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S.W.I.F.T. SC

Type	Cooperative society[1]
Industry	Telecommunications
Founded	3 May 1973; 49 years ago
Headquarters	La Hulpe, Belgium 50°44′04″N 4°28′43″E / 50.73444°N 4.47861°ECoordinates: 50°44′04″N 4°28′43″E / 50.73444°N 4.47861°E
Key people	Javier Perez-Tasso, CEO
Products	Financial telecommunication
Number of employees	>3,000
Website	www.swift.com

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), legally S.W.I.F.T. SC, is a Belgian cooperative society providing services related to the execution of financial transactions and payments between banks worldwide. Its principal function is to serve as the main messaging network through which international payments are initiated.^[2] It also sells software and services to financial institutions, mostly for use on its proprietary «SWIFTNet», and assigns ISO 9362 Business Identifier Codes (BICs), popularly known as «SWIFT codes».

The SWIFT messaging network is a component of the global payments system.^[3] SWIFT acts as a carrier of the «messages containing the payment instructions between financial institutions involved in a transaction».^[4][5] However, the organization does not manage accounts on behalf of individuals or financial institutions, and it does not hold funds from third parties.^[6] It also does not perform clearing or settlement functions.^[7][5] After a payment has been initiated, it must be settled through a payment system, such as TARGET2 in Europe.^[8] In the context of cross-border transactions, this step often takes place through correspondent banking accounts that financial institutions have with each other.^[4]

As of 2018, around half of all high-value cross-border payments worldwide used the SWIFT network,^[9] and in 2015, SWIFT linked more than 11,000 financial institutions in over 200 countries and territories, who were exchanging an average of over 32 million messages per day (compared to an average of 2.4 million daily messages in 1995).^[10]

Though widely utilized, SWIFT has been criticized for its inefficiency. In 2018, the London-based Financial Times noted that transfers frequently «pass through multiple banks before reaching their final destination, making them time-consuming, costly and lacking transparency on how much money will arrive at the other end».^[9] SWIFT has since introduced an improved service called «Global Payments Innovation» (GPI), claiming it was adopted by 165 banks and was completing half its payments within 30 minutes.^[9]

As a cooperative society under Belgian law, SWIFT is owned by its member financial institutions. It is headquartered in La Hulpe, Belgium, near Brussels; its main building was designed by Ricardo Bofill Taller de Arquitectura and completed in 1989.^[11] The chairman of SWIFT is Yawar Shah^[12] of Pakistan,^[13] and its CEO is Javier Pérez-Tasso of Spain.^[14] SWIFT hosts an annual conference, called Sibos, specifically aimed at the financial services industry.^[15]

History[edit]

SWIFT was founded in Brussels on 3 May 1973 under the leadership of its inaugural Swedish CEO, Carl Reuterskiöld (1973–1989), a former employee at Wallenberg-owned Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, and was supported by 239 banks in 15 countries.^[16] Before its establishment, international financial transactions were communicated over Telex, a public system involving manual writing and reading of messages.^[17] It was set up out of fear of what might happen if a single private and fully American entity controlled global financial flows – which before was First National City Bank (FNCB) of New York – later Citibank. In response to FNCB’s protocol, FNCB’s competitors in the US and Europe pushed an alternative «messaging system that could replace the public providers and speed up the payment process».^[18] SWIFT started to establish common standards for financial transactions and a shared data processing system and worldwide communications network designed by Logica and developed by the Burroughs Corporation.^[19] Fundamental operating procedures and rules for liability were established in 1975, and the first message was sent in 1977. SWIFT’s first international (non-European) operations centre was inaugurated by Governor John N. Dalton of Virginia in 1979.^[20]

Standards[edit]

SWIFT has become the industry standard for syntax in financial messages. Messages formatted to SWIFT standards can be read and processed by many well-known financial processing systems, whether or not the message travelled over the SWIFT network. SWIFT cooperates with international organizations for defining standards for message format and content. SWIFT is also Registration authority (RA) for the following ISO standards:
^[21]

• ISO 9362: 1994 Banking – Banking telecommunication messages – Bank identifier codes
• ISO 10383: 2003 Securities and related financial instruments – Codes for exchanges and market identification (MIC)
• ISO 13616: 2003 IBAN Registry
• ISO 15022: 1999 Securities – Scheme for messages (Data Field Dictionary) (replaces ISO 7775)
• ISO 20022-1: 2004 and ISO 20022-2:2007 Financial services – Universal Financial Industry message scheme

In RFC 3615 urn:swift: was defined as Uniform Resource Names (URNs) for SWIFT FIN.^[22]

Operations centres[edit]

The SWIFT secure messaging network is run from three data centres, located in the United States, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. These centres share information in near real-time. In case of a failure in one of the data centres, another is able to handle the traffic of the complete network. SWIFT uses submarine communications cables to transmit its data.^[23]

Shortly after opening its third data centre in Switzerland in 2009,^[24] SWIFT introduced new distributed architecture with two messaging zones, European and Trans-Atlantic, so data from European SWIFT members no longer mirrored the U.S. data centre.^[25] European zone messages are stored in the Netherlands and in part of the Swiss operating centre; Trans-Atlantic zone messages are stored in the United States and in another part of the Swiss operating centre that is segregated from the European zone messages. Countries outside of Europe were by default allocated to the Trans-Atlantic zone, but could choose to have their messages stored in the European zone.

