprom to import natural gas to China from 2015 onwards, an agreement with Rosneft on extending oil supply to the Russia-China Crude Pipeline, and an agreement with Lukoil on expanding strategic cooperation. Both sides hailed the series of agreements as a «new era» in cooperation, and Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin told reporters in Beijing that Russia was «ready to meet China’s full demand in gas» going forward.^[106]

In September 2010, President Putin reaffirmed the potential nuclear future of Russia and China’s energy relations, saying «Of course, our cooperation with China is not limited to just hydrocarbons … Russia is China’s main partner in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy, and equipment supplies here amount to billions of dollars».^[107] As of 2011, however, Russian officials have remained reluctant to transfer nuclear energy technologies and other knowledge products to Chinese partners. Industry experts have pointed out that while proprietary technology would protect Russian exports from being displaced by lower-cost Chinese products in third-party markets, such an approach may reinforce Chinese doubts about Russia’s reliability as a long-term energy partner.^[62]

The Russian oil industry has not only been burdened by corporate struggles such as with Yukos and political disagreements between the countries, but also by the reoccurring breaches in safety. Some difficulties stem from the Kazakh riots^[108] to endless environmental concerns,^{[109][110][111]} but most recently the capsizing of an oil platform that was allowed to operate in the north late in the season, while towed under adverse maritime conditions.^[112] Incidents such as these cannot help but give potential foreign investment, which the region needs, pause as to the reliability of Russian energy supplies.^{[according to whom?]}

Russian Far East (RFE)[edit]

In 1996, the Russian Federation completed two production sharing agreements (PSA) for oil and gas exploration off the northeast coast of the Sakhalin Islands. The Sakhalin-I project, operated by Exxon Neftegas Limited (ENL), has estimated potential recoverable reserves at 307 million tons of oil (2.3 billion bbn) and 485 billion cubic meters of gas as of 2002.^[113][114] ENL, a subsidiary of US-based ExxonMobil, holds a 30 percent interest in the project, while Rosneft holds 20 percent via its affiliates RN-Astra (8.5 percent) and Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf (11.5 percent). Japanese consortium SODECO and the Indian state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Ltd. holds the remaining 50 percent (30 and 20 percent, respectively).

The Sakhalin-II project is managed by the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. (Sakhalin Energy). As of 2011, Russian state monopoly Gazprom holds 50% plus 1 share, RoyalDutch Shell 27.5%, Mitsui 12.5% and Mitsubishi 10%.^[115] Gazprom purchased its majority stake from Sakhalin-2 operator Royal Dutch Shell in 2006. The project had been placed permanently on hold by environmental regulators, but moved forward after the sale.^[116] The series of events led to widespread speculation that environmental violations may have been used as a bargaining chip in the deal.^[117] Sakhalin-II consists of two 800-km pipelines running from the northeast of the island to Prigorodnoye (Prigorodnoe) in Aniva Bay at the southern end. The consortium built Russia’s first liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant at Prigorodnoye. Industry sources speculated that «some in Russia hope to sell China gas from Sakhalin-2’s or other facilities’ future LNG holdings now that it has mastered the technology».^[118]

In December 2003, CNPC and Sakhalin Energy signed a frame agreement on exploration and development in Russia’s Sakhalin oilfield.^[119] ExxonMobil also looked towards the Chinese market, making preliminary agreements on supplying Sakhalin-I gas to China as early as 2002. On November 2, 2004, CNPC began negotiations with ExxonMobil for possible long-term gas deliveries from Sakhalin-1.^[120] Negotiations were then concluded in October 2006, when Exxon and CNPC officially announced an agreement. Under the deal, Sakhalin-1 could sell up to 10 billion cubic meters of gas to China over 20 years by pipeline. The plan met strong opposition from Gazprom, which has a rival pipeline project and controls all Russian gas exports apart from sales through PSAs such as Sakhalin-1.^[121] In August 2006, Sakhalin-I’s De-Kastri oil terminal began exporting processed petroleum to markets including China, Japan, and South Korea.^[122]

The influence of Russia’s regional energy trade has led to a sense of local uneasiness about foreign countries’ influence in the sector. In 2000, President Putin warned a Siberian audience that unless Russia intensified the region’s development, the Russian Far East would end up speaking Chinese, Japanese and Korean.^[123][124] In 2002, the Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Vladimir Potapov, expressed serious concerns about the region’s combined remoteness, weak infrastructure, declining population, and wealth «in very diverse resources».^[125][126] Political figures like Viktor Ozerov, Chairman of the Federation Council’s Defense and Security Committee, warned of military threats in the Far East and decried the predatory use of the region’s resources, and large-scale illegal immigration, though scholars pointed out that no imminent threat was visible.^[127] Dmitri Trenin stated that, ‘the principal domestic reason is the situation of eastern Russia, especially East Siberia and the Russian Far East. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the territories have been going through a deep crisis. The former model of their development is inapplicable; a new model is yet to be devised and implemented. Meanwhile, the vast region has been going through depopulation, deindustrialization, and general degradation. … The quality of Moscow’s statesmanship will be tested by whether it can rise up to the challenge in the East.»^[128] The RFE has been one of the most difficult areas to transition between the structure of the Soviet Union and the still developing Russian state due to the lack of economic self-sufficiency in the region or any prospects of stable growth.

In September 2005, the Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref promised a doubling of state support for the RFE to $612 million in 2006, and the consideration of allocating a new $2.5 billion infrastructure fund for projects in the region.^[129] A year later, at the end of 2006, Putin reiterated that the socio-economic isolation of the RFE represented a threat to national security, and advocated yet another new socioeconomic commission and regional development strategy to be formed. He specifically pointed to the perceived threat of foreign immigration in the Far East.^[130] Scholars and regional experts have suggested that China’s rapid economic growth (especially relative to Russia’s GDP growth rate) lies at the root of anxieties concerning the RFE. While the Russian and Chinese economies were roughly the same size in 1993, China’s grew to over 3.5 times larger than Russia’s by 2008. Even since 1998, when Russia began a rapid economic recovery, China has grown at a faster rate; the gap has only widened since the global economic crisis and falling energy prices of the late 2000s. China’s growth has led to the creation of new productive capacity, whereas Russia’s recovery has been based largely on reutilizing Soviet-era capacity that had idled in the early 1990s.^[131][132]

Russian officials have repeatedly reiterated their opposition to being merely China’s natural resources storehouse.^[133] As early as 2001, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin warned that if Russia failed to become «a worthy economic partner» for Asia and the Pacific Rim, «China and the Southeast Asian countries will steamroll Siberia and the Far East.»^[134][135] At the start of his presidency in September 2008, Dmitri Medvedev echoed similar concerns, warning a Kamchatka audience that if Russia fails to develop the RFE, it could turn into a raw material base for more developed Asian countries and «unless we speed up our efforts, we can lose everything.»^[136][137] Regional experts have pointed out that despite these increasingly vocal concerns, the local economy of the RFE has become increasingly reliant on Chinese goods, services, and labor over the past decade; furthermore, local out-migration shows little sign of reversing. For all the early promises under Putin, Moscow’s policy towards the RFE has not seemed effective as of 2008.^[138]

Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow branch of the Carnegie Endowment has argued that Siberia’s development could become Russia’s most urgent challenge.^[139] Failure to develop the region into more than a raw material outpost could lead to what he calls a «Chinese takeover of the region, not by migration but rather by economic means of trade and tourism.»

Russia’s plans for this region have revolved around building energy infrastructure to leverage exports and attracting investment so that the capital will be available for modernizing regional infrastructure.^[140][141] These plans largely depend on foreign investments, which Russian companies have grudgingly acknowledged. In 2008, a consortium of Chinese engineering firms led by Harbin Turbine signed an agreement with Russian power producer OGK to produce coal-fired turbines in the RFE, adding 41,000 megawatts of new generating capacity by 2011. Stanislav Nevynitsyn, executive director of OGK, admitted, «It is simply a necessity for us to work with the Chinese – we will not get the capacity built otherwise.»^[142] Through loans to Russia’s Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs, Vnesheconombank (VEB), China became a major stockholder in Lukoil in 2009.^[143] In the same year, after having excluded foreign firms from bidding on the huge Udokan copper mine in Southeast Siberia, Moscow welcomed Chinese, South Korean, and Kazakh miners and refiners back into the bidding process.^[144][145]

As part of the ‘Russia’s Energy Strategy till 2020’ program, the Russian government launched a program of creating a unified gas production, transportation, and supply system in Eastern Siberia and the RFE in 2006. The program would ultimately provide affirmation of an all-Russia gas system from the Baltic Sea up to the Pacific Ocean.»^[146] Russian policymakers have also suggested building an international center for spent fuel and nuclear energy in the RFE, hoping to raise the profile in the export of nuclear energy to the global market.^[147]

In 2009, Gazprom was awarded subsurface licenses for the Kirinsky, Vostochno-Odoptinsky and Ayashsky blocks to begin the Sakhalin-III project.^[148] Geological exploration has been underway at the Kirinskoye field and, as of 2009, natural gas production is scheduled for 2014. The field will become one of the natural gas sources for the Sakhalin–Khabarovsk–Vladivostok gas transmission system (GTS). The first GTS start-up complex will be 1,350 km, with a capacity of 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year.^[149]

Central Asia[edit]

China and Russia generally cooperate with each other regarding Central Asia affairs.^[150] While they sometimes compete in Central Asia, those competitions are typically focused on economic matters and proceed in an orderly way within established norms.^[150] Where competition in Central Asia does occur between the two powers, it typically arises as a product of the circumstances rather than as an intentional effort to contain the other country.^[150]

In 1996, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan formed the Shanghai Five, a collaborative body that was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001.^[151] As members of the SCO, China and Russia have cooperated in military exercises, such as counterterrorism drills in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and similar exercises in Kazakhstan and China in 2003.^[152]

Russian and Chinese leaders regularly call for greater cooperation and coordination through the SCO between their two countries in the context of their broader goal of promoting multilateral diplomacy.^{[153][154][155]} In a joint statement issued on May 23, 2008, Russia and China asserted that “International security is comprehensive and inalienable, and some countries’ security cannot be guaranteed at the cost of some others’, including expanding military and political allies.”^[156] Zhao Huasheng, Director of Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University’s Shanghai Cooperation Center, has argued that economic cooperation will ensure the long-term relevance of the SCO, as current security threats recede.^[157] While China and Russia do enjoy some bilateral energy cooperation, which experts predict will continue to grow in the future, the two countries have emerged as rivals for Central Asian oil and gas supplies.^[158] With the rising oil prices in the mid-2000s, Russia has sought to renew its influence in Central Asia, in particular the region’s southern flank, to guarantee access to gas supplies for reexport to Europe and for its own domestic needs. As China’s energy needs have grown and its policymakers have sought to develop its western provinces, China, too, has sought to expand its influence in Central Asia.^[152]

In 2007, at a meeting of SCO prime ministers in Tashkent, Russian Premier Viktor Zubkov reiterated Moscow’s desire to forge a Central Asian energy «club» within the SCO, comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The SCO energy club could be set up as soon as 2008, Russian Deputy Industry and Energy Minister Ivan Materov announced in Tashkent. Materov insisted, however, that the club would not amount to a sort of mini-OPEC. Political and economic analysts in Moscow believe the Kremlin is keen to establish an energy club as a means to prevent a possible clash with China over Central Asia’s energy resources.^[159]

At a May 2007 SCO summit in Turkmenbashi, Russian, Kazakh and Turkmen leaders announced the expansion of the Prikaspiisky gas pipeline from Turkmenistan into Russia.^[160] The plan has stalled due to several obstacles, including price disagreements and the economic recession of the late 2000s.^[161][162]

Uncertainty over the Prikaspiisky route has given China an opening into the region, especially in Turkmenistan. During a brief visit to Ashgabat, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called for efforts «to step up bilateral trade cooperation to a new level.» Berdymukhamedov, in turn, expressed interest in «working closely» with China on a natural gas pipeline project, Xinhua News Agency reported. In December 2005, Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev inaugurated the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline to ship oil to China. The $800 million Atasu-Alashankou route still needs Russian crude oil from Western Siberia, transported via the Omsk-Pavlodar-Shymkent pipeline, to reach its full annual capacity of 20 million tons by 2010.^[163] Although China and its Central Asian partners view their expanding cooperation as a means of diversifying their energy partnerships, Russia has enjoyed success in other major energy projects. In November 2007, two Russian companies (TNK-BP and GazpromNeft) signed an agreement with KazTransOil to ship up to 5 million tons of oil annually to China via the Omsk-Pavlodar-Atasu-Alanshakou pipeline. In the first quarter of 2008, 300,000 tons of Russian crude oil were exported to China along this route.^[164] Moreover, a Russian engineering company, Stroytransgaz, won a tender to build Turkmenistan’s section of the gas pipeline to China.^[165]

China and Russia announced in May 2014 that they had reached a 30-year gas deal where «Russia would supply 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year to China».^[166] These developments continue to show Russia and China’s attempts to work together outside of USA confinements.