Data centres

SN	SWIFT data centres	Type
1	Zoeterwoude, Netherlands	OPC (Operating Centre)
2	Culpeper, Virginia, United States	OPC (Operating Centre)
3	Diessenhofen, Switzerland[26]	OPC (Operating Centre)
4	Hong Kong	Command and control

SWIFTNet network[edit]

SWIFT moved to its current IP network infrastructure, known as SWIFTNet, from 2001 to 2005,^[27] providing a total replacement of the previous X.25 infrastructure. The process involved the development of new protocols that facilitate efficient messaging, using existing and new message standards. The adopted technology chosen to develop the protocols was XML, where it now provides a wrapper around all messages legacy or contemporary. The communication protocols can be broken down into:

Architecture[edit]

SWIFT provides a centralized store-and-forward mechanism, with some transaction management. For bank A to send a message to bank B with a copy or authorization involving institution C, it formats the message according to standards and securely sends it to SWIFT. SWIFT guarantees its secure and reliable delivery to B after the appropriate action by C. SWIFT guarantees are based primarily on high redundancy of hardware, software, and people.

SWIFTNet Phase 2[edit]

During 2007 and 2008, the entire SWIFT network migrated its infrastructure to a new protocol called SWIFTNet Phase 2. The main difference between Phase 2 and the former arrangement is that Phase 2 requires banks connecting to the network to use a Relationship Management Application (RMA) instead of the former bilateral key exchange (BKE) system. According to SWIFT’s public information database on the subject, RMA software should eventually prove more secure and easier to keep up-to-date; however, converting to the RMA system meant that thousands of banks around the world had to update their international payments systems to comply with the new standards. RMA completely replaced BKE on 1 January 2009.

Products and interfaces[edit]

SWIFT means several things in the financial world:

1. a secure network for transmitting messages between financial institutions;
2. a set of syntax standards for financial messages (for transmission over SWIFTNet or any other network)
3. a set of connection software and services allowing financial institutions to transmit messages over SWIFT network.

Under 3 above, SWIFT provides turn-key solutions for members, consisting of linkage clients to facilitate connectivity to the SWIFT network and CBTs or «computer based terminals» which members use to manage the delivery and receipt of their messages. Some of the more well-known interfaces and CBTs provided to their members are:

• SWIFTNet Link (SNL) software which is installed on the SWIFT customer’s site and opens a connection to SWIFTNet. Other applications can only communicate with SWIFTNet through the SNL.
• Alliance Gateway (SAG) software with interfaces (e.g., RAHA = Remote Access Host Adapter), allowing other software products to use the SNL to connect to SWIFTNet
• Alliance WebStation (SAB) desktop interface for SWIFT Alliance Gateway with several usage options:
  1. administrative access to the SAG
  2. direct connection SWIFTNet by the SAG, to administrate SWIFT Certificates
  3. so-called Browse connection to SWIFTNet (also by SAG) to use additional services, for example Target2
• Alliance Access (SAA) and Alliance Messaging Hub (AMH) are the main messaging software applications by SWIFT, which allow message creation for FIN messages, routing and monitoring for FIN and MX messages. The main interfaces are FTA (files transfer automated, not FTP) and MQSA, a WebSphere MQ interface.
• The Alliance Workstation (SAW) is the desktop software for administration, monitoring and FIN message creation. Since Alliance Access is not yet capable of creating MX messages, Alliance Messenger (SAM) has to be used for this purpose.
• Alliance Web Platform (SWP) as new thin-client desktop interface provided as an alternative to existing Alliance WebStation, Alliance Workstation (soon)^[when?] and Alliance Messenger.
• Alliance Integrator built on Oracle’s Java Caps which enables customer’s back office applications to connect to Alliance Access or Alliance Entry.
• Alliance Lite2 is a secure and reliable, cloud-based way to connect to the SWIFT network which is a light version of Alliance Access specifically targeting customers with low volume of traffic.

Services[edit]

There are four key areas that SWIFT services fall under in the financial marketplace: securities, treasury & derivatives, trade services. and payments-and-cash management.

SWIFTREF[edit]

Swift Ref, the global payment reference data utility, is SWIFT’s unique reference data service. Swift Ref sources data direct from data originators, including central banks, code issuers and banks making it easy for issuers and originators to maintain data regularly and thoroughly. SWIFTRef constantly validates and cross-checks data across the different data sets.^[29]

SWIFTNet Mail[edit]

SWIFT offers a secure person-to-person messaging service, SWIFTNet Mail, which went live on 16 May 2007.^[30] SWIFT clients can configure their existing email infrastructure to pass email messages through the highly secure and reliable SWIFTNet network instead of the open Internet. SWIFTNet Mail is intended for the secure transfer of sensitive business documents, such as invoices, contracts and signatories, and is designed to replace existing telex and courier services, as well as the transmission of security-sensitive data over the open Internet. Seven financial institutions, including HSBC, FirstRand Bank, Clearstream, DnB NOR, Nedbank, and Standard Bank of South Africa, as well as SWIFT piloted the service.^[31]

U.S. government involvement[edit]

Terrorist Finance Tracking Program[edit]

A series of articles published on 23 June 2006 in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the Los Angeles Times revealed a program, named the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, which the US Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other United States governmental agencies initiated after the 11 September attacks to gain access to the SWIFT transaction database.^[32]

After the publication of these articles, SWIFT quickly came under pressure for compromising the data privacy of its customers by allowing governments to gain access to sensitive personal information. In September 2006, the Belgian government declared that these SWIFT dealings with American governmental authorities were a breach of Belgian and European privacy laws.^{[citation needed]}

In response, and to satisfy members’ concerns about privacy, SWIFT began a process of improving its architecture by implementing a distributed architecture with a two-zone model for storing messages (see Operations centres).

Concurrently, the European Union negotiated an agreement with the United States government to permit the transfer of intra-EU SWIFT transaction information to the United States under certain circumstances. Because of concerns about its potential contents, the European Parliament adopted a position statement in September 2009, demanding to see the full text of the agreement and asking that it be fully compliant with EU privacy legislation, with oversight mechanisms emplaced to ensure that all data requests were handled appropriately.^[33] An interim agreement was signed without European Parliamentary approval by the European Council on 30 November 2009,^[34] the day before the Lisbon Treaty—which would have prohibited such an agreement from being signed under the terms of the codecision procedure—formally came into effect. While the interim agreement was scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 2010, the text of the agreement was classified as «EU Restricted» until translations could be provided in all EU languages and published on 25 January 2010.

On 11 February 2010, the European Parliament decided to reject the interim agreement between the EU and the US by 378 to 196 votes.^[35][36] One week earlier, the parliament’s civil liberties committee had already rejected the deal, citing legal reservations.^[37]

In March 2011, it was reported that two mechanisms of data protection had failed: EUROPOL released a report complaining that requests for information from the US had been too vague (making it impossible to make judgments on validity)^[38] and that the guaranteed right for European citizens to know whether their information had been accessed by US authorities had not been put into practice.^[38]

Monitoring by the NSA[edit]

Der Spiegel reported in September 2013 that the National Security Agency (NSA) widely monitors banking transactions via SWIFT, as well as credit card transactions.^[39] The NSA intercepted and retained data from the SWIFT network used by thousands of banks to securely send transaction information. SWIFT was named as a «target», according to documents leaked by Edward Snowden. The documents revealed that the NSA spied on SWIFT using a variety of methods, including reading «SWIFT printer traffic from numerous banks».^[39] In April 2017, a group known as the Shadow Brokers released files allegedly from the NSA which indicate that the agency monitored financial transactions made through SWIFT.^[40][41]

Use in sanctions[edit]

Belarus[edit]

The European Union issued the first set of sanctions against Belarus — the first was introduced on 27 February 2022, which banned certain categories of Belarusian items in the EU, including timber, steel, mineral fuels and tobacco.^[42] After the Lithuanian prime minister proposed disconnecting Belarus from SWIFT,^[43] the European Union, which does not recognise Lukashenko as the legitimate President of Belarus, started to plan an extension of the sanctions already issued against Russian entities and top officials to its ally.^[44]

Iran[edit]

In January 2012, the advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) implemented a campaign calling on SWIFT to end all relations with Iran’s banking system, including the Central Bank of Iran. UANI asserted that Iran’s membership in SWIFT violated US and EU financial sanctions against Iran as well as SWIFT’s own corporate rules.^[45]

Consequently, in February 2012, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee unanimously approved sanctions against SWIFT aimed at pressuring it to terminate its ties with blacklisted Iranian banks. Expelling Iranian banks from SWIFT would potentially deny Iran access to billions of dollars in revenue using SWIFT but not from using IVTS. Mark Wallace, president of UANI, praised the Senate Banking Committee.^[46]

Initially SWIFT denied that it was acting illegally,^[46] but later^[when?] said that «it is working with U.S. and European governments to address their concerns that its financial services are being used by Iran to avoid sanctions and conduct illicit business».^[47] Targeted banks would be—amongst others—Saderat Bank of Iran, Bank Mellat, Post Bank of Iran and Sepah Bank.^[48] On 17 March 2012, following agreement two days earlier between all 27 member states of the Council of the European Union and the Council’s subsequent ruling, SWIFT disconnected all Iranian banks that had been identified as institutions in breach of current EU sanctions from its international network and warned that even more Iranian financial institutions could be disconnected from the network.