Military relations[edit]

After the EU arms embargo on China imposed as a consequence of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, China became a reliable client for Russian military exports, making up 25–50% of all foreign military sales.^[167] On November 9, 1993, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian signed a five-year defense cooperation agreement paving the way for an increase in the number of military attachés stationed in their respective capitals. On July 12, 1994, the Russian and Chinese defence ministers signed a border security agreement designed to prevent potentially dangerous military incidents, such as unintentional radar jamming and airspace violations. In December 1996, Russia finalized «the sale of SU-27 fighters and related production technology to China.»^[14]

On October 19, 1999, Defence Minister of China, General Chi Haotian, after meeting with Syrian Defence Minister Mustafa Tlass in Damascus, Syria to discuss expanding military ties between Syria and China, flew directly to Israel and met with Ehud Barak, the then Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Israel where they discussed military relations. Among the military arrangements was a $1 billion Israeli-Russian sale of military aircraft to China, which were to be jointly produced by Russia and Israel.^[168]

In 2004, the Russian Foreign Ministry blocked both the sale of the Su-35 and Tupolev Tu-22M bombers to China over concerns about the arrangements for Chinese production of the Sukhoi Su-27SK (known as the Shenyang J-11).^[169] Originally, the licensing agreement required that engines and avionics be sourced by Russian suppliers; however, by 2004 these components were being produced domestically.^{[citation needed]}

Currently, China focuses on domestic weapon designs and manufacturing, while still importing certain military products from Russia, such as jet engines. China sought to become independent in its defence sector and become competitive in global arms markets; its defence sector is rapidly developing and maturing. Gaps in certain capabilities remain, including development of electronic and reliable propulsion systems, although China’s defense industry production has improved significantly, providing an advantage over other militaries in the Asia-Pacific region.^[170] China’s 2015 Defense White Paper called for «independent innovation» and the «sustainable development» of advanced weaponry and equipment.^[170]

In September 2018, Russia hosted the militaries of China and Mongolia as a part of the Vostok 2018 military exercise to improve ties between the countries, making them the first two countries outside of the former Soviet Union to join the exercise.^[171][172]

In December 2019, Rostec officials accused China of intellectual property theft of a range of military technologies.^[173] In June 2020, Russia charged one of its Arctic scientists of passing sensitive information to China.^[174]

In July 2019, and again in December 2020, Russia and China flew joint bomber patrols over the Pacific.^[175][176]

In November 2022, Russian and Chinese warplanes including the Tupolev-95 and XIAN H-6K long range strategic bombers conducted joint patrols over the Sea of Japan and East China sea.^[177]

As early as February 2022, according to US authorities, Russia asked China for advanced military weaponry, in particular, armed drones for use in their invasion of Ukraine.^[178][179] China and Russia have both denied these allegations.^[180]

Media communication agreements[edit]

In March 2013, the Voice of Russia and the People’s Daily Online signed a news sharing agreement as Xi and Putin presided.^[181][182] On October 13, 2014, Russia Today and the People’s Daily signed a cooperation agreement.^[182] In July 2021, the Russian-Chinese Commission for Humanitarian Cooperation agreed to mass-media cooperation.^[183][184]

Mutual perceptions[edit]

Since 1995, Russians have consistently held positive views of China. As of September 2022, 88% of Russians surveyed by the Levada Center view China favorably, with only 5% expressing a negative opinion.^[185]

According to a 2017 BBC World Service poll, 74% of the Chinese view Russia’s influence positively, with 18% expressing a negative view, while 44% of Russians view China’s influence positively and 23% negatively.^[186]

According to a 2019 survey by the Pew Research Center, 71% of Russians have a favorable view of China, with 18% expressing an unfavorable view.^[187] A YouGov survey conducted in the same year found that 71% of the Chinese think Russia has a positive effect on world affairs, while 15% view it negatively.^[188]

During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, many social media users in China showed sympathy for Russian narratives due in part to distrust of US foreign policy.^[189][190] Chinese company NetEase has published videos critical of Russia from Chinese in Ukraine and Ukrainians in China.^[191][192]

According to a Genron NPO poll released in November 2022 asking about Chinese peoples’ views on the Russian invasion, 39.5% of respondents said the Russian actions «are not wrong», 21.5% said «the Russian actions are a violation of the U.N. Charter and international laws, and should be opposed», and 29% said «the Russian actions are wrong, but the circumstances should be considered.»^[193][194]

See also[edit]

• Foreign relations of China
• Foreign relations of Russia
• Embassy of China, Moscow
• Ambassadors of China to Russia
• Ambassadors of Russia to China
• China–Soviet Union relations
• Russia–Taiwan relations
• History of Sino-Russian relations
• Russia’s turn to the East

Notes[edit]

References[edit]

Further reading[edit]

• Bernstein, Thomas P. and Hua-Yu Li, eds. China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present (2010).
• Blank, Stephen. «Is Russia a great power in Asia?.» in Great Powers and Geopolitics (Springer, Cham, 2015) pp. 161–182. online
• Blank, Stephen. «Russo-Chinese relations in strategic perspective.» in International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier (Palgrave, Singapore, 2018) pp. 93–108.
• Blank, Stephen, and Younkyoo Kim. «Does Russo-Chinese partnership threaten America’s interests in Asia?.» Orbis 60.1 (2016): 112–127.
• Contessi, Nicola P. «China, Russia and the Leadership of the SCO: A Tacit Deal Scenario» China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 8, 4 (2010): 101–123.
• Efremenko D. «New Russian Government’s Foreign Policy towards East Asia and the Pacific» Journal of East Asian Affairs (2012) 26#2 (Seoul: Institute for National Security ) metaCode=en_m_pub&boardId=a57b3ef8b2bff73bb9e00084&pkey=1 online
• Fravel, M. Taylor. Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton University Press, 2019) online reviews
• Garver, John W. Foreign relations of the People’s Republic of China (1992) online
• Herbst, John. «The Coming Russian-Chinese Clash» The National Interest Aug. 21, 2020.
• Hsu, Jing-Yun, and Jenn-Jaw Soong. «Development of China-Russia Relations (1949–2011) Limits, Opportunities, and Economic Ties.» Chinese economy 47.3 (2014): 70–87. online
• Jersild, Austin. The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (U of North Carolina Press, 2014).
• Kim, Younkyoo, and Stephen Blank. «Rethinking Russo-Chinese Relations in Asia: Beyond Russia’s Chinese Dilemma.» China: An International Journal(2013) 11#3 pp: 136–148. online
• Kim, Younkyoo; Indeo, Fabio (2013). «The new great game in Central Asia post 2014: The US «New Silk Road» strategy and Sino-Russian rivalry». Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 46 (2): 275–286. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2013.03.005.
• Korolev, Alexander. «The Strategic Alignment between Russia and China: Myths and Reality.» Singapore: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper #15–19 (2015). online
• Kuliabin A. Semine S. Russia — a counterbalancing agent to the Asia. Zavtra Rossii, #28, 17 July 1997. RUSSIA IN THE PACIFIC REGION SYSTEM:
• March, G. Patrick. Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific (1996) online
• Marsh, Christopher. Unparalleled Reforms. China’s Rise, Russia’s Fall and the Interdependence of Transition (2005).
• Maxwell. Neville. «How the Sino-Russian boundary conflict was finally settled: From Nerchinsk 1689 to Vladivostok 2005 via Zhenbao Island 1969.» Critical Asian Studies 39.2 (2007): 229–253. online
• Moshes, Arkady and Matti Nojonen, eds. Russia-China relations: Current state, alternative futures, and implications for the West FIIA Report 30, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (September 2011)
• Nye, Joseph. «A New Sino-Russian Alliance?» Project Syndicate 12 January 2015
• Quested, Rosemary K.I. Sino-Russian relations: a short history (Routledge, 2014) online
• Rozman, Gilbert. The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East versus West in the 2010s (2014) online review
• Rozman, Gilbert. The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985 (Princeton UP, 1987).
• Rozman, Gilbert and Sergey Radchenko, eds. International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier (Palgrave, Singapore, 2018) excerpt
• Shen, Zhihua. A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991 (Springer Singapore;Palgrave Macmillan, 2020)
• Tian, Hao. «Sino-Russian Relations: Conflict and Cooperation.» (Lehigh University, 2016), bibliography pp 55–60; online
• Trenin, Dmitri. Challenges and Opportunities: Russia and the Rise of China and India in Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers – China and India (September 2011)
• Urbansky, Sören. Beyond the Steppe Frontier: A History of the Sino-Russian Border (2020) a comprehensive history; excerpt
• Weitz, Richard. China-Russia security relations: strategic parallelism without partnership or passion? (Maroon Ebooks, 2015)
• Wishnick, Elizabeth. Mending Fences. The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (2001)
• Zubok, Vladislav. «The Soviet Union and China in the 1980s: reconciliation and divorce.» Cold War History 17.2 (2017): 121–141.

На основании Вашего запроса эти примеры могут содержать грубую лексику.

На основании Вашего запроса эти примеры могут содержать разговорную лексику.

Перевод «российско-китайские отношения» на английский

Russian-Chinese relations

Russia-China relations

Sino-Russian relations

relations between Russia and China

Russian-Chinese relationship

Russo-Chinese relations

Russia-China relationship

Chinese-Russian relations

China-Russia relations

Russian-Chinese ties

В-третьих, российско-китайские отношения давно уже во многом определяют общий климат международной жизни.

Third, for a long time already, Russian-Chinese relations have been responsible for the general climate of international life.

Благодаря своему стратегическому и долговременному характеру российско-китайские отношения стали важным стабилизирующим фактором современной международной политики.

Thanks to their strategic and long-term nature, Russian-Chinese relations had become an important stabilizing factor in contemporary international politics.

В.Путин заявил, что российско-китайские отношения развиваются по намеченному двумя сторонами плану.

Vladimir Putin expressed that Russia-China relations have been marching forward in the direction set by both sides.

Прочные российско-китайские отношения не в интересах США.

А развивающиеся российско-китайские отношения не привели к глубокой переоценке американского мышления.

And growing Sino-Russian relations have not led to any fundamental reassessment in the U.S.’s thinking.

Но правда в том, что российско-китайские отношения слишком стабильны, чтобы на них могли повлиять незначительные инциденты.

But the truth is, Sino-Russian relations are too stable to be affected by minor incidents.

Рады, что российско-китайские отношения всеобъемлющего партнерства и стратегического взаимодействия, вступающие в новую эпоху, продолжают интенсивно развиваться.

We are happy that Russian-Chinese relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation, which are entering a new era, continue to be developed strongly.

Необходимо правильно понимать российско-китайские отношения, и превосходить западное представление о геополитике.

You have to properly understand the Russian-Chinese relations, and surpass the Western conception of geopolitics.

В статье рассматриваются российско-китайские отношения в области науки и образования с 90-х годов…

The article deals with Russian-Chinese relations in Science and Education from the 90th years of XX…

По моим наблюдениям, сегодня российско-китайские отношения уже вышли за пределы этого устаревшего механизма треугольника.

According to my observations, today Russian-Chinese relations have already gone beyond this outdated mechanism of the triangle.

Тот мир, в котором существуют и который окружает российско-китайские отношения, похоже, тоже очень сильно меняется.

The world in which you exist and which surrounds the Russian-Chinese relations, it seems, is also changing very much.

За это время российско-китайские отношения прошли большой путь, а за последние двадцать с лишним лет устойчиво развиваются по восходящей.

During this period, Sino-Russian relations have traversed a long path and in the past 20-odd years they have seen a steady uptrend.

Почему-то всех очень интересовали российско-китайские отношения, которые и были, можно сказать, центральной темой.

For some reason everyone was particularly interested in Russian-Chinese relations, which took centre stage, so to speak.

Беспрецедентно высокого уровня достигли российско-китайские отношения, которые развивались в направлении последовательного углубления партнерства и стратегического взаимодействия.

Russia-China relations achieved an unprecedentedly high level, having developed towards a consistent deepening of partnership and strategic interaction.

Я уверен, что российско-китайские отношения будут продолжать всесторонне продвигаться на благо народов двух стран и мира.

I firmly believe that Russia-China relations will continue to advance in an all-round way, and benefit the two countries and people of the world.

Так, российско-китайские отношения в военной сфере доверительны как никогда — проводятся совместные учения.

Thus, Russian-Chinese relations in the military sphere are showing more trust than ever before — joint exercises are now being held.

Сегодня российско-китайские отношения находятся на подъёме и переживают лучший период за свою многовековую историю.

Today the Russian-Chinese relations are on the rise, they are the best in their centuries-long history.

Напомним, современные российско-китайские отношения официально определяются сторонами как всеобъемлющее равноправное доверительное партнерство и стратегическое взаимодействие.

Today’s Russian-Chinese relations are officially defined by the parties as a comprehensive equal trusting partnership and strategic interaction.

Современные российско-китайские отношения официально определяются сторонами как всеобъемлющее, равноправное и доверительное партнерство и стратегическое взаимодействие.

Both sides officially identify current Russian-Chinese relations as a comprehensive, equal and trusting partnership and strategic cooperation.

Но российско-китайские отношения исторически складывались непросто, были и периоды дружбы, и конфронтации.

But Russian-Chinese relations historically evolved uneasily, there were periods of friendship and of confrontation.

Ничего не найдено для этого значения.

Результатов: 191. Точных совпадений: 191. Затраченное время: 80 мс

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Российско-китайские отношения
Россия Китай

Российско-китайские отношения — взаимоотношения между Российской Федерацией и Китайской Народной Республикой, а в исторической ретроспективе — между государствами, существовавшими соответственно на территории этих стран на протяжении последних 400 лет. На современном этапе российско-китайское взаимодействие характеризуется широким спектром областей сотрудничества, включающих интенсивные контакты на высшем уровне, торгово-экономические и гуманитарные связи, сотрудничество на международной арене, в том числе в Совете безопасности ООН, совместное участие в международных и региональных организациях (ШОС, БРИКС) и др.

На КНР в 2012 году пришлось 10,1 % всего российского внешнеторгового товарооборота^[2]. Доля России во внешней торговле Поднебесной скромнее, но тоже существенна — 2,3 % товарооборота Китая в 2012 году (9-е место после США, Гонконга, Японии, Южной Кореи, Тайваня, Германии, Австралии, Малайзии)^[2].

История отношений[править | править код]

Русские и монгольская империя Юань[править | править код]

Первые связи между русскими княжествами и Китаем относятся к XIII—XIV векам, когда обе страны входили в состав единого государства — Монгольской империи. После частичной оккупации монголами Руси, некоторое количество плененных мужчин было отправлено в Китай.

Согласно «Истории династии Юань», в первый год правления под девизом «Чжишунь» (1329) взятые в плен русские в Китае обороняли границы и обрабатывали землю в качестве военных поселенцев. Правительство империи Юань учредило в Пекине специальный орган, который отвечал за управление ими^[3].

В Пекине русских пленников зачислили в ханскую гвардию. Были сформированы следующие полки: кипчакский (из кипча — половцев), асу (из асов — аланов), русский. Соединение ханской гвардии, составленное из русских, называлось «Охранный русский полк, прославившийся верноподданностью» (宣忠斡罗思卫亲军 Сюаньчжун олосы вэй циньцзюнь). Сведений о первоначальной численности полка не сохранилось. Но известно, что в 1331 году к нему было приписано 600 человек. В «Истории династии Юань» за 1332 год упоминается о прибытии в Пекин полоненных русских трижды, численностью 170, 2500 и 30 человек со 103 подростками. Также есть упоминание о назначении монгольского полководца Бояня командиром монгольского, кипчакского и русского полков.^[4][5][6][7]

В XVI веке при Иване Грозном было снаряжено 2 посольства для поиска пути в Китай через Среднюю Азию и Монголию. После основания Тобольска его воевода посылал казаков на Дальний Восток. Русские казаки и крестьяне заселяли Забайкалье и Приамурский край, построили вдоль Амура несколько острогов (огороженных поселений), крупнейшими из которых были Албазин на левом берегу Амура и Нерчинск на реке Шилка.

Российское государство и китайская империя Мин[править | править код]

После того, как монголы были изгнаны, Китай вновь стал государством (империя Мин).

• 1608 — Первая попытка проникнуть в Китай. Царем Василием Шуйским подписывается указ об отправке посольства к Алтан-хану и в Китайское государство. Но из-за войны между Шолой Убаши-хунтайджи и черными калмыками посольство не доехало до места назначения. В 1616 году отправляется новое посольство во главе с атаманом Василием Тюменцем. Делегация была принята Шолой Убаши-хунтайджи, но далее в Китай посольство не поехало, возвратившись в Москву. В XIX веке считалось, что первая русская делегация отправилась в Китай при Иване Грозном в 1567 году во главе с атаманами Иваном Петровым и Бурнашом Елычевым, что якобы следовало из древнерусской рукописи. Но позднее рукопись была признана подделкой, а сам факт путешествия вымыслом.^[8]
• 1618 — Тобольский воевода отправляет в Китай династии Мин посольство казака И. Петлина для установления отношений.
• 1641—1642 — Поездка казака Е. Вершинина в Китай.

Российское государство и империя Цин[править | править код]

В результате завоевательных походов маньчжуров Китай вновь потерял независимость и стал частью маньчжурской империи Цин.