In February 2016, most Iranian banks reconnected to the network following the lift of sanctions due to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.^[49]

Russia[edit]

Similarly, in August 2014 the UK planned to press the EU to block Russian use of SWIFT as a sanction due to Russian military intervention in Ukraine.^[50] However, SWIFT refused to do so.^[51] SPFS, a Russia-based SWIFT equivalent, was created by the Central Bank of Russia as a backup measure.^[52]

During the prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States developed preliminary possible sanctions against Russia, but excluded banning Russia from SWIFT.^[53] Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the foreign ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia called for Russia to be cut off from SWIFT. However, other EU member states were reluctant, both because European lenders held most of the nearly $30 billion in foreign banks’ exposure to Russia and because Russia had developed the SPFS alternative.^[54] The European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States finally agreed to remove select Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; the governments of France, Germany, Italy and Japan individually released statements alongside the EU.^[55][5]

Israel[edit]

In 2014, SWIFT rejected calls from pro-Palestinian activists to revoke Israeli banks’ access to its network.^[56]

Competitors[edit]

Alternatives to the SWIFT system include:

1. CIPS: sponsored by China, for trade-related deals to internationalize Chinese currency RMB use. 1280 financial institutions in 103 countries and regions have connected to the system^[57][58]
2. SFMS: sponsored by India
3. SPFS: sponsored by Russia, mostly composed of Russian banks^[59]
4. INSTEX: sponsored by the European Union, limited to non-USD transactions for trade with Iran, largely unused and ineffective^[60][61]

Security[edit]

In 2016 an $81 million theft from the Bangladesh central bank via its account at the New York Federal Reserve Bank was traced to hacker penetration of SWIFT’s Alliance Access software, according to a New York Times report. It was not the first such attempt, the society acknowledged, and the security of the transfer system was undergoing new examination accordingly.^[62] Soon after the reports of the theft from the Bangladesh central bank, a second, apparently related, attack was reported to have occurred on a commercial bank in Vietnam.^[63]

Both attacks involved malware written to both issue unauthorized SWIFT messages and to conceal that the messages had been sent. After the malware sent the SWIFT messages that stole the funds, it deleted the database record of the transfers then took further steps to prevent confirmation messages from revealing the theft. In the Bangladeshi case, the confirmation messages would have appeared on a paper report; the malware altered the paper reports when they were sent to the printer. In the second case, the bank used a PDF report; the malware altered the PDF viewer to hide the transfers.^[63]

In May 2016, Banco del Austro (BDA) in Ecuador sued Wells Fargo after Wells Fargo honoured $12 million in fund transfer requests that had been placed by thieves. In this case, the thieves sent SWIFT messages that resembled recently cancelled transfer requests from BDA, with slightly altered amounts; the reports do not detail how the thieves gained access to send the SWIFT messages. BDA asserts that Wells Fargo should have detected the suspicious SWIFT messages, which were placed outside of normal BDA working hours and were of an unusual size. Wells Fargo claims that BDA is responsible for the loss, as the thieves gained access to the legitimate SWIFT credentials of a BDA employee and sent fully authenticated SWIFT messages.

In the first half of 2016, an anonymous Ukrainian bank and others—even «dozens» that are not being made public—were variously reported to have been «compromised» through the SWIFT network and to have lost money.^[65]

In March 2022, Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported about the increased security precautions by the State Police of Thurgau at the SWIFT data centre in Diessenhofen. After most of the Russian banks have been excluded from the private payment system, the risk of sabotage was considered higher. Inhabitants of the town described the large complex as a «fortress» or «prison» where frequent security check of the fenced property are conducted.^[66]

See also[edit]

• ABA routing transit number
• Bilateral key exchange and the new Relationship Management Application (RMA)
• Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS)
• Cryptocurrency / Digital currency
• Digital renminbi
• Digital Rupee
• Electronic money
• Indian Financial System Code (IFSC)
• Structured Financial Messaging System (SFMS)
• Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX)
• International sanctions
• Internationalization of the renminbi
• ISO 9362, the SWIFT/BIC code standard
• ISO 15022
• ISO 20022
• Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
• Routing number (Canada)
• Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA)
• Sibos conference
• SPFS
• Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
• TIPANET
• Value transfer system

References[edit]

Further reading[edit]

• Farrell, Henry and Abraham Newman. 2019. Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle over Freedom and Security. Princeton University Press.

External links[edit]

• Official website

S.W.I.F.T. SC

Type	Cooperative society[1]
Industry	Telecommunications
Founded	3 May 1973; 49 years ago
Headquarters	La Hulpe, Belgium 50°44′04″N 4°28′43″E / 50.73444°N 4.47861°ECoordinates: 50°44′04″N 4°28′43″E / 50.73444°N 4.47861°E
Key people	Javier Perez-Tasso, CEO
Products	Financial telecommunication
Number of employees	>3,000
Website	www.swift.com

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), legally S.W.I.F.T. SC, is a Belgian cooperative society providing services related to the execution of financial transactions and payments between banks worldwide. Its principal function is to serve as the main messaging network through which international payments are initiated.^[2] It also sells software and services to financial institutions, mostly for use on its proprietary «SWIFTNet», and assigns ISO 9362 Business Identifier Codes (BICs), popularly known as «SWIFT codes».