• 1654—1657 — посольство Ф. И. Байкова, потерпевшее дипломатическую неудачу, но составившее ряд подробных описаний и документов.
• 1675—1678 — посольство Спафария. Маньчжурская империя Цин, захватившая Китай, по-прежнему отказывается признавать русские поселения в Приамурье.
• 1684 — атаки маньчжурских войск на русские поселения, осада Албазина и Нерчинска.
• 1689 — Нерчинский договор — первый договор между Россией и империей Цин, установивший границу между государствами, порядок торговли и разрешения споров^[9]. Подписан в ходе посольства Ф. Головина. Россия отказалась от претензий на значительные территории южнее Амура.
• 1727 — Буринский договор (Буринский трактат) подготовлен в период посольства Владиславича. Содержит уточнения границ по Нерчинскому договору.
• 1727 — Кяхтинский договор о разграничении и торговле между Россией и империей Цин, подготовлен в период Посольства Владиславича в ходе работы над Буринским договором.
• 1851 — подписан Кульджинский договор — торговый пакт России и Китая, сближающий торгово-экономические отношения в Центральной Азии.
• 1858 — ослабленная Второй опиумной войной, династия Цин подписывает с Россией Айгунский договор, по которому Россия получает значительную часть Маньчжурии, включая Приморье («Уссурийский край»).
• 1860 — по окончании Второй опиумной войны между империей Цин и европейскими странами подписан ряд договоров (Пекинская конвенция), один из которых закрепляет положения Айгунского договора.
• 1864 — Чугучакский протокол. Является приложением к Пекинскому трактату. Этот протокол покончил с двойной выплатой дани казахами, и Российской империи и Китайской. После него казахи Старшего жуза стали платить дань только Российской империи.
• 1871 — Дунганское восстание приводит к исчезновению центрального контроля в Синьцзяне и установлению эфемерного государства Якуб бека в Кашгаре. Российские войска оккупируют Илийский край (Кульджу).
• 1881 — Договор об Илийском крае (1881), в соответствии с которым российские войска выводятся из Илийского края к 1883 году.
• 1896 — Союзный договор между Российской империей и Китаем (1896), по условиям которого Россия получила право постройки на территории Маньчжурии Китайско-восточной железной дороги. Заключение данного договора было навязано Китаю после его разгрома в Японо-китайской войне, с учетом отсутствия в китайской казне денежных средств.
• 1897 — заключение российско-китайской конвенции, в результате ухудшения военного и экономического положения Китая. Россия обусловила свою помощь Китаю предоставлением ей Порт-Артура и Даляня в аренду. Российская эскадра занимает Порт-Артур.
• 1897—1903 — Россия строит первоначальную (наиболее прямую) линию Транссибирской магистрали, пересекающую Маньчжурию как Китайско-Восточная железная дорога. Сегодняшний маршрут, целиком проходящий по территории России, был закончен только в 1916 году.
• 1898 — русскими основан город Харбин — железнодорожная станция КВЖД.
• 1898 — подписана Русско-китайская конвенция, по которой Россия закрепила статус КВЖД и арендовала территории для доступа к морю, в том числе Порт-Артур.
• 1898 — на арендованной китайской территории русскими основан город Далянь (Дальний).
• 1900—1902 — участие российских войск в подавлении Ихэтуаньского восстания.
• 1905 — после поражения России в Русско-японской войне подписывается Портсмутский мирный договор, по которому Россия теряет арендуемые порты, а также ветку КВЖД от Порт-Артура до Куаньчэнцзы. А также денонсируется Союзный договор между Российской империей и Китаем (1896).
• 1913 — Россия официально признала Китайскую республику.

СССР и Китай[править | править код]

• 1922 — после революции из России в Китай поступают беженцы. Русское население Харбина, Шанхая и других китайских городов увеличивается.
• 1927 — после неудачи, постигшей Кантонское восстание 1927 года, 14 декабря были разорваны дипломатические отношения между СССР и Китаем.
• 1929 — до 1926 года включительно советское правительство оказывало поддержку Гоминьдану и Чан Кайши, который провёл несколько месяцев в Москве. Однако по мере продвижения Чан Кайши к власти возник острый конфликт между его сторонниками и коммунистами. В Китае продолжается серия войн и конфликтов, один из которых — конфликт на КВЖД — задевает интересы СССР.
• 1932 — между Китаем и СССР на Дальнем Востоке Японией создаётся государство Маньчжоу-го, враждебно настроенное по отношению к СССР.
• 1938 — с территории Маньчжоу-го в СССР вторгаются японские войска. В ходе операции в районе озера Хасан они разбиты советскими войсками. Конфликт повторяется в 1939 году на территории Монголии, возле реки Халхин-Гол.
• 1937—1942 — советские специалисты, лётчики, военные советники оказывают содействие Китаю в войне против японских захватчиков.
• 1937—1938 — при участии нескольких тысяч советских специалистов китайские рабочие построили 2925-километровую автотрассу через Синьцзян для доставки грузов из СССР^[10].

	В Викитеке есть тексты по теме: Соглашение между СССР, Китайской Республикой и провинцией Синьцзян о строительстве нефтекомбината (3 августа 1938 года)

• 1938 — СССР и правительство Синьцзяна (после проведения с советской помощью геологоразведочных работ) заключили устное соглашение о строительстве нефтеперерабатывающего комбината в Тушанцзы на паритетных началах, которое завершилось к ноябрю 1940 года^[11]. В 1939 — мае 1941 годов на месторождении было пробурено 9 скважин, суточный дебет сырой нефти составил 1,2 тонны^[10].
• 16 июня 1939 — между СССР и Китаем заключен торговый договор^[12].
• 1945 — СССР наносит поражение японской Квантунской армии на территории Маньчжурии.
• 1945—1949 — при советской поддержке к власти в Китае приходит Мао Цзэдун и Коммунистическая партия Китая.
• 2 октября 1949 — Советский Союз первым из стран мира признаёт Китайскую Народную Республику, на следующий день после её учреждения.
• 1949—1956 — расцвет советско-китайских отношений. Советско-китайский договор о дружбе, союзе и взаимной помощи. Китаю оказывается помощь в строительстве государства, армии, обучении специалистов. Китаю вновь переданы Далянь, КВЖД. Генерал КГБ Николай Леонов отмечал, что по принятому руководством СССР решению — КНР была отдана вся советская разведывательная агентура, заведенная на территории Китая к тому времени^[13]. «Мы должны всемерно укреплять вечную, нерушимую братскую дружбу Советского Союза с великим китайским народом», — отмечает в своей речи на траурном митинге в день похорон Сталина председатель Совета министров СССР Г. М. Маленков^[14]. «После победы в войне Советский Союз протянул нам руку помощи и дружбы для восстановления китайской экономики», — отмечает член Политбюро ЦК КПК Цао Ганчуань^[15].
• 1956 — После прихода к власти Хрущёва и XX съезда (разоблачения культа личности Сталина) отношения между двумя странами ухудшаются. Мао Цзэдун обвиняет советское правительство в ревизионизме и уступкам Западу (в частности, во время Карибского кризиса). Руководители КНР считали ошибочной советскую идеологическую концепцию «мирного сосуществования»^[16].
• 18 августа 1960 года СССР отозвал из КНР всех специалистов и аннулировал ранее заключенные торговые договоры.
• 1963 — обмен письмами между ЦК КПСС и ЦК КПК, выражающие различие между их идеологическими позициями^[17].
• 1964 — Мао заявляет, что в СССР победил капитализм. Практически полный разрыв отношений между КПСС и КПК. (см. также Советско-китайский раскол)
• 1969 — вооружённые пограничные конфликты между СССР и Китаем возле острова Даманский (Приморье), реки Тасты и озера Жаланашколь (Казахстан).

• 11 сентября 1969 в пекинском аэропорту премьер Госсовета КНР Чжоу Эньлай провел встречу с председателем Совета Министров СССР Косыгиным с целью урегулирования крайне напряженных после вооруженных столкновений на восточных и западных участках китайско-советской границы отношений между двумя странами; встреча положила начало постепенной нормализации советско-китайских отношений, на ней было решено вновь назначить послов и активизировать торговые и экономические связи^[18].
• 1984 — возобновление обмена студентами и стажерами (по 70 человек с каждой стороны)^[19].
• декабрь 1986 — открыты Генеральные консульства: китайское в Ленинграде и советское в Шанхае^[19].
• 1989 — восстановление межпартийных связей, визит М. С. Горбачёва в Китай, нормализация отношений.

В КНР придаётся значение созданию «Историй взаимоотношений Китая и России»: «Принципиальное содержание всех этих „Историй“ одинаково. Суть его состоит в том, чтобы у читателей складывалось представление об истории как о практически непрерывных войнах или как о борьбе Китая против „агрессии“ и „неравноправия“ со стороны России с начала наших отношений в XVII в. до конца XX в.»^[20].

Некоторые российские эксперты считают, что в своих сочинениях китайские россиеведы начала XXI в. намеренно подчеркивают и повторяют слова «война» и «враг» применительно к отношениям Китая с Россией, явно выполняя задачи, которые ставит перед ними пропагандистский отдел ЦК КПК^[21].

Кроме того, в XXI веке официальная точка зрения КНР по-прежнему состоит в том, что в 1969 году имела место советская агрессия на острове Даманском и в районе озера Жаланашколь^[22].

В китайских исторических учебниках и атласах части Сибири и Дальнего Востока часто окрашены в «китайские» цвета на картах соответствующих периодов^[23]. По мнению политолога, президента Института Стратегических оценок Александра Коновалова, Китай — в будущем серьёзная головная боль для России^[24].

Отношениям между КНР и СССР посвящены ряд почтовых марок КНР и СССР:

• 

• 

  Почтовая марка Китая. Сталин и Мао на крыше Кремля, 1953

• 

  Дружба советских и китайских студентов.
  Почта СССР, 1959

• 

  Дружба навеки!.
  Почта СССР, 1959

Россия и Китай[править | править код]

• 1991 — после распада СССР начинается новая эра отношений между Россией и Китаем, поддерживаются официально хорошие отношения. Начиная с периода 1991—1996 гг., когда отношения между двумя государствами перешли от простой нормализации к добрососедскому партнерству, а в 1996 г — к стратегическому взаимодействию. 16 июля 2001 г. по инициативе Цзян Цзэминя — Председателя КНР, был подписан договор о добрососедстве, дружбе и сотрудничестве^[26]:
• 2001 — заключение Российско-китайского договора о добрососедстве, дружбе и сотрудничестве, создание Шанхайской организации сотрудничества.
• 2005 — ратифицирован договор об урегулировании спорных пограничных вопросов между двумя странами, в результате которого Китай получил ряд спорных территорий общей площадью 337 квадратных километров^{[27][28][29][30]}. Проводятся первые совместные военные учения. На саммите ШОС принята декларация с призывом к США определить сроки вывода американских военных баз из бывших советских республик в Центральной Азии.
• Как отмечает к. п. н. Елена Подолько: Россия и Китай впервые в истории двусторонних отношений провели в 2006 г. Год России в Китае и в 2007 г. — Год Китая в России, а в 2005 и в 2007 гг. — беспрецедентно масштабные военные антитеррористические учения поочередно в Китае и России с участием стран — членов ШОС^[31].
  • 2007 — антитеррористические учения ШОС.
  • 2006 — год России в Китае.
  • 2007 — год Китая в России.
• 2009 — Программа сотрудничества между регионами Дальнего Востока и Восточной Сибири РФ и Северо-Востока КНР до 2018 гг.[3]
• 2009 — год русского языка в Китае^[32].
• 2010 — год китайского языка в России, завершение строительства ответвления на Китай нефтепровода Восточная Сибирь — Тихий океан.
• 2012 — год российского туризма в Китае (по статистике российской стороны, количество китайских туристов, побывавших в России в 2012 году, увеличилось на 47 % по сравнению с предыдущим годом^[33]).
• 2013 — год китайского туризма в России.

Россия стала первой страной, которую посетил глава КПК Си Цзиньпин в качестве главы государства — председателя КНР^[34]. Вице-премьер Госсовета КНР Ван Ян ранее отмечал, что это свидетельствует о том, что новое китайское руководство придаёт большое значение развитию отношений с Россией^[33]. Си Цзиньпин был одним из мировых лидеров, посетивших Россию для участия в праздновании 70-летия Победы в Великой Отечественной войне 9 мая 2015 года.

Согласно опубликованной 26 дек 2013 Институтом азиатско-тихоокеанской и мировой стратегии Академии общественных наук Китая Синей книге «Доклад о развитии АТР», вероятность восстановления союзнических связей между КНР и РФ невелика, — отмечает «Жэньминь жибао»^[35].

Существуют сомнения в том, что российско-китайское сотрудничество действительно выгодно и перспективно или по крайней мере может стать таковым для российской стороны^[36]. Торговые отношения продолжают крепнуть, однако они все больше устраивают интересы скорее Китая, чем России^[37]. Эксперт Стивен Дж. Бланк так оценивает перспективы российско-китайских отношений: «Политические и экономические неудачи России по развитию Дальнего Востока подорвали её стремление к стабильному статусу великой державы в Азии и её способность играть эту роль… Если эти тенденции сохранятся в текущем виде, Россия станет младшим партнером Китая и поставщиком сырья, а не самостоятельной державой в Азии^[38]». Подобный вывод содержится и в докладе экспертов Европейского совета по международным отношениям: Китай находится в положении «развивающейся супердержавы, которая во все большей степени рассматривает Россию как младшего партнера»^[37]. Часть исследователей идёт в своих выводах гораздо дальше. Так, Б. Миронов считает, что принятие в конце 2014 г. закона 473-ФЗ поможет КНР юридически оформить фактическое (экономическое и демографическое) присоединение Дальнего Востока и Сибири^[39]. А Н. Михалков прямо указал на риск военного захвата этих территорий — при сохранении их слаборазвитости, малонаселённости, при высоком уровне коррупции и низкой боеготовности армии^[40]. Сочетание серьёзных внутренних проблем, вызванных перенаселением, острой нехваткой полезных ископаемых, земли и воды; характер закупаемых НОАК систем вооружений, и проводимых учений в приграничных к РФ военных округах, серьёзно беспокоит военных специалистов^[41].

Общие тенденции развития отношений

Ещё до кризиса из-за событий на Украине В. Путин провозгласил «поворот на восток» приоритетом внешней политики РФ^[42]. Но основным торговым партнёром КНР является США, а не РФ^[43] и значительная разница в экономическом потенциале «партнёров», и различие интересов, создаёт предпосылки для того, чтобы сотрудничество было более выгодным для КНР, а не для РФ.

У ряда авторов^[кого?] вызывает беспокойство повышение экономической активности китайцев на территории РФ, особенно после принятия закона «О территориях опережающего социально-экономического развития в Российской Федерации» N 473-ФЗ^[44], снимающего ограничения на, например, использование труда иностранных рабочих.
Варварская вырубка лесов китайскими предпринимателями^[45] лишает коренные народы Дальнего Востока и Сибири единственной среды обитания; и использование китайскими фермерами токсичных и запрещённых в РФ с/х ядохимикатов^[46] — уже вызвали возмущение и протесты обеспокоенных местных жителей.