The SWIFT messaging network is a component of the global payments system.^[3] SWIFT acts as a carrier of the «messages containing the payment instructions between financial institutions involved in a transaction».^[4][5] However, the organization does not manage accounts on behalf of individuals or financial institutions, and it does not hold funds from third parties.^[6] It also does not perform clearing or settlement functions.^[7][5] After a payment has been initiated, it must be settled through a payment system, such as TARGET2 in Europe.^[8] In the context of cross-border transactions, this step often takes place through correspondent banking accounts that financial institutions have with each other.^[4]

As of 2018, around half of all high-value cross-border payments worldwide used the SWIFT network,^[9] and in 2015, SWIFT linked more than 11,000 financial institutions in over 200 countries and territories, who were exchanging an average of over 32 million messages per day (compared to an average of 2.4 million daily messages in 1995).^[10]

Though widely utilized, SWIFT has been criticized for its inefficiency. In 2018, the London-based Financial Times noted that transfers frequently «pass through multiple banks before reaching their final destination, making them time-consuming, costly and lacking transparency on how much money will arrive at the other end».^[9] SWIFT has since introduced an improved service called «Global Payments Innovation» (GPI), claiming it was adopted by 165 banks and was completing half its payments within 30 minutes.^[9]

As a cooperative society under Belgian law, SWIFT is owned by its member financial institutions. It is headquartered in La Hulpe, Belgium, near Brussels; its main building was designed by Ricardo Bofill Taller de Arquitectura and completed in 1989.^[11] The chairman of SWIFT is Yawar Shah^[12] of Pakistan,^[13] and its CEO is Javier Pérez-Tasso of Spain.^[14] SWIFT hosts an annual conference, called Sibos, specifically aimed at the financial services industry.^[15]

History[edit]

SWIFT was founded in Brussels on 3 May 1973 under the leadership of its inaugural Swedish CEO, Carl Reuterskiöld (1973–1989), a former employee at Wallenberg-owned Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, and was supported by 239 banks in 15 countries.^[16] Before its establishment, international financial transactions were communicated over Telex, a public system involving manual writing and reading of messages.^[17] It was set up out of fear of what might happen if a single private and fully American entity controlled global financial flows – which before was First National City Bank (FNCB) of New York – later Citibank. In response to FNCB’s protocol, FNCB’s competitors in the US and Europe pushed an alternative «messaging system that could replace the public providers and speed up the payment process».^[18] SWIFT started to establish common standards for financial transactions and a shared data processing system and worldwide communications network designed by Logica and developed by the Burroughs Corporation.^[19] Fundamental operating procedures and rules for liability were established in 1975, and the first message was sent in 1977. SWIFT’s first international (non-European) operations centre was inaugurated by Governor John N. Dalton of Virginia in 1979.^[20]

Standards[edit]

SWIFT has become the industry standard for syntax in financial messages. Messages formatted to SWIFT standards can be read and processed by many well-known financial processing systems, whether or not the message travelled over the SWIFT network. SWIFT cooperates with international organizations for defining standards for message format and content. SWIFT is also Registration authority (RA) for the following ISO standards:
^[21]

• ISO 9362: 1994 Banking – Banking telecommunication messages – Bank identifier codes
• ISO 10383: 2003 Securities and related financial instruments – Codes for exchanges and market identification (MIC)
• ISO 13616: 2003 IBAN Registry
• ISO 15022: 1999 Securities – Scheme for messages (Data Field Dictionary) (replaces ISO 7775)
• ISO 20022-1: 2004 and ISO 20022-2:2007 Financial services – Universal Financial Industry message scheme

In RFC 3615 urn:swift: was defined as Uniform Resource Names (URNs) for SWIFT FIN.^[22]

Operations centres[edit]

The SWIFT secure messaging network is run from three data centres, located in the United States, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. These centres share information in near real-time. In case of a failure in one of the data centres, another is able to handle the traffic of the complete network. SWIFT uses submarine communications cables to transmit its data.^[23]

Shortly after opening its third data centre in Switzerland in 2009,^[24] SWIFT introduced new distributed architecture with two messaging zones, European and Trans-Atlantic, so data from European SWIFT members no longer mirrored the U.S. data centre.^[25] European zone messages are stored in the Netherlands and in part of the Swiss operating centre; Trans-Atlantic zone messages are stored in the United States and in another part of the Swiss operating centre that is segregated from the European zone messages. Countries outside of Europe were by default allocated to the Trans-Atlantic zone, but could choose to have their messages stored in the European zone.

Data centres

SN	SWIFT data centres	Type
1	Zoeterwoude, Netherlands	OPC (Operating Centre)
2	Culpeper, Virginia, United States	OPC (Operating Centre)
3	Diessenhofen, Switzerland[26]	OPC (Operating Centre)
4	Hong Kong	Command and control

SWIFTNet network[edit]

SWIFT moved to its current IP network infrastructure, known as SWIFTNet, from 2001 to 2005,^[27] providing a total replacement of the previous X.25 infrastructure. The process involved the development of new protocols that facilitate efficient messaging, using existing and new message standards. The adopted technology chosen to develop the protocols was XML, where it now provides a wrapper around all messages legacy or contemporary. The communication protocols can be broken down into:

Architecture[edit]

SWIFT provides a centralized store-and-forward mechanism, with some transaction management. For bank A to send a message to bank B with a copy or authorization involving institution C, it formats the message according to standards and securely sends it to SWIFT. SWIFT guarantees its secure and reliable delivery to B after the appropriate action by C. SWIFT guarantees are based primarily on high redundancy of hardware, software, and people.