Пограничное урегулирование[править | править код]

В 2005 году состоялась ратификация Государственной думой РФ и Всекитайским собранием народных представителей дополнительного соглашения между РФ и КНР о российско-китайской государственной границе в её восточной части. Этот процесс завершил урегулирование пограничных проблем в отношениях России и КНР — многолетний переговорный процесс, который был начат ещё СССР и КНР в 1964 и который, помимо переговоров дипломатов, сопровождался ещё и кровопролитием с обеих сторон.

Дополнительное соглашение определяет линию прохождения границы в районе острова Большой в верховьях реки Аргунь (Забайкальский край) и территории островов Тарабаров и Большой Уссурийский на Амуре. Эти два участка составляют менее 2 % общей протяжённости границы в 4,3 тыс. км. Соглашение предусматривает равное распределение районов общей площадью 380 кв. км., не согласованных при заключении предыдущего соглашения между СССР и КНР о советско-китайской государственной границе на её восточной части от 16 мая 1991. Граница будет зафиксирована по фарватеру судоходных рек, а для несудоходных — по середине реки. Документ был подписан главами государств 14 октября 2004.

Подписание и ратификация соглашений с российской стороны была воспринята в штыки российскими патриотически-государственническими политическими кругами, рассматривающими их как уступку Китаю исконно русских территорий. По мнению МИД России, подписание и ратификация этого соглашения не означает ни уступок, ни передачи «российских территорий Китаю, и речь не идёт о каких-то территориальных завоеваниях этой страной нашей территории».

В августе 2005 года прошли первые совместные российско-китайские военные учения^[47].

В августе 2012 года в процессе демаркации между Россией и КНР возникли разногласия по линии прохождения государственной границы на западном участке российско-китайской границы^[48]. Китай требует смещения линии государственной границы вглубь территории России^[48]. Площадь территориальных претензий КНР к России достигает 17 гектар^[48][49].

Ряд специалистов отмечает, что — несмотря на декларируемое достигнутое соглашение — китайская сторона, по сути, не считает существующее положение окончательным и приемлемым для себя; а полностью контролируемые государством китайские СМИ, работающие внутри страны, продолжают утверждать, что значительная часть территории нынешнего Дальнего Востока РФ была ранее отторгнута от Китая в результате «неравноправных договоров» (т. е. — что её нужно вернуть)^[50][51].

Проблемы территориальной целостности КНР[править | править код]

Тайваньская проблема[править | править код]

Россия поддерживает принцип территориальной целостности КНР. После принятия Китайской Народной Республикой в марте 2005 года закона «О противодействии расколу страны» президент Путин заявил о своей однозначной поддержке этого закона. При этом акцент делается на необходимость использования политических средств для обеспечения территориального единства Китая.

МИД РФ высказал «понимание мотивов» принятия данного закона. По словам официального представителя МИД РФ А. Яковенко, «мы считаем, что в мире существует только один Китай, неотъемлемой частью которого является Тайвань. Исходя из этого, выступаем против независимости Тайваня в какой бы то ни было форме, не приемлем концепций „двух Китаев“ или „одного Китая и одного Тайваня“». (подробнее см. КНР и Тайвань).

Экономические, научно-технические, культурные и другие неофициальные связи между Россией и Тайванем осуществляются отдельными гражданами и неправительственными организациями, при этом в российско-тайваньских контактах не могут использоваться государственная символика России и символика и название Китайской Республики^[52].

Тибет[править | править код]

Китай установил свою власть над Тибетом в 1950, и с тех пор Тибет для руководства СССР и России всегда представлял собой неотъемлемую часть КНР.

С 2001 по 2004 Россия отказывала в предоставлении въездной визы для Духовного главы буддистов мира и религиозного лидера Тибета Далай-ламы XIV Агвана Лобсана Тенцзина Гьяцо, почитаемого российскими гражданами, исповедующими буддизм (в основном в Калмыкии, Тыве, Бурятии и двух бурятских автономных округах).

До этого Далай-лама в течение 1979—1996 семь раз посещал российских буддистов. В 1994, находясь в Москве, он даже выступал в Госдуме. Однако чем более прочным становилось российско-китайское партнёрство, тем труднее было Далай-ламе попасть в Россию. Лишь в конце ноября 2004 ему вновь было разрешено побывать в Калмыкии с одним условием — отказа от каких-либо контактов с официальными лицами. С тех пор в визе вновь отказывают под разными предлогами.

Экономическое сотрудничество[править | править код]

Дореволюционный период[править | править код]

Первый (казенный) караван был отправлен из Москвы в Цинскую империю в 1698 году (пересек китайскую границу только в 1699 году)^[54]. 25 августа 1728 года был открыт торг между Россией и Китаем через Кяхту, в 1735 год в России была введена смертная казнь для частных лиц за вывоз китайского ревеня из Сибири (торговля этим товаром была объявлена казенной монополией)^[55]. В 1762 году караванная торговля с Китаем была передана в частные руки, к тому времени Поднебесная была заметным партнером Москвы: на Цинскую империю в 1760 году пришлось 7,5 % внешнеторгового оборота России^[56]. Важнейшим товаром российского экспорта в Цинскую империю в XVIII веке была пушнина^[57]. Потом почти единственным товаром, поставляемым из Поднебесной в Россию, стал чай — в 1812—1817 годы на него приходилось 68,3 % импорта из Китая через Кяхту, в 1839—1845 годах уже 98,0 %. До начала XIX века также осуществлялись большие поставки тканей из Цинской империи — в 1812—1817 годах на бумажные ткани пришлось 26,0 % китайского экспорта в Россию, а на шелк 2,1 %, но к 1830-м годам эти товары почти перестали закупать^[58]. Торговля в Кяхте носила меновой характер, кроме того по правилам 1800 года был запрещен вывоз в Китай денег, золота и серебра в слитках, оружия и пороха, а также ввоз из Поднебесной соли, водки, кож и скота^[58]. В 1812—1852 годах структура российского экспорта в Китай резко изменилась: упала доля пушнины с 62 до 18 %, зато возросла доля фабричных изделий (кож, тканей, металлических изделий и т. п.) с 38 до 82 %. Основным товаром русского экспорта в XIX веке стало отечественное и иностранное (до 1840 года) сукно и бумажные изделия (338 тыс. аршин в 1813 году и 3,3 млн аршин в 1852 году)^[59]. В середине XIX века в связи с «открытием» Китая и началом поставок чая через Суэцкий канал таможня в Кяхте была упразднена. В XIX веке более скромная, чем в Кяхте торговля осуществлялась с Китаем также через Среднюю Азию и Казахстан — на этом направлении поставки чая в Россию выросли с 1420 пудов в 1836 году до 44815 пудов в 1854 году^[60]. В последние годы существования Российской империи Китай был важным торговым партнером Москвы: на Поднебесную в 1913 году приходилось 2,1 % российского экспорта и 6,1 % импорта^[61]. В начале XX века Россия также была одним из крупнейших иностранных инвесторов в экономику Северо-Востока Китая: в 1902 году на Москву пришлось 30,3 % иностранных инвестиций в данный регион, а в 1914 году 15,4 % (падение связано с поражением в русско-японской войне)^[62].

Торговля[править | править код]

Советско-китайская торговля[править | править код]

Советская Россия и Китай (особенно Маньчжурия и Синьцзян) так нуждались друг в друге, что двусторонняя торговля была очень быстро восстановлена. Уже в 1920 году власти Синьцзяна с согласия пекинских властей пригласили в Кульджу для переговоров советскую торгово-дипломатическую миссию, в ходе которых 27 мая 1920 года было заключено двустороннее Илийское соглашение, предусматривавшее учреждение в Кульдже советского агентства для торговых вопросов, а также регламентирующее торговлю между СУАР и Советской Россией.
В 1920-е годы из Синьцзяна в СССР поставлялись кожи, шерсть, пушнина, шелк-сырец, хлопок, чай, табак, лошади, скот, сухофрукты, а вывозились в Синьцзян из СССР сахар, спички, нефтепродукты, хлопчатобумажные ткани, нитки, железные и чугунные изделия, посуда и т. п..
В 1930-е годы СССР доминировал во внешней торговле Синьцзяна.
В Северо-Восточном Китае влияние СССР было очень сильно благодаря находившейся в собственности двух стран КВЖД, которую обслуживало большое количество советских граждан. Но после продажи КВЖД советское влияние в Северо-Восточном Китае резко сократилось.

Данные по объёму советско-китайской торговли следующие (млрд долларов): в 1980 году — 0,492, в 1985 году — 1,881, в 1990 году — 5,4, в 1991 году — 3,9; доля СССР во внешнеторговом обороте КНР тем не менее была существенной: в 1980 году — 1,3 %, в 1985 — 3,1 %, в 1990 — 3,8 %, в 1991 — 2,9 %^[19].

Российско-китайская торговля[править | править код]

в 1992—2004 гг.

В 1993—2004 годах структура российско-китайской торговли претерпела существенные изменения. Доля машин и оборудования в российском экспорте в 1993—2004 гг. упала с 35,2 % до 4,9 %, чёрных металлов в 41,4 % до 12,4 %^[63]. Зато в этот период резко возросла в структуре экспорта РФ доля древесины и изделий из неё с 0,9 до 11,7 %, минерального топлива, нефти и нефтепродуктов с 4,2 до 34,8 %, рыбы, моллюсков и ракообразных с 1,5 до 6,5 %, бумажной массы и целлюлозы с 0,2 до 3,6 %^[63]. Российский импорт из КНР в 1993—2004 гг. также претерпел некоторые изменения: доля машин и оборудования возросла с 7,1 % до 16,9 %, пушнины с 1,1 % до 13,2 %^[64].

после 2004 года

В 2004 году объём российско-китайской торговли составил 21,2 млрд долларов^[19]. Для российско-китайской торговли в 2004—2012 годах было характерно увеличение доли КНР в общем импорте России с 6,3 % до 16,5 %^[65]. Также в 2004—2012 годы возросла доля КНР в экспорте России с 5,6 % до 6,8 %^[65].
Доля России во внешней торговле КНР скромна — в 2012 году на РФ пришлось 2,3 % внешнеторгового оборота Поднебесной (правда в 2004 этот показатель составил лишь 1,8 %)^[65]. Зато на Китай в 2012 года пришлось 10,4 % внешнеторгового оборота РФ (в 2004 году — 5,8 %)^[65]. В 2012 году Россия обеспечила 20,6 % нефтепродуктов, 9,1 % сырой нефти, 7,2 % угля, 1,8 % железной руды, импортированных в КНР^[66]. Оборот китайско-российской торговли в 2014 году по данным Главного таможенного управления КНР составил 95,3 млрд долларов США, в том числе российский экспорт 41,6 млрд долларов (доля минерального топлива и нефтепродуктов в нём составила 71,63 %)^[67]. Структура российского экспорта (2014 год): 71,63 % нефть, нефтепродукты и минеральное топливо, 6,97 % древесина, 3,96 % цветные металлы, 3,05 % рыба и моллюски, 2,89 % руда, 2,25 % удобрения, 1,22 % драгоценные камни, 1,12 % машины и оборудование)^[68]. Импорт из КНР (2011 год): 40,9 % машины и оборудование, 9,3 % химические товары, 6,3 % обувь, 5,4 % текстильная одежда, 5,2 % трикотажная одежда^[69].
Из новых товаров российского экспорта стоит назвать электроэнергию (первые поставки были в 2009 году); в 2012 году РФ экспортировала в Китай 2,63 млрд квт-ч, 24 млн тонн нефти и 19,3 млн тонн угля^[70]. Китай занимает ключевые позиции в российском импорте обуви (78 % российского ввоза этого товара в 2012 году)^[71].

За 2014 год товарооборот между двумя странами составил $88,4 млрд^[72].

Товарооборот России и Китая за 2017 год вырос на 20,8 %, а за 2018 год — на 27,1 % и превысил $107 млрд^[73]. Санкции Запада против России стимулируют рост торгового оборота между Россией и Китаем, расширению сотрудничества и построению транспортной Российско-Китайской инфраструктуры. «Санкции против России привели к естественному высвобождению значительного числа ниш на российском рынке к большой радости Китая, а теперь уже и России. Это позволило нам создать новые торговые и логистические маршруты, новые инвестиционные возможности» (заместитель Министра иностранных дел РФ Александр Панкин)^[74].

вывоз леса

Большие масштабы приобрёл экспорт из России древесины ценных пород деревьев, при этом большая часть деревьев вырубается незаконно, с нанесением значительного экономического и экологического ущерба для РФ; принятие закона 473-ФЗ (2014) создало более благоприятные условия для экспансии китайского бизнеса в РФ, и усугубило негативные экологические последствия от деятельности предпринимателей^[45][46][75].

Приграничная торговля[править | править код]

Россия играет ключевую роль во внешней торговле пограничной китайской провинции Хэйлунцзян (в 2013 году на РФ пришлось 57,5 % объёма всей внешней торговли этой провинции КНР^[76]. При этом роль Хэйлунцзян растет: в 2003 году на провинцию приходилось 18,75 % российско-китайского товарооборота, а в 2013 году уже 25,10 %^[76]. Объём товарооборота между РФ и Хэйлунцзян вырос в 2003—2013 годах с 2,955 млрд долларов до 22,360 млрд долларов^[76]. КНР в 1992 году созданы четыре «зоны приграничного экономического сотрудничества», где ведется трансграничная торговля и местное производство: Хэйхэ (площадь 41,6 км кв., объём внешней торговли в 2007 году составил 100 млн долларов, ориентирована на Благовещенск), Суйфэньхэ (площадь 5 км кв., в 2009 году объём приграничной торговли через зону составил 1,52 млрд долларов, ориентирована на Пограничный), Маньчжурия (площадь 70 км кв., объём приграничной торговли в 2007 году составил 8,4 млрд долларов, ориентирована на Забайкальск), Хуньчунь (площадь 5 км кв., объём приграничной торговли в 2007 году составил 676,8 млн долларов, ориентирована на Зарубино)^[77]. Также в 2000 году была создана российско-китайская зона приграничной торговли Дуннин-Полтавка, где существует безвизовый режим граждан двух стран и ограниченный беспошлинный торговый режим^[78]. Товарооборот зоны Дуннин-Полтавка в 2008 году составил 1,18 млрд долларов, в том числе китайский экспорт в Россию — 1,15 млрд долларов^[78].

Запланированные проекты[править | править код]

В марте 2006, в ходе очередного визита российского президента Владимира Путина в Китай, было подписано несколько меморандумов в области поставок российских энергоресурсов, которые позволят Китаю повысить свою энергетическую безопасность и получить независимость от внешней политики США и стран Западной Европы. С российской стороны право экспорта энергоносителей было закреплено за государственными компаниями — «Газпромом», «Роснефтью» и РАО ЕЭС (с 2008 года РАО ЕЭС перестала существовать).