SWIFTNet Phase 2[edit]

During 2007 and 2008, the entire SWIFT network migrated its infrastructure to a new protocol called SWIFTNet Phase 2. The main difference between Phase 2 and the former arrangement is that Phase 2 requires banks connecting to the network to use a Relationship Management Application (RMA) instead of the former bilateral key exchange (BKE) system. According to SWIFT’s public information database on the subject, RMA software should eventually prove more secure and easier to keep up-to-date; however, converting to the RMA system meant that thousands of banks around the world had to update their international payments systems to comply with the new standards. RMA completely replaced BKE on 1 January 2009.

Products and interfaces[edit]

SWIFT means several things in the financial world:

1. a secure network for transmitting messages between financial institutions;
2. a set of syntax standards for financial messages (for transmission over SWIFTNet or any other network)
3. a set of connection software and services allowing financial institutions to transmit messages over SWIFT network.

Under 3 above, SWIFT provides turn-key solutions for members, consisting of linkage clients to facilitate connectivity to the SWIFT network and CBTs or «computer based terminals» which members use to manage the delivery and receipt of their messages. Some of the more well-known interfaces and CBTs provided to their members are:

• SWIFTNet Link (SNL) software which is installed on the SWIFT customer’s site and opens a connection to SWIFTNet. Other applications can only communicate with SWIFTNet through the SNL.
• Alliance Gateway (SAG) software with interfaces (e.g., RAHA = Remote Access Host Adapter), allowing other software products to use the SNL to connect to SWIFTNet
• Alliance WebStation (SAB) desktop interface for SWIFT Alliance Gateway with several usage options:
  1. administrative access to the SAG
  2. direct connection SWIFTNet by the SAG, to administrate SWIFT Certificates
  3. so-called Browse connection to SWIFTNet (also by SAG) to use additional services, for example Target2
• Alliance Access (SAA) and Alliance Messaging Hub (AMH) are the main messaging software applications by SWIFT, which allow message creation for FIN messages, routing and monitoring for FIN and MX messages. The main interfaces are FTA (files transfer automated, not FTP) and MQSA, a WebSphere MQ interface.
• The Alliance Workstation (SAW) is the desktop software for administration, monitoring and FIN message creation. Since Alliance Access is not yet capable of creating MX messages, Alliance Messenger (SAM) has to be used for this purpose.
• Alliance Web Platform (SWP) as new thin-client desktop interface provided as an alternative to existing Alliance WebStation, Alliance Workstation (soon)^[when?] and Alliance Messenger.
• Alliance Integrator built on Oracle’s Java Caps which enables customer’s back office applications to connect to Alliance Access or Alliance Entry.
• Alliance Lite2 is a secure and reliable, cloud-based way to connect to the SWIFT network which is a light version of Alliance Access specifically targeting customers with low volume of traffic.

Services[edit]

There are four key areas that SWIFT services fall under in the financial marketplace: securities, treasury & derivatives, trade services. and payments-and-cash management.

SWIFTREF[edit]

Swift Ref, the global payment reference data utility, is SWIFT’s unique reference data service. Swift Ref sources data direct from data originators, including central banks, code issuers and banks making it easy for issuers and originators to maintain data regularly and thoroughly. SWIFTRef constantly validates and cross-checks data across the different data sets.^[29]

SWIFTNet Mail[edit]

SWIFT offers a secure person-to-person messaging service, SWIFTNet Mail, which went live on 16 May 2007.^[30] SWIFT clients can configure their existing email infrastructure to pass email messages through the highly secure and reliable SWIFTNet network instead of the open Internet. SWIFTNet Mail is intended for the secure transfer of sensitive business documents, such as invoices, contracts and signatories, and is designed to replace existing telex and courier services, as well as the transmission of security-sensitive data over the open Internet. Seven financial institutions, including HSBC, FirstRand Bank, Clearstream, DnB NOR, Nedbank, and Standard Bank of South Africa, as well as SWIFT piloted the service.^[31]

U.S. government involvement[edit]

Terrorist Finance Tracking Program[edit]

A series of articles published on 23 June 2006 in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the Los Angeles Times revealed a program, named the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, which the US Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other United States governmental agencies initiated after the 11 September attacks to gain access to the SWIFT transaction database.^[32]

After the publication of these articles, SWIFT quickly came under pressure for compromising the data privacy of its customers by allowing governments to gain access to sensitive personal information. In September 2006, the Belgian government declared that these SWIFT dealings with American governmental authorities were a breach of Belgian and European privacy laws.^{[citation needed]}

In response, and to satisfy members’ concerns about privacy, SWIFT began a process of improving its architecture by implementing a distributed architecture with a two-zone model for storing messages (see Operations centres).

Concurrently, the European Union negotiated an agreement with the United States government to permit the transfer of intra-EU SWIFT transaction information to the United States under certain circumstances. Because of concerns about its potential contents, the European Parliament adopted a position statement in September 2009, demanding to see the full text of the agreement and asking that it be fully compliant with EU privacy legislation, with oversight mechanisms emplaced to ensure that all data requests were handled appropriately.^[33] An interim agreement was signed without European Parliamentary approval by the European Council on 30 November 2009,^[34] the day before the Lisbon Treaty—which would have prohibited such an agreement from being signed under the terms of the codecision procedure—formally came into effect. While the interim agreement was scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 2010, the text of the agreement was classified as «EU Restricted» until translations could be provided in all EU languages and published on 25 January 2010.

On 11 February 2010, the European Parliament decided to reject the interim agreement between the EU and the US by 378 to 196 votes.^[35][36] One week earlier, the parliament’s civil liberties committee had already rejected the deal, citing legal reservations.^[37]

In March 2011, it was reported that two mechanisms of data protection had failed: EUROPOL released a report complaining that requests for information from the US had been too vague (making it impossible to make judgments on validity)^[38] and that the guaranteed right for European citizens to know whether their information had been accessed by US authorities had not been put into practice.^[38]

Monitoring by the NSA[edit]

Der Spiegel reported in September 2013 that the National Security Agency (NSA) widely monitors banking transactions via SWIFT, as well as credit card transactions.^[39] The NSA intercepted and retained data from the SWIFT network used by thousands of banks to securely send transaction information. SWIFT was named as a «target», according to documents leaked by Edward Snowden. The documents revealed that the NSA spied on SWIFT using a variety of methods, including reading «SWIFT printer traffic from numerous banks».^[39] In April 2017, a group known as the Shadow Brokers released files allegedly from the NSA which indicate that the agency monitored financial transactions made through SWIFT.^[40][41]

Use in sanctions[edit]

Belarus[edit]

The European Union issued the first set of sanctions against Belarus — the first was introduced on 27 February 2022, which banned certain categories of Belarusian items in the EU, including timber, steel, mineral fuels and tobacco.^[42] After the Lithuanian prime minister proposed disconnecting Belarus from SWIFT,^[43] the European Union, which does not recognise Lukashenko as the legitimate President of Belarus, started to plan an extension of the sanctions already issued against Russian entities and top officials to its ally.^[44]

Iran[edit]

In January 2012, the advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) implemented a campaign calling on SWIFT to end all relations with Iran’s banking system, including the Central Bank of Iran. UANI asserted that Iran’s membership in SWIFT violated US and EU financial sanctions against Iran as well as SWIFT’s own corporate rules.^[45]

Consequently, in February 2012, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee unanimously approved sanctions against SWIFT aimed at pressuring it to terminate its ties with blacklisted Iranian banks. Expelling Iranian banks from SWIFT would potentially deny Iran access to billions of dollars in revenue using SWIFT but not from using IVTS. Mark Wallace, president of UANI, praised the Senate Banking Committee.^[46]

Initially SWIFT denied that it was acting illegally,^[46] but later^[when?] said that «it is working with U.S. and European governments to address their concerns that its financial services are being used by Iran to avoid sanctions and conduct illicit business».^[47] Targeted banks would be—amongst others—Saderat Bank of Iran, Bank Mellat, Post Bank of Iran and Sepah Bank.^[48] On 17 March 2012, following agreement two days earlier between all 27 member states of the Council of the European Union and the Council’s subsequent ruling, SWIFT disconnected all Iranian banks that had been identified as institutions in breach of current EU sanctions from its international network and warned that even more Iranian financial institutions could be disconnected from the network.

In February 2016, most Iranian banks reconnected to the network following the lift of sanctions due to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.^[49]

Russia[edit]

Similarly, in August 2014 the UK planned to press the EU to block Russian use of SWIFT as a sanction due to Russian military intervention in Ukraine.^[50] However, SWIFT refused to do so.^[51] SPFS, a Russia-based SWIFT equivalent, was created by the Central Bank of Russia as a backup measure.^[52]

During the prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States developed preliminary possible sanctions against Russia, but excluded banning Russia from SWIFT.^[53] Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the foreign ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia called for Russia to be cut off from SWIFT. However, other EU member states were reluctant, both because European lenders held most of the nearly $30 billion in foreign banks’ exposure to Russia and because Russia had developed the SPFS alternative.^[54] The European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States finally agreed to remove select Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; the governments of France, Germany, Italy and Japan individually released statements alongside the EU.^[55][5]

Israel[edit]

In 2014, SWIFT rejected calls from pro-Palestinian activists to revoke Israeli banks’ access to its network.^[56]

Competitors[edit]

Alternatives to the SWIFT system include:

1. CIPS: sponsored by China, for trade-related deals to internationalize Chinese currency RMB use. 1280 financial institutions in 103 countries and regions have connected to the system^[57][58]
2. SFMS: sponsored by India
3. SPFS: sponsored by Russia, mostly composed of Russian banks^[59]
4. INSTEX: sponsored by the European Union, limited to non-USD transactions for trade with Iran, largely unused and ineffective^[60][61]