Все меморандумы предполагают подготовку долгосрочных контрактов по поставкам в КНР газа, нефти и электроэнергии.
Подписанные документы предусматривают:

• строительство двух газопроводов пропускной способностью 60-80 млрд кубометров газа в год (оценочная стоимость — $10 млрд.). В 2009 году добыча собственного природного газа в Китае составила 85,2 млрд м³, потребление — 88,7 млрд куб. м. При этом потребление стремительно растет, значительно опережая возможности внутренней добычи.^[79] Первый газопровод (западный газопровод «Алтай»), который планируется построить до 2011 года, пройдёт с Урала через Алтай на западный участок границы России с Китаем и далее будет подключён к китайскому газопроводу Запад-Восток. Его ресурсная база — газовые месторождения Западной Сибири. Второй газопровод пройдёт по восточному маршруту, который частично уже построен, — с Сахалина на материк и далее через Хабаровск в Китай. Ресурсы осваиваемого в настоящее время Ковыктинского газоконденсатного месторождения в Иркутской области пока задействовать не планируется.
• строительство ответвления на Китай от проектируемого нефтепровода Восточная Сибирь-Тихий океан. В своё время — в начале века — идею прокладки нефтепровода из Восточной Сибири в Китай и увеличения поставок нефти в эту страну активно лоббировало руководство нефтяной компании ЮКОС, однако с арестом Михаила Ходорковского и последовавшими налоговыми санкциями на компанию компания была вынуждена свернуть практически все свои зарубежные проекты. Вопрос о нескольких вариантах маршрута так называемого Восточного нефтепровода обсуждается вот уже несколько лет. Основными конкурентами в борьбе за российскую нефть являются Китай и Япония.
• создание совместного предприятия в Китае для строительства АЗС и нефтеперерабатывающего завода годовой мощностью 10 млн тонн. Государственная китайская нефтяная компания CNPC также хотела бы приобрести миноритарный пакет акций российской госкомпании «Роснефть».
• подготовку предварительного ТЭО на ежегодную поставку в Китай до 60 млрд кВт·ч электроэнергии. Для реализации этого проекта до 2020 года потребуется ввести 10 800 МВт генерирующих мощностей (преимущественно ТЭС на базе угольных месторождений Дальнего Востока России) и 3400 км сетей постоянного и переменного тока.

Участие России в строительстве объектов в КНР

• Тяньваньская АЭС — соглашение о строительстве заключено в 1997 году, а в 2004 и 2005 годах сданы в эксплуатацию два агрегата^[19].

Инвестиции[править | править код]

Российские инвестиции в КНР

В 2001 году в Китае насчитывалось 1100 предприятий с российскими капиталами на общую сумму 220 млн долларов (0,01 % всех иностранных инвестиций в КНР), в 2004 году уже 1644 предприятия с суммарным объёмом накопленных российских инвестиций в 414 млн долларов (0,08 % от всех иностранных капиталовложений в Поднебесную)^[19].

Китайские инвестиции в Россию

В 2012 году на КНР пришлось 1,1 % всех прямых иностранных инвестиций в Россию на общую сумму в 212,2 млн долларов^[80]. По состоянию на 2010 год основная доля прямых накопленных китайских инвестиций (54,7 %) пришлась на Северо-Западный федеральный округ России, тогда как на граничащие с КНР Дальневосточный и Сибирский федеральные округа только 10,5 % и 16,2 %^[81]. Стоит отметить, что объём прямых инвестиций из Поднебесной в РФ в 2000-е годы сильно колебался по годам: в 2004 году он составил 83,9 млн долларов, в 2005 году — 13,1 млн долларов, в 2006 году — 105,6 млн долларов, в 2007 году — 228,6 млн долларов, в 2008 году — 109,6 млн долларов, в 2009 году — 300,4 млн долларов, в 2010 году — 120,6 млн долларов, в 2011 году — 591,1 млн долларов^[82].
В начале 2001 года в России насчитывалось 1300 предприятий с китайским капиталом, а суммарный объём инвестиций из Поднебесной составил 100 млн долларов^[19]. В начале 2004 года в РФ было только 423 предприятия с китайским капиталом, суммарный объём инвестиций из Поднебесной составил уже 546,2 млн долларов^[19].

В 2015 году Россия полностью погасила остаток своего небольшого долга перед КНР, выплатив 400,97 млн швейцарских франков: большая часть этой задолженности была предоставлена во времена СССР^[83].

Военно-техническое сотрудничество[править | править код]

Советский период[править | править код]

В 1949—1962 гг. КНР безвозмездно получила 650 лицензий на производство вооружений и военной техники, а в 1958 году (так утверждал Н. С. Н. С. Хрущёв) Москва заключила с Пекином договор о «производстве» атомной бомбы и дала её «макет», но из-за претензий Пекина на Владивосток в 1959 году было приостановлено Соглашение 1957 года о сотрудничестве в области атомной промышленности^[84]. Кроме того, в 1950—1960 годах в КНР побывало около 10 тыс. советских специалистов-атомщиков^[85]. В 1958 году при поддержке советских специалистов в Китае был запущен первый реактор на тяжелой воде^[85].

Поставки российского вооружения[править | править код]

В 1992 году создана Российско-китайская смешанная межправительственная комиссия по военно-техническому сотрудничеству. Она определяет основные направления взаимодействия и пути реализации проектов между двумя странами в области военного сотрудничества. Комиссия собирается один раз в год поочерёдно в Москве и Пекине.

В 1992—2000 гг. Россия поставила в КНР 281 тяжелый истребитель Су-27/30^[87].
В 1995 году подтвержден факт продажи в КНР четырёх дизельных подводных лодок класса «Варшавянка»^[19].
В 2005 году КНР получила из РФ четыре эсминца и 12 подводных лодок^[87].
С 2000 года в КНР начали поставлять противокорабельные ракеты «Москит»^[19]. Также Китай получил зенитно-ракетный комплекс «Тор-М», крылатые ракеты М-80Э, управляемые авиабомбы, зенитно-ракетные комплексы С-300 ПМУ1, 200 танков Т-80У и 1200 управляемых реактивных снарядов для их оснащения^[19]. Объёмы поставок были очень значительными. В 1992—2002 гг. КНР получила 1 тыс. управляемых артиллерийских снарядов «Краснополь», 1200 ракет «воздух-воздух» малой дальности^[87].

В начале апреля Россия морским транспортом отправила несколько десятков новых ракет для С-400 в Китай для замены поврежденных во время шторма в проливе Ла-Манш^[88].

Выпуск российского вооружения на предприятиях КНР[править | править код]

В 1998 году на авиазаводе в Шэньяне начался выпуск по российской лицензии самолетов Су-27, а в 2004 году там же был собран первый самолет ДЛРО KJ-2000^[19].
В 2003 году прошли испытания совместного российско-китайского истребителя FC-1^[19]. ОКБ имени Яковлева участвовало в разработке учебно-тренировочного самолета L-15^[19]. КНР приобретена лицензия на производство артиллерийских реактивных снарядов с лазерным наведением и управляемых снарядов «Бастион»^[19].

По мнению А. Храмчихина^[51], военное сотрудничество РФ и КНР носит характер «выкачивания» из РФ новейших военных технологий (не считая многочисленных случаев их хищений^[89]).

Так, самоходная гаубица Мста-С стала изготавливаться в КНР без лицензии (PLZ-05).

Купив лицензию на выпуск копии Су-27, китайская сторона изготовила лишь 105 машин из запланированных 200 (причём из них 40 — учебно-тренировочные, двухместные). Затем в КНР отказалась от лицензионного производства. Вместо этого, был налажен выпуск не-лицензионной копии — J-11B^[51][90]. А худшее качество китайских двигателей по сравнению с АЛ-31Ф стимулировало попытки хищений последних (и комплектующих к ним) в РФ^[89].

После покупки образцов РСЗО «Смерч» в конце 1990-х, был налажен выпуск не-лицензионных копий: PHL-03, и полной копии A-100.

Сотрудничество в области науки, образования и культуры[править | править код]

В послевоенные годы очень активно в СССР публиковали переводы китайских авторов: только в 1946—1960-е годы было издано 976 книг общим тиражом около 43 млн экземпляров^[91]. В 1952—1966 годах по китайским официальным данным в вузах СССР прошли обучение 25 тысяч китайцев^[92]. В 1993 году в вузах и НИИ КНР работало более 1 тысячи ученых из России^[19]. В 1990-е годы развивался студенческий обмен: в 1993 году в вузах России обучалось (главным образом за свой счет) около 12 тысяч студентов из КНР^[19], а в 1997 году в вузах Поднебесной было около 600 студентов из РФ^[19].
По данным Минобрнауки РФ, в начале 2014 года в вузах России обучались уже 23 тысячи китайских студентов, а в Китае—около 15 тысяч российских студентов^[93]. В 2014 году в России работали 18 Институтов Конфуция^[94]. В 2010 году Институт океанографии Циндао совместно с российским Тихоокеанским океанографическим институтом провели первую российско-китайскую океанографическую экспедицию в Охотском море^[95]. В 2000-е годы в КНР были созданы три российско-китайских технопарка: в 2001 году в Цзюйхуа (первый совместный технопарк РФ и КНР), в 2006 году в Чанчуне, в 2006 году инкубатор высоких технологий в Шэньяне^[96]. Также создан российско-китайский технопарк в Харбине^[97]. В РФ же действует только один российско-китайский технопарк «Дружба», созданный в 2003 году в Москве^[97].

2019: перспективы упрощения визового режима между Россией и Китаем.^[98]

Гуманитарное сотрудничество[править | править код]

В 2004 году КНР передала РФ 600 тыс. долларов на восстановление разрушенных школ Чечни, а Москва помогла пострадавшей от холодов провинции Гуйчжоу, а также провинции Сычуань после землетрясений 2008 и 2010 годов^[99].
В 2010 году Пекин выделил гуманитарной помощи на 3,9 млн долларов на помощь в ликвидации лесных пожаров в России^[99].

Медицина[править | править код]

Хотя первый медик из России, английский хирург Томас Гарвин, появился в Цинской империи в 1715 году, создание русской сети медицинских учреждений в Поднебесной связано со строительством КВЖД^[100]. Белая эмиграция привела к переселению в Китай большого числа российских медицинских работников. В 1946—1957 гг. в лечебных учреждениях Китая (Синьцзян, Маньчжурия, Пекин) работали более 3 тыс. советских медицинских работников, которые оказали медицинскую помощь 2650 тыс. китайским гражданам^[101]. В 1957 году все советские лечебные учреждения в Китае, а также их оборудование и запасы медикаментов были безвозмездно переданы властям КНР^[101].

Туризм[править | править код]

Улучшение отношений между СССР и КНР привело к тому, что в 1990 году Китай посетило 109,8 тыс. туристов из Советского Союза^[102]. В дальнейшем число туристов из РФ возросло до 1080,0 тыс. в 2000 году и достигло пика в 3123 тыс. в 2008 году^[102]. В 2013 году Китай посетили 2186 тыс. российских туристов^[102].
КНР посетили в 2004 году 1790 тыс. туристов из России, что поставило РФ на третье (после Японии и Южной Кореи) место в мире по числу туристов, посетивших Поднебесную^[19].

Отмечается, что при организации туристических поездок граждан КНР в РФ, происходит дискриминация российской стороны (переводчиков, гидов, обслуживающие компании — гостиницы, магазины и др.), так как все средства, потраченные туристами, уходят китайским предпринимателям. Только в их гостиницах размещают туристов; посещаются только их магазины по продаже сувениров и т.п.; российские переводчики остаются без работы, а заменившие их китайцы не всегда дают туристам достоверную информацию^[103]. Рост турпоездок, и разрешение иностранным гражданам скупать землю (не сельхозугодья) привёл к тому, что граждане КНР уже без подставных лиц скупают по дешёвке землю под застройку около Байкала, строят там мини-гостиницы, и используют их для приёма «серых» тургрупп. Компании, организующие эти поездки, не используют местных гидов и переводчиков, платят налоги в КНР, и рассказывают туристам о том, что РФ «временно владеет этой землёй, где раньше жили китайцы». Нарушения законодательства остаются без последствий^[104].

Изучение русского языка в Китае[править | править код]

Началом изучения русского языка в Китае является 1708 год, когда в Цинской империи была открыта первая русская школа^[105]. В 1960 году был издан «Большой русско-китайский словарь»^[106]. На начало 2009 года русский язык преподавался в 61 вузе КНР как основная специальность 652 преподавателями 6415 студентам^[107]. По состоянию на начало 2009 года в Китае русский язык как иностранный изучали 30 тыс. студентов (под руководством 600 преподавателей), 70 тыс. школьников в 97 школах^[107].

Изучение китайского языка в России[править | править код]

В XVIII веке в России был создан ряд школ китайского языка, но они не просуществовали долго: одна школа функционировала в 1739—1741 годах в Тобольске; затем в Петербурге в 1741—1751 годах действовала школа И. К. Россохина, и там же школа А. Л. Леонтьева (1763—1767 годы)^[108]. В 1798 году при Коллегии иностранных дел была официально учреждена школа для подготовки переводчиков с китайского, татарского, персидского, маньчжурского, турецкого языков^[109]. В 1727—1864 годах в Пекин для обучения прибыли 48 учеников из России (Россия была единственной европейской страной, которая получила право по Кяхтинскому договору посылать учеников в Цинскую империю)^[110].

В РФ запланировали ввести китайский язык в ЕГЭ в ~2018—2019 гг.^[111] — это станет достаточным основанием для поступление в ВУЗ (как знание иностранного языка).

Миграция[править | править код]

Китайских граждан в Россию[править | править код]

Трудовая миграция из КНР в советский период

Перепись 1923 года выявила в Приморье 50 188 китайских рабочих^[112]. Начало первой послевоенной волны миграции связано с изданием 17 ноября 1945 года Постановления СНК СССР, которое предусматривало привлечение из Маньчжурии до 50 тыс. рабочих на предприятия золотой, вольфрамово-молибденовой и оловянной промышленности^[113]. Хотя реально вероятно удалось набрать гораздо меньше, но вербованные из Поднебесной составили заметную часть рабочей силы на Дальнем Востоке — например, в 1946 году в тресте «Приморзолото» трудились 4 тыс. китайцев, в том числе 800 военнопленных^[113].

Следующая волна трудовой миграции связана с заключением в 1954 году соглашения между СССР и КНР о привлечении для работы в Советский Союз 80 тыс. китайских трудовых мигрантов.
Однако, в связи с последующим фактическим разрывом советско-китайских отношений, трудовая миграция стала на многие годы невозможна.
Трудовая миграция из КНР в СССР возобновилась в 1986 году и уже в 1989 году на Дальнем Востоке трудились в строительной отрасли 2363 китайских рабочих^[114]. Уже в 1995 году в РФ легально работало 26,5 тысяч китайских рабочих^[19].

Трудовая миграция из КНР после 1991 г.

Одно из основных опасений на сегодняшний день — проблема стихийной и незаконной иммиграции китайских граждан на территорию России, особенно российского Дальнего Востока^[89][115]. Распространено мнение, что если данная тенденция сохранится, то русские на Дальнем Востоке станут национальным меньшинством, более ста миллионов человек живут в трёх провинциях Северо-Восточного Китая, в то время как по другую сторону границы население, проживающее на 6,2 миллионах квадратных километров Дальневосточного федерального округа, сократилось примерно с девяти миллионов в 1991 году до семи миллионов в 2002 году^[116].