Security[edit]

In 2016 an $81 million theft from the Bangladesh central bank via its account at the New York Federal Reserve Bank was traced to hacker penetration of SWIFT’s Alliance Access software, according to a New York Times report. It was not the first such attempt, the society acknowledged, and the security of the transfer system was undergoing new examination accordingly.^[62] Soon after the reports of the theft from the Bangladesh central bank, a second, apparently related, attack was reported to have occurred on a commercial bank in Vietnam.^[63]

Both attacks involved malware written to both issue unauthorized SWIFT messages and to conceal that the messages had been sent. After the malware sent the SWIFT messages that stole the funds, it deleted the database record of the transfers then took further steps to prevent confirmation messages from revealing the theft. In the Bangladeshi case, the confirmation messages would have appeared on a paper report; the malware altered the paper reports when they were sent to the printer. In the second case, the bank used a PDF report; the malware altered the PDF viewer to hide the transfers.^[63]

In May 2016, Banco del Austro (BDA) in Ecuador sued Wells Fargo after Wells Fargo honoured $12 million in fund transfer requests that had been placed by thieves. In this case, the thieves sent SWIFT messages that resembled recently cancelled transfer requests from BDA, with slightly altered amounts; the reports do not detail how the thieves gained access to send the SWIFT messages. BDA asserts that Wells Fargo should have detected the suspicious SWIFT messages, which were placed outside of normal BDA working hours and were of an unusual size. Wells Fargo claims that BDA is responsible for the loss, as the thieves gained access to the legitimate SWIFT credentials of a BDA employee and sent fully authenticated SWIFT messages.

In the first half of 2016, an anonymous Ukrainian bank and others—even «dozens» that are not being made public—were variously reported to have been «compromised» through the SWIFT network and to have lost money.^[65]

In March 2022, Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported about the increased security precautions by the State Police of Thurgau at the SWIFT data centre in Diessenhofen. After most of the Russian banks have been excluded from the private payment system, the risk of sabotage was considered higher. Inhabitants of the town described the large complex as a «fortress» or «prison» where frequent security check of the fenced property are conducted.^[66]

See also[edit]

• ABA routing transit number
• Bilateral key exchange and the new Relationship Management Application (RMA)
• Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS)
• Cryptocurrency / Digital currency
• Digital renminbi
• Digital Rupee
• Electronic money
• Indian Financial System Code (IFSC)
• Structured Financial Messaging System (SFMS)
• Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX)
• International sanctions
• Internationalization of the renminbi
• ISO 9362, the SWIFT/BIC code standard
• ISO 15022
• ISO 20022
• Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
• Routing number (Canada)
• Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA)
• Sibos conference
• SPFS
• Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
• TIPANET
• Value transfer system

References[edit]

Further reading[edit]

• Farrell, Henry and Abraham Newman. 2019. Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle over Freedom and Security. Princeton University Press.

External links[edit]

• Official website

СВИФТ

Синонимы:

Полезное

У этого термина существуют и другие значения, см. Swift.

О́бщество всеми́рных межба́нковских фина́нсовых кана́лов свя́зи (англ. Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, аббр.: SWIFT) — международная межбанковская система передачи информации и совершения платежей. Сама система не является платёжной — она не выполняет функций расчёта и взаимного клиринга между участниками.

Основано в 1973 году. Соучредителями выступили 248 банков из 19 стран. Штаб-квартира SWIFT находится в Ла-Юльпе, Бельгии. SWIFT является кооперативным обществом, созданным по бельгийскому законодательству, принадлежит его членам. По состоянию на 2015 год членами SWIFT являются более 11 тыс. финансовых организаций в более чем 200 странах мира, в том числе около 1000 корпораций. Средний оборот — более 30 миллионов сообщений в день.

Адресация абонентов в системе основана на так называемом BIC (англ. Business Identifier Code, ранее известном как Bank Identifier Code), присваиваемом в соответствии с международным стандартом ISO 9362. Также иногда именуется SWIFT-BIC, SWIFT ID или SWIFT code. На практике для совершения платежа в Европе достаточно знать наименование и IBAN-код банковского счёта получателя (уже содержащий интерпретированный BIC в своём составе).

SWIFT проводит ежегодную конференцию под названием Sibos  (англ.) (рус., специально посвящённую индустрии финансовых услуг.

История

SWIFT была основана в Брюсселе в 1973 году под руководством своего первого генерального директора Карла Рейтерскиельда  (англ.) (рус. и была поддержана 239 крупными банками в пятнадцати странах. Новая система была призвана установить общие стандарты для финансовых транзакций и сформировать общую систему обработки данных. Основные рабочие протоколы, правила ответственности и т. д. были установлены в 1975 году, а первая транзакция была проведена в 1977 году. Первый операционный центр SWIFT в США был открыт губернатором Вирджинии Джоном Н. Далтоном в 1979 году^[2].

Как работает SWIFT

Есть два типа