Многие эксперты отмечают сильное завышение масштабов «китайской угрозы» в современных СМИ, научно-популярных передачах и выступлениях политиков, полагая, что реальные объёмы иммиграции из Китая пока не позволяют говорить о превращении русских на Дальнем Востоке в «национальное меньшинство» в обозримой перспективе^[117]. Тем не менее, по мнению многих русских демографов, число китайцев в России в 34 500 чел. по данным переписи может представлять собой недоучёт, полагая более реальной оценку от 200 000 до 400 000. Например, по оценкам Жанны Зайончковской, руководительницы лабораторией миграции населения Национального экономического института прогнозирования Российской Академии наук, в 2004 году общее количество китайцев в настоящее время в России в любой момент (резидентов или туристов) составляет около 400 000 человек^[118].

Присутствие китайцев в РФ создаёт и другие проблемы: возможность их участия в потенциальном конфликте, как во время Китайско-вьетнамской войны^[119].

Автор статьи в китайском издании не рассматривает возможность военного решения проблемы освоения китайцами не населённой (по его мнению) территории РФ^[120] Аналогично, Ли Юаньчао, заместитель председателя КНР^[121] отметил необходимость объединения российской территории и трудолюбивого китайского населения, что (по его мнению) приведёт к значительному прогрессу.

Из России в Китай[править | править код]

За 15 лет (1997—2012) из РФ в КНР на постоянное место жительства выехало 15 404 человека. Пиком стал 2012 год, когда иммигрировали 4358 россиян (в 2011 году — только 507 россиян)^[122].

Международное сотрудничество[править | править код]

Международные организации:

• Шанхайская организация сотрудничества
• МАГАТЭ

Россия — КНР — Индия[править | править код]

Идею создания стратегического треугольника Россия — Индия — Китай первым из известных политических деятелей выдвинул ещё в 1998 году российский премьер-министр Евгений Примаков. Не в состоянии остановить готовившуюся операцию НАТО против Югославии, Примаков призвал к сотрудничеству трёх стран как своего рода противодействию однополярности в мире. Потребовалось, однако, несколько лет для того, чтобы это предложение было поддержано дипломатами.

Первые трёхсторонние встречи в этом формате состоялись в Нью-Йорке в период сессий Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН в 2002 и 2003, а в 2004 — в Алма-Ате в ходе Совещания по взаимодействию и мерам доверия в Азии.
В июне 2005 встреча министров иностранных дел России, Китая и Индии впервые состоялась на территории одного из трёх государств «треугольника» — во Владивостоке.

Взаимодействие трёх государств, суммарное население которых составляет 40 % населения земного шара, позволяет повысить международный вес каждой из них. Судя по заявлениям лидеров трёх стран, их сотрудничество не направлено против кого бы то ни было, но в то же время оно призвано сделать мир многополярным и способствовать демократизации миропорядка.

Каждое из государств, по-видимому, преследует, помимо общих, ещё и индивидуальные интересы:

• Индия и Китай рассчитывают получить доступ к российским энергоносителям — нефти и газу;
• Россия подчёркивает важность практического сотрудничества в борьбе с международным терроризмом, наркотрафиком и другими новыми угрозами (особенно в зоне, прилегающей к территории всех трёх стран, — в Центральной Азии, поскольку возможное усиление исламского экстремизма в этом регионе способно ударить по каждому из трёх государств);
• Индия рассчитывает на поддержку её стремления стать постоянным членом Совета Безопасности ООН; Россия и Китай согласны, что ООН нуждается в реформах; предполагается, что к сентябрьской сессии^{[какой?]} ООН три государства выйдут с совместными предложениями.
• Индия стремилась войти в Шанхайскую организацию сотрудничества (ШОС; вошла в неё в 2017 году вместе с Пакистаном) и играть более активную роль в Центральной Азии.

Сотрудничество в рамках «треугольника» уже позволило начать процесс нормализации отношений между Китаем и Индией и урегулирования пограничных проблем. Полностью урегулированы пограничные вопросы между Китаем и Россией (см. выше).

Наблюдатели указывают на то, что партнёрство трёх государств организационно пока никак не оформлено и, возможно, не примет чётких международно-правовых форм, поскольку это означало бы образование альтернативного США центра силы в Азии и неминуемо вызвало бы их негативную реакцию.

В настоящее время ни одному из трёх государств этого по разным причинам не хотелось бы. В частности, Россия рассматривает США как партнёра в борьбе с распространением ядерного оружия и за поддержание стратегической стабильности в мире.

Нумизматика[править | править код]

3 июня 2019 года Банк России выпустил в обращение памятную серебряную номиналом 3 рубля и золотую номиналом 50 рублей монеты «70 лет установления дипломатических отношений с КНР»^[123].

См. также[править | править код]

• Внешняя политика Китая
• История Китая — Цинский Китай и Россия
• Русско-китайская конвенция 1898
• Рагузинский-Владиславич, Савва Лукич
• Русская духовная миссия в Пекине
• Православие в Китае
• Китайская угроза

Выдающиеся исследователи в области российско-китайских отношений[править | править код]

XIX век

• Иакинф Бичурин | трад. 乙阿欽特, упр. 乙阿钦特, пиньинь: Yǐāqīntè, палл.: Иациньтэ; в миру Никита Яковлевич Бичурин (1777—1853) — архимандрит Православной российской церкви (1802—1823); востоковед и путешественник, знаток китайского языка, истории, географии и культуры, первый профессиональный русский синолог, получивший общеевропейскую известность.

XXI век

• Владимир Мясников, советский и российский историк, востоковед, китаист, специалист в области российско-китайских отношений, истории внешней политики. Академик Российской Академии наук, доктор исторических наук, профессор. Преподаватель Военно-дипломатической Академии в Москве. Автор около 500 опубликованных книг, монографий и научных трудов.
• Алексей Постников, — доктор технических наук, профессор, специалист в области истории картографии, географии и геополитики в Азии. Автор около 300 опубликованных книг, монографий и других научных трудов. Отдельные работы посвящены истории российско-китайских отношений.

Литература[править | править код]

• Мясников В.С. Русско-китайские отношения 1689—1916. — Москва: Политическая литература, 1958. — количество ? с. — тираж ? экз.
• Мясников В.С. Империя Цин и Русское государство в XVII веке / Отв. ред. чл.-кор. АН СССР С. Л. Тихвинский; Институт Дальнего Востока АН СССР. — Москва: Наука (ГРВЛ), 1980. — 312 с. — 5000 экз.
• Мясников В. С. Russia and China. 400 years of interstate ties. — New York — London: издательство, 2001. — количество ? с. — тираж ? экз. — ISBN ?.
• Постников А. В. Становление рубежей России в Центральной и Средней Азии (XVIII—XIX вв.). — Москва: Памятники исторической мысли, 2007. — 464 с. — 800 экз. — ISBN 5-88451-216-0. (в пер.)
• Постников А. В. История географического изучения и картографирования Сибири и Дальнего Востока в XVII — начале XX вв. в связи с формированием русско-китайской границы. — Москва: Ленанд, 2013. — 364 с. — ISBN 978-5-9710-0699-2.
• Русско-китайские отношения в XX веке. Многотомное издание. — Москва
• Чжан Би Юй. Тенденции развития туристического комплекса Китая. — Москва, 2015. — 200 с.
• П. В. Густерин. Архимандрит Аввакум (к истории Тяньцзиньского трактата 1858 года) // Новая и новейшая история. 2008, № 6.
• Наземцева Е. Н. Русская эмиграция в Синьцзяне (1920—1930 гг.). Барнаул, 2010.
• Невельской Г. И. Подвиги русских морских офицеров на крайнем востоке России 1849—1855, ОГИЗ, Москва, 1947.

Статьи

• Игорь Денисов. Встреча на рейде // Лента.ру. — 2014.

Ссылки[править | править код]

• И. М. Попов. РОССИЯ И КИТАЙ: 300 лет на грани войны (Очерки истории военно-политических отношений) Москва: Издательство «АСТ-Астрель», 2004. 511 с.
• Россия-Китай: документальное приложение // milresource.ru
• Договоры России с Китаем 1858—1902 гг. на hist.msu.ru
• Моисеев В. А. «Россия и Китай в Центральной Азии (вторая половина XIX в. — 1917 гг.)»
• Россия и Китай — выход межгосударственного сотрудничества на новый уровень // журнал Внешнеэкономические связи
• Волынец Алексей «Как Сталин в Китай инвестировал» // rusplt.ru
• Волынец Алексей «Россия и Китай: первая попытка военного союза. Как две континентальные империи пытались „дружить“ против европейцев» // warspot.ru
• Не видать юаня: как Россия провалила разворот на Восток // Новая газета, 9.05.2019
• Стоит ли России верить в дружбу с Китаем // Взгляд, 6 июня 2019

Примечания[править | править код]

Prior to the 17th century China and Russia were on opposite ends of Siberia, which was populated by independent nomads. By about 1640 Russian settlers had traversed most of Siberia and founded settlements in the Amur River basin. From 1652 to 1689, China’s armies drove the Russian settlers out, but after 1689, China and Russia made peace and established trade agreements.

By the mid-19th century, China’s economy and military lagged far behind the colonial powers. It signed unequal treaties with Western countries and Russia, through which Russia annexed the Amur basin and Vladivostok. The Russian Empire and Western powers exacted many other concessions from China, such as indemnities for anti-Western riots, control over China’s tariffs, and extraterritorial agreements including legal immunity for foreigners and foreign businesses.

Meanwhile, Russian culture and society, especially the elite, were westernized. The ruler of Russia officially was no longer called tsar but emperor, an import from Western Europe.^[1][2]

Issues that affected only Russia and China were mainly the Russian-Chinese border since Russia, unlike the Western countries, bordered China. Many Chinese people felt humiliated by China’s submission to foreign interests, which contributed to widespread hostility towards the emperor of China.

In 1911, the Xinhai Revolution broke out and led to the establishment of the Republic of China. However, China’s new regime, known as the Beiyang government, was forced to sign more unequal treaties with Western countries and with Russia.^[3][4] In recent years, Russia and China signed a border agreement.^[5]

In late 1917, Moscow and Petrograd were taken over by a communist group, the Bolsheviks, during the October Revolution, which caused the Russian Civil War between the Bolshevik Red Army and the anticommunist White forces. China’s Beiyang government sided with the Whites and, along with most of the West, sent troops to fight against the Reds. In 1922, the Reds won the civil war and established a new country: the Soviet Union. In 1923, the Soviets provided aid and support to the Kuomintang, a Chinese faction that had been opposed to the Beiyang government. In alliance with the small Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Kuomintang seized power in 1928, and both countries established diplomatic ties. Sino–Soviet relations remained fractious, and both countries fought two wars for the next ten years. Nevertheless, the Soviets, under Joseph Stalin, helped Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang government against Imperial Japan. Stalin told the Communists’ leader, Mao Zedong, to co-operate with China’s Kuomintang regime, but once in power, the Kuomintang orchestrated a violent mass purge of Communists, referred to as the Shanghai Massacre.

In 1937, the Kuomintang and the communists formed a new alliance to oppose the Japanese invasion of China, but they resumed fighting each other in 1942. After Japan had been defeated in 1945, both Chinese factions signed a truce, but the Chinese Civil War soon erupted again between them.

In 1949, with Soviet support, the communists won the Chinese Civil War and established the People’s Republic of China, which made an alliance with the Soviets. Mao became the first leader of Communist China. Mao’s most radical supporters, who became known as the «Gang of Four,» gradually eliminated most of his rivals throughout his 27 years in power.

Ideological tension between the two countries emerged after Stalin’s death in 1953. Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s crimes in 1956, and both regimes started to criticise each other. At first, the criticism was indirect and muted, but in 1961, Mao accused the Soviet leadership of revisionism, and the alliance openly ended. Both countries competed for control over foreign communist states and political movements, and many countries had two rival communist parties that concentrated their fire on each other.

In 1969, a brief border war between the two countries occurred. Khrushchev had been replaced by Leonid Brezhnev in 1964, who abandoned many Soviet reforms criticized by Mao. However, China’s anti-Soviet rhetoric intensified under the influence of Mao’s closest supporters, the Gang of Four. Mao died in 1976, and the Gang of Four lost power in 1978.

After a period of instability, Deng Xiaoping became the new leader of China. The philosophical difference between both countries lessened somewhat since China’s new leadership abandoned anti-revisionism.

China’s internal reforms did not bring an immediate end to conflict with the Soviet Union. In 1979, China invaded Vietnam, which was a Soviet ally. China also sent aid to the mujahedin against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1982, Brezhnev made a speech offering reconciliation with China, and Deng agreed to restore diplomatic relations.

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, reduced the Soviet garrisons at the Sino–Soviet border and in Mongolia, resumed trade, and dropped the border issue that had caused open war 16 years earlier. In 1989, he withdrew Soviet support from the communist government of Afghanistan. Rapprochement accelerated after the Soviet Union fell and was replaced by the Russian Federation in 1991.

Sino–Russian relations since 1991 are currently close and cordial. Both countries maintain a strong geopolitical and regional alliance and significant levels of trade.

Imperial period[edit]

Lying at opposite ends of Eurasia, the two countries had little contact before about 1640.^[6] Both had to deal with the steppe nomads, Russia from the south and China from the northwest. Russia became a northern neighbor of China when in 1582–1643 Russian adventurers made themselves masters of the Siberian forests. There were three points of contact: 1) south to the Amur River basin (early), 2) east along the southern edge of Siberia toward Peking (the main axis) and 3) in Turkestan (late).

The Oirats transmitted some garbled and incorrect descriptions of China to the Russians in 1614, the name «Taibykankan» was used to refer to the Wanli Emperor by the Oirats.^[7]

South to the Amur (1640–1689)[edit]

About 1640 Siberian cossacks spilled over the Stanovoy Mountains to the Amur River basin. This land was claimed by the Manchus who at this time were just beginning their conquest of China (Qing dynasty). By 1689 the Russians were driven back over the mountains and the Stanovoy Mountains remained the Russo-Chinese frontier from the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) to the Treaty of Aigun in 1859. For a full account see Sino–Russian border conflicts.^[8]

Russian expansion eastward along the southern edge of Siberia[edit]

Russian expansion in Siberia was confined to the forested area because the Cossacks were skilled in forest travel and were seeking furs while the forest natives were weak and the steppe nomads warlike. In the west, Siberia borders on the Kazakh Steppe. North of what is now Mongolia, there are mountains, Lake Baikal and more mountains until the Argun River separates Trans-Baikalia from Manchuria. West of Siberia, Russia slowly expanded down the Volga, around the southern Urals and out into the Kazakh steppe.

Early contacts[edit]

From the time of Kievan Rus’ there was trade (fur, slaves) down the Volga to the Caspian Sea and Persia. Later trade extended southeast to the main Asian trade routes at Bukhara. Under the Mongol Yoke, Russian princes would regularly travel to Sarai for investiture. When Marco Polo returned from China he mentioned Russia as an obscure country in the far north. In 1466/73 Afanasy Nikitin made a journey southeast to India and left an interesting account. After the English reached the White Sea, Anthony Jenkinson travelled through Muscovy to Bukhara. In 1608 the Voivode of Tomsk tried and failed to reach China via the Altan Khan in western Mongolia. In 1616 a second attempt got as far as the Khan (Vasilly Tyumenets and Ivan Petrov). The first Russian to reach Peking was probably Ivan Petlin in 1618/19.

After the Russians reached Trans-Baikalia in the 1640s, some trade developed, but it is poorly documented. At this point there were three routes: 1) Irtysh River and east across Dzungaria and Mongolia, 2) Lake Baikal, Selenga River and southeast (the shortest) and 3) Lake Baikal, east to Nerchinsk, and south (slow but safe).

Early Russo-Chinese relations were difficult for three reasons: mutual ignorance, lack of a common language and the Chinese wish to treat the Russians as tributary barbarians, something that the Russians would not accept and did not fully understand. The language problem was solved when the Russians started sending Latin-speaking westerners who could speak to the Jesuit missionaries in Beijing.

In 1654 Fyodor Baykov was sent as the first ambassador, but his mission failed because he was unwilling to comply with the rules of Chinese diplomacy. Setkul Ablin, a Central Asian in the Russian service travelled to Peking in 1655,1658 and 1668. It was apparently on his third trip that the Manchus realized that these people from the west were the same as those who were raiding the Amur. In 1670 the Nerchinsk voyvode sent Ignatiy Milovanov to Beijing (he was probably the first Russian to cross Manchuria). The next ambassador, Nicholae Milescu (1675–78) was also unsuccessful. After months of fruitless arguments, he was given a blunt lecture about the proper behavior of tributary barbarians and sent home. After the capture of Albazin in 1685, a few Russians, commonly referred to as Albazinians, settled in Beijing where they founded the Chinese Orthodox Church.

Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689)[edit]

After their first victory at Albazin in 1685, the Manchus sent two letters to the Tsar (in Latin) suggesting peace and demanding that Russian freebooters leave the Amur. The resulting negotiations led the Treaty of Nerchinsk. The Russians gave up the Amur valley but kept the land between Lake Baikal and the Argun River. The treaty said nothing about what is now Mongolia since that area was then controlled by the Oirat Zunghar Khanate.^[9]

After Nerchinsk regular caravans started running from Nerchinsk south to Peking. Some of the traders were Central Asians. The round trip took from ten to twelve months. The trade was apparently profitable to the Russians but less so to the Chinese. The Chinese were also disenchanted by the drunken brawls of the traders. In 1690 the Qing defeated the Oirats at the Great Wall and gained complete control over the Khalka Mongols in Inner Mongolia. In 1696 the Oirats were defeated and driven back to the Altai Mountains (Kangxi Emperor in person with 80,000 troops in a battle near Ulan Bator). This opened the possibility of trade from Baikal southeastward and raised the problem of the northern border of Outer Mongolia. In March 1692 Eberhard Isbrand Ides, a Dane in the Russian service, was sent from Nerchinsk as ambassador. The Manchus raised the question of the border west of the Argun. Ides returned to Moscow January 1695. From this time it was decided that the China trade would be a state monopoly. Four state caravans travelled from Moscow to Peking between 1697 and 1702. The fourth returned via Selenginsk (near Lake Baikal) in 90 days and bore a letter from the Li-Fan Yuan suggesting that future trade use this route.

In 1712 Tulishen became the first Manchu or Chinese official to visit Russia (not counting earlier visits to Nerchinsk). He was mainly interested in the Kalmyks along the Caspian Sea and how they might be used to deal with their cousins, the Oirats. He left Peking in June 1712 and reached Tobolsk in August 1713. Here he learned that he could not see the Tsar because of the Swedish wars. He went to Saratov and down the Volga to visit Ayuka Khan of the Kalmyks. He returned to Peking in April 1715. His report, ‘Yiyilu’ of ‘Record of Strange Regions’ was long the main source of Chinese knowledge of Russia.

About this time the Kangxi Emperor began to put pressure on Saint Petersburg to delineate the Mongolian border west of the Argun, and several Russian caravans were held up. In July 1719 Lev Izmailov^[10] was sent as ambassador to Peking where he dealt with Tulishen, but the Chinese would not deal with the trade problem until the border was dealt with. Izmailov returned to Moscow in January 1722. Lorents Lange was left as consul in Peking, but was expelled in July 1722. He returned to Selenginsk and sent reports to Petersburg.

Treaty of Kyakhta (1729)[edit]

Just before his death, Peter the Great decided to deal with the border problem. The result was the Treaty of Kyakhta. This defined the northern border of what is now Mongolia (except for Tuva) and opened up the Kyakhta caravan trade southeast to Peking.

The needs for communication between the Russian and Chinese traders at Kyakhta and elsewhere resulted in the development of a pidgin, known to linguists as Kyakhta Russian-Chinese Pidgin.^[11]

The treaties of Nerchinsk and Kyakhta were the basis of Russo-Chinese relations until the Treaty of Aigun in 1858. The fixed border helped the Chinese to gain full control of Outer Mongolia and annex Xinjiang by about 1755. Russo-Chinese trade shifted from Nerchinsk to Kyakhta and the Nerchensk trade died out by about 1750. (Local trade in this area shifted east to a border town called Tsurukhaitu on the Argun River).^[12]

Turkestan[edit]

After the Russians reached Tobolsk in 1585, it was natural to continue up the Irtysh River to the Kazakh steppes north of Lake Balkhash to Dzungaria and western Mongolia, which was the route used by Fyodor Baykov to reach China. In 1714, Peter the Great sent Ivan Bukholts with 1,500 troops, including Swedish miners who were prisoners of war, up the Irtysh to Lake Zaysan to search for gold. The next year, he ascended the river again with 3,000 workers to build a fort. Tsewang Rabtan (or Tseren-Donduk) of the Zunghar Khanate attacked them and drove them back to Omsk. In 1720, an expedition, under Ivan Likharev, ascended the river and founded a permanent settlement at Ust-Kamenogorsk just west of the lake. Meanwhile, the Zunghars were severely defeated by the Manchus and driven out of Tibet. In 1721 to 1723, Peter sent Ivan Unkovsky to attempt to discuss an alliance. A major reason for the failure was that Lorents Lange at Selenginsk had turned over a number of Mongol refugees to the Manchus as part of the buildup to the Treaty of Kyakhta. In 1755, the Qing destroyed the remnants of the Zunghar Khanate, creating a Russo-Chinese border in Xinjiang. The area did not become active again until the Russian conquest of Turkestan.^[13]

1755–1917[edit]

Meeting in Central Asia[edit]

As the Chinese Empire established its control over Xinjiang in the 1750s, and the Russian Empire expanded into Kazakhstan at the beginning and in the middle of the 19th century, the two empires’ areas of control met in what is today eastern Kazakhstan and Western Xinjiang. The 1851 Treaty of Kulja legalized trade between both countries in the region.^[14]

Russian encroachment[edit]

In 1858, during the Second Opium War, China grew increasingly weaker as the «Sick man of Asia» while Russia strengthened and eventually annexed the north bank of the Amur River and the coast down to the Korean border in the «Unequal Treaties» of Treaty of Aigun (1858) and the Convention of Peking (1860). Russia and Japan gained control of Sakhalin Island.

The Manza War (1868) was the first attempt by Russia to expel the Chinese from the territory that it controlled.^[15] Hostilities broke out around Peter the Great Gulf, Vladivostok, when the Russians tried to shut off gold mining operations and to expel Chinese workers there.^[16] The Chinese resisted a Russian attempt to take Askold Island and in response, two Russian military stations and three Russian towns were attacked by the Chinese, and the Russians failed to oust the Chinese.^[17]

Russia’s special status[edit]

Unlike other Western countries, who deal with the Qing court on a monarch to monarch basis, Sino–Russian relations were governed by administrative bodies, the Qing’s Board of Foreign Affairs (Lifan Yuan) and the Russian Senate (Senat). Unlike the Netherlands and Portugal in the 18th century, who were considered part of the tribute system,^[18] Russia was able to trade directly with Beijing, and their relations were under the jurisdiction of Mongolian and Manchu border officials.^[19] Russia established an Orthodox mission in Beijing in the early 18th century, and was able to escape the anti Christian persecutions of the Qing dynasty.^[20]

The Great Game and the 1870s Xinjiang border Dispute[edit]

A British observer, Demetrius Charles de Kavanagh Boulger, suggested a British-Chinese alliance to check Russian expansion in Central Asia.

During the Ili crisis, when Qing China threatened to go to war against Russia over the Russian occupation of Ili, a British officer, Charles George Gordon, was sent to China by Britain to advise China on its military options against Russia in a potential war between China and Russia.^[21]

The Russians occupied the city of Kuldja, in Xinjiang, during the Dungan revolt (1862–1877). After General Zuo Zongtang and his Xiang Army crushed the rebels, they demanded for Russia to return the occupied regions.

General Zuo Zongtang was outspoken in calling for war against Russia and hoped to settle the matter by attacking Russian forces in Xinjiang with his Xiang army. In 1878, tension increased in Xinjiang, and Zuo massed Chinese troops toward Russian-occupied Kuldja. Chinese forces also fired on Russian expeditionary forces originating from Yart Vernaic, expelled them, and caused a Russian retreat.^[22]

The Russians observed that the Chinese building up their arsenal of modern weapons during the Ili crisis since they had bought thousands of rifles from Germany.^[23] In 1880, massive amounts of military equipment and rifles were shipped via boats to China from Antwerp as China purchased torpedoes, artillery, and 260,260 modern rifles from Europe.^[24]

A Russian military observer, D. V. Putiatia, visited China in 1888 and found that in Northeastern China (Manchuria), along the Chinese-Russian border, the Chinese soldiers could become adept at «European tactics» under certain circumstances and were armed with modern weapons, like Krupp artillery, Winchester carbines, and Mauser rifles.^[25]

Compared to the Russian-controlled areas, more benefits were given to the Muslim Kirghiz in the Chinese-controlled areas. Russian settlers fought against the Muslim nomadic Kirghiz, which led the Russians to believe that the Kirghiz would be a liability in any conflict against China. The Muslim Kirghiz were sure that a war would have China defeat Russia.^[26]

The Qing dynasty forced Russia to hand over disputed territory in the Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1881) in what was widely seen by the west as a diplomatic victory for the Qing.^[27] Russia acknowledged that China could pose a serious military threat.^[28] Mass media in the West portrayed China as a rising military power because of its modernization programs and as a major threat to the West. They even invoked fears that China would manage to conquer western colonies like Australia.^[29]

Russian sinologists, the Russian media, the threat of internal rebellion, the pariah status inflicted by the Congress of Berlin, and the negative state of the Russian economy all led Russia to concede and negotiate with China in Saint Petersburg and to return most of Ili to China.^[30]

Historians have judged the Qing dynasty’s vulnerability and weakness to foreign imperialism in the 19th century to be based mainly on its maritime naval weakness although it achieved military success against Westerners on land. Historian Edward L. Dreyer stated, «China’s nineteenth-century humiliations were strongly related to her weakness and failure at sea. At the start of the Opium War, China had no unified navy and no sense of how vulnerable she was to attack from the sea; British forces sailed and steamed wherever they wanted to go…. In the Arrow War (1856–60), the Chinese had no way to prevent the Anglo-French expedition of 1860 from sailing into the Gulf of Zhili and landing as near as possible to Beijing. Meanwhile, new but not exactly modern Chinese armies suppressed the midcentury rebellions, bluffed Russia into a peaceful settlement of disputed frontiers in Central Asia, and defeated the French forces on land in the Sino–French War (1884–85). But the defeat of the fleet, and the resulting threat to steamship traffic to Taiwan, forced China to conclude peace on unfavorable terms.»^[31]

According to Henry Hugh Peter Deasy in 1901 on the people of Xinjiang: «insurrection is about the last course to which the natives would of their own accord resort. Any riots and disturbances which occur are got up by the officials for the purpose of inflicting injury on foreigners. The population have no fighting courage, no arms, no leaders, are totally incapable of combined action, and, so far as the government of their own country is concerned. may be regarded as of no account. They have been squeezed to the utmost, but would prefer to remain under the dominion of China. If they are questioned, they say ‘The Chinese plunder us, but they do not drive and hustle us, and we can do as we please.’ This opinion agrees with that of the Andijanis, or natives of Russian Turkestan, who assert that Russian rule is much disliked among them, owing to the harassing administration to which they are subjected.»^[32]

1890s alliance[edit]

Russian Finance Minister Sergei Witte controlled East Asian policy in the 1890s.^[33] His goal was the peaceful expansion of trade and the increase of Russian influence over China. Japan’s greatly-expanded and -modernized military easily defeated the antiquated Chinese forces in the First Sino–Japanese War (1894–1895). Russia now faced the choice of working with Japan, which had fairly good relations for some years, or acting as protector of China against Japan. Witte chose the latter policy, and in 1894 Russia joined Britain and France in forcing Japan to soften the peace terms that it had imposed on China. Japan was forced to return the Liaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur (both territories in southeastern Manchuria, a Chinese province) to China. The new Russian role angered Tokyo, which decided that Russia was the main enemy in its quest to control Manchuria, Korea, and China. Witte underestimated Japan’s growing economic and military power and exaggerated Russia’s military prowess.^[34]

Russia concluded an alliance with China in 1896 by the Li–Lobanov Treaty, with China a junior partner and practically a protectorate.^[35] It led in 1898 to an occupation and administration by Russian personnel and police of the entire Liaodong Peninsula and to a fortification of the ice-free Port Arthur. Since Russia was receiving large-loans from France, Witte used some of the funds to establish the Russo-Chinese Bank, which provided 100 million rubles for China to fund the reparations that it owed to Japan. Along with the International Commercial Bank of St-Petersburg, it became the conduit through which Russian capital was funneled into East Asia. Furthermore, the Russo-Chinese Bank bankrolled the Russian government’s policies towards Manchuria and Korea. That enormous leverage allowed Russia to make strategic leases of key military ports and defense stations.^[36] The Chinese government ceded its concession rights for building and owning the new Chinese Eastern Railway, which was to cross northern Manchuria from the west to the east, to link Siberia with Vladivostok, and strengthen the military capabilities of the Russian forces in the Far East greatly. It was built in 1898 to 1903 and operated by the Russo-Chinese Bank and allowed Russia to become economically dominant in Manchuria, which was still nominally controlled by Peking.^[37]

In 1899, the Boxer Rebellion broke out with Chinese nativist attacks on all foreigners. A large coalition of eleven major Western powers, led by Russia and Japan, sent an army to relieve their diplomatic missions in Peking and to take control of the Chinese capital.^[38] The Russian government used it as an opportunity to bring a substantial army into Manchuria, which became a fully-incorporated outpost of Russia in 1900. Japan started to prepare for a war with Russia over Korea and Manchuria.^[36]

Russo-Japanese War[edit]

Chinese Honghuzi bandits were nomads who came from China, roamed the area around Manchuria and the Russo-Chinese border, and raided Russian settlers in the Far East from 1870 to 1920.^[39]

Revolutions[edit]

Both countries saw their monarchies abolished during the 1910s, the Chinese Qing dynasty in 1912, following the Xinhai Revolution, and the Russian Romanov dynasty in 1917, following the February Revolution.

Soviet Union, Republic of China, People’s Republic of China[edit]

Russian Civil War and Mongolia[edit]

The Beiyang government, in Northern China, joined the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War. It sent 2,300 troops in Siberia and North Russia in 1918 after the request by the Chinese community in the area.^[40]

Mongolia and Tuva became contested territories. After being occupied by Chinese General Xu Shuzheng in 1919 and then by the Russian White
general turned independent warlord, Ungern von Sternberg, in 1920, Soviet troops, with the support of Mongolian guerrillas, led by Damdin Sükhbaatar, defeated the White warlord and established a new pro-Soviet Mongolian client state. By 1924, it had become the Mongolian People’s Republic.

KMT, CCP, and the Chinese Civil War[edit]

Soviet Foreign Minister Georgy Chicherin played a major role in establishing formal relations with China in 1924, and in designing the Kremlin’s China policy. He focused on the Chinese Eastern Railway, Manchuria, and the Mongolian issue.^[41][42][43] In 1921, the Soviet Union began supporting the Kuomintang, and in 1923, the Comintern instructed the CCP to sign a military treaty with the KMT. But in 1926, KMT leader, Chiang Kai-shek abruptly dismissed his Soviet advisers, and imposed restrictions on CCP participation in the government. By 1927, when the Northern Expedition was nearly concluded, Chiang purged the CCP from the KMT-CCP alliance, resulting in the Chinese Civil War which was to last until 1950, a few months after the People’s Republic of China, led by Mao Zedong, was proclaimed. During the war, some Soviet support was given to the CCP, who in 1934 were dealt a crushing blow when the KMT brought an end to the Chinese Soviet Republic, beginning the CCP’s Long March to Shaanxi.^[44]

Second Sino–Japanese War and World War II[edit]

In 1931, the Empire of Japan invaded Manchuria and created the puppet state of Manchukuo (1932), which signalled the beginning of the Second Sino–Japanese War. In 1937, a month after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Soviet Union established a non-aggression pact with the Republic of China. During the World War II-period, the two countries suffered more losses than any other country, with China (in the Second Sino–Japanese war) losing over 35 million and the Soviet Union 27 million people.

Joint-victory over Imperial Japan[edit]

On August 8, 1945, three months after Nazi Germany surrendered, and on the week of the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and 9), the Soviet Union launched the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, a massive military operation mobilizing 1.5 million soldiers against one million Kwantung Army troops, the last remaining Japanese military presence. Soviet forces won a decisive victory while the Kwantung suffered massive casualties, with 700,000 having surrendered. The Soviet Union distributed some of the weapons of the captured Kwantung Army to the CCP, who would go on to battle the KMT in the Chinese Civil War.

Independence of Mongolia[edit]

The China, Soviet Union: Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed by the Soviet Union and the Republic of China. It stated that possible Mongolian independence was in exchange for the Soviets’ failure to support the communists in China.

War of Liberation and the People’s Republic of China[edit]

Between 1946 and 1950, the CCP was increasingly enjoying massive support from the Chinese people in the «War of Liberation» and effectively implemented a people’s war, but the KMT became increasingly isolated and only belatedly attempted to stem corruption and to introduce popular reforms. On October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed by Mao Zedong, and by May 1950, the civil war was brought to an end by the Battle of Kuningtou, which saw the KMT expelled from Mainland China but remaining in control of Taiwan. With the creation of the People’s Republic of China, the supreme political authority in the two countries became centered in two communist parties, which both espoused revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology: the CCP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In 1951, Chinese Muslim General Bai Chongxi made a speech in Taiwan to the entire Muslim world that called for a war against the Soviets and the avoiding of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was accused of being blind to Soviet imperialism.^[45][46]

From camaraderie to the Sino–Soviet Split[edit]

After the PRC was proclaimed, the Soviet Union became its closest ally for several years. Soviet design, equipment, and skilled labour were sent out to help the Industrialization and the modernization of the PRC. In the 1960s, relations became deeply strained by the Sino–Soviet Split. In military terms, there was the low-level Sino–Soviet border conflict.

The split was ideological and forced communist parties around the world to take sides. Many of them split, and the pro-Soviet communists were battling the pro-Chinese communists for local control of global communis. The split quickly made a dead letter of the 1950 alliance between Moscow and Beijing, destroyed the socialist camp’s unity, and affected the world balance of power. Internally, it encouraged Mao to plunge China into the Cultural Revolution to expunge traces of Soviet ways of thinking. The quarrel began in 1958, after several years of close relations. Mao was always loyal to Stalin, and Nikita Khrushchev felt insulted. However, when the Warsaw Pact crushed the dissident movements in Eastern Europe in 1956, Beijing was pleased that Moscow had apparently realized the dangers of de-Stalinization and would no longer tolerate independence or encourage revisionism. Beijing was also pleased that the success of the Soviet Union in the space race (the original Sputniks) demonstrated that the international communist movement had caught up in high technology with the West. Mao argued that as far as all-out nuclear war was concerned, the human race would not be destroyed, but a brave new communist world would arise from the ashes of imperialism. That attitude troubled Moscow, which had a more realistic view of the utter disasters that would accompany a nuclear war. Three major issues suddenly became critical in dividing the two nations: Taiwan, India, and China’s Great Leap Forward. Although Moscow supported Beijing’s position of Taiwan entirely belonging to China, it demanded to be forewarned of any invasion or serious threat that would bring an American intervention. Beijing refused, and the Chinese bombardment of the island of Quemoy in August 1958 escalated the tensions. Moscow was cultivating India, both as a major purchaser of munitions and as a strategically critical ally. However China escalated its threats to the northern fringes of India, especially from Tibet, and was building a militarily significant road system that would reach disputed areas along the border. Moscow clearly favored India, and Beijing felt betrayed as a result.

By far, the major ideological issue was the Great Leap Forward, which represented the Chinese rejection of the Soviet form of economic development. The Soviets were deeply resentful, especially since they had spent heavily to supply China with cutting-edge technology, even including some nuclear tech. The Soviets withdrew their vital technicians and economic and military aid. Khrushchev was increasingly crude and intemperate in ridiculing China and Mao to both communist and noncommunist audiences. China responded through its official propaganda network of rejecting Moscow’s claim to Lenin’s heritage. Beijing insisted that it was the true inheritor of the great Leninist tradition.

At one major meeting of communist parties, Khrushchev personally attacked Mao as an ultraleftist and a left revisionist and compared him to Stalin for dangerous egotism. The conflict was now out of control and was increasingly fought out in 81 communist parties around the world. The final split came in July 1963, after 50,000 refugees escaped from Sinkiang, in Western China, to Soviet territory to escape persecution. China ridiculed the Soviet incompetence in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as adventurism and capitulationism that ended up in defeat. Moscow was increasingly prioritizing friendly relationships and test ban treaties with the United States and the United Kingdom.^{[47][48][49][50]}

Increasingly, China began to consider the Soviet Union, which it viewed as social imperialist, as the greatest threat it faced, more so than even the leading capitalist power, the United States. In turn, overtures were made between the PRC and the US, such as in the Ping Pong Diplomacy and the 1972 Nixon visit to China.

From 1965 to 1988, the Sino–Soviet border, including the Tumen River area, became highly militarized and fortified. That included a large concentration of tactical nuclear-armed missile sites on both sides of the zone. Until 1991, foreigners, consulates and nonresidents had not been permitted in Vladivostok since 1948 or in Yanbian or the border areas of Heilongjiang Province since 1965. Political, social, and economic conditions deteriorated further, as the Cultural Revolution disrupted Chinese life and institutions from 1966 to 1972. Periods of extreme tension in 1968 to 1970 along the eastern Sino–Soviet border (with Primorsky) resulted in border skirmishes on the Ussuri River in 1969 and again from 1979 to 1980, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia, and China retaliated by launching a border war with Vietnam. The skirmishes led to the intensification of border fortifications and the mobilization of the civilian populations on both sides.^[51]

Post-Mao era and stabilizing relations[edit]

In September 1976, Mao died. A month later, the Gang of Four were overthrown by his successor, Chairman Hua Guofeng, with the support of Deng Xiaoping, who was to soon implement pro-market economic reform. With the PRC no longer espousing the anti-revisionist notion of the antagonistic contradiction between classes, relations between the two countries became gradually normalized. In 1979, however, the PRC launched the Sino–Vietnamese War. The invasion of Vietnam, a Soviet ally, was in response to Vietnam’s invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia, which overthrew the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge from power. Even though Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev went on to criticize the post-Maoist CCP for allowing PRC millionaires to have lost the socialist path, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Russia itself turned to privatization.

Dissolution of the Soviet Union[edit]

Unlike in the PRC, a much more extreme, highly
-unregulated form of privatization occurred during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, which resulted in asset grabs by Russians in a highly unregulated fashion and in deep socio-economic inequalities in Russia and the collapse of the economy as well as various Russian institutions. Thus, after the Cold War, the PRC emerged in a far more favourable and stable financial position. The PRC is currently seeing the fastest rate of economic growth of any large economy, several percentage points higher than Russia, which has been growing at an annualized rate of some 5–6%. The economy of Russia in the early 2000s was largely driven by demand for export of natural resources to Europe and Asia, with a gradual move up the value-added chain as Russian aluminum and steel mills upgrade to international standards. China is the growth market, and with the ESPO pipeline, Russia will continue to diversify energy exports away from Europe and towards Asia.

China and the Russian Federation[edit]

China and Russia share a land border which was demarcated in 1991, and they signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001, which was renewed in June 2021 for five more years.^[52] On the eve of a 2013 state visit to Moscow by General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin remarked that the two nations were forging a special relationship.^[53] The two countries have enjoyed close relations militarily, economically, and politically, while supporting each other on various global issues.^[54][55][56]

When China attempted to build closer relations with Russia in 2013, the Russian government initially had reservations.^[57] However, the United States sanctions against Russia for its 2014 annexation of Crimea helped push Russia to a warmer relationship with China.^[57]

In 2022, Russia added Taiwan to a list of foreign states and territories that commit «unfriendly actions» against its military invasion of Ukraine.^[58]

See also[edit]

• China–Russia border
• Chinese Eastern Railway
• Li–Lobanov Treaty of 1896 between Russia and China
• Kyakhta trade
• International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919)
• Ethnic Chinese in Russia
• Russians in China
• BRICS, for 21st century relations of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

Notes and References[edit]

Further reading[edit]

• Chen, Vincent. Sino–Russian relations in the seventeenth century (Springer, 2012)
• Cheng, Tianfang. A history of Sino–Russian relations (Public Affairs Press, 1957) online free
• Dallin, David. Soviet foreign policy after Stalin (1961) online
• Elleman, Bruce. Moscow and the Emergence of Communist Power in China, 1925–30: The Nanchang Uprising and the Birth of the Red Army (Routledge, 2009).
• Elleman, Bruce (2016). Diplomacy and Deception: Secret History of Sino–Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-27. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781315293196.
• Fischer, Louis. Russia’s road from peace to war: Soviet foreign relations, 1917–1941 (1969)
• Fletcher, Joseph. «Sino–Russian Relations, 1800–62.» in Fairbank, John King, ed. The Cambridge History of China: Late Chʻing, 1800–1911, pt. 1. (1978)
• Floyd, David. Mao against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino–Soviet Conflict (1964) online
• Foust, Clifford M. Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia’s Trade with China and Its Setting, 1727–1805 (1969) online
• Fravel, M. Taylor. Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics) (2019).
• Friedman, Jeremy. Shadow Cold War: The Sino–Soviet Competition for the Third World (UNC Press Books, 2015).
• Garver, John W. Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 1988) online
• Heinzig, Dieter. The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance (M.E. Sharpe, 2004).
• Hsu, Jing-Yun, and Jenn-Jaw Soong. «Development of China–Russia Relations (1949–2011) Limits, Opportunities, and Economic Ties.» Chinese economy 47.3 (2014): 70–87. online Archived 2016-12-20 at the Wayback Machine
• Jersild, Austin. The Sino–Soviet Alliance: An International History (University of North Carolina Press, 2014) detailed reviews and discussions of this book by historians, June 2015; full text online
• Lukin, Alexander. The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century (2002) excerpt
• Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino–Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008)
• McAleavy, Henry. «China and the Amur Provinces» History Today (1964) 14#6 pp. 381–390.
• Moore, Harriet L. Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931–1945 (Princeton UP, 1945). online
• Morse, Hosea Ballou. International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Conflict: 1834-1860. (1910) online
  • Morse, Hosea Ballou. International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Submission: 1861–1893. (1918) online
  • Morse, Hosea Ballou. International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Subjection: 1894–1911 (1918) online
• Morse, Hosea Ballou. The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire (1908) online
• Paine, S. C. M. Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (1996) online
• Pavlovsky, Michel N. Chinese-Russian Relations (Philosophical Library, 1949) online
• Quested, Rosemary K.I. Sino–Russian relations: a short history (Routledge, 2014)
• Radchenko, Sergey. Two Suns in Heaven: The Sino–Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967 (2009).
• Robinson, Thomas W. «The Sino–Soviet border dispute: Background, development, and the March 1969 clashes.» American Political Science Review 66.4 (1972): 1175–1202. online
• Ross, Robert S. China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (1993) online
• Rozman, Gilbert. A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China (1985),
• Rozman, Gilbert. The Sino–Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East versus West in the 2010s (2014) online review
• Rozman, Gilbert. The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985 (Princeton UP, 1987).
• Schwartz, Harry. Tsars, mandarins, and commissars: a history of Chinese-Russian relations (1973)
• Shen, Zhihua. A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991 (Springer Singapore;Palgrave Macmillan, 2020)
• Shen, Zhihua and Yafeng Xia, «Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference,» Journal of Cold War Studies (2009) 11#4 pp74–117.
• Tang, James Tuck-Hong. Britain’s Encounter with Revolutionary China, 1949–54 (Springer, 2016).
• Urbansky, Sören. Beyond the Steppe Frontier: A History of the Sino–Russian Border (2020) a comprehensive history; excerpt
• Walker, Michael M. 1929 Sino–Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew (2017) online book review
• Westad, Odd Arne, ed. Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino–Soviet Alliance (1998)
• Whiting, Allen S. Soviet policies in China, 1917–1924 (Stanford University Press, 1954)
• Yakhontoff, Victor A. Russia And The Soviet Union In The Far East (1932) online
• Zhang, Shu Guang, «The Sino–Soviet Alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962», in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol 1 in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds. (2010), pp. 353–375

Primary sources[edit]

• Radchenko, Sergey, and David Wolff, «To the Summit via Proxy-Summits: New Evidence from Soviet and Chinese Archives on Mao’s Long March to Moscow, 1949,» CWIHPB, no. 16 (Fall 2007—Winter 2008), 105–82.
• Westad, Odd Arne. «Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino–Soviet Treaty of 1950,» CWIHPB, nos. 8–9 (Winter 1996–97), 224–36
  • The numerous digital initiatives of CWIHP are online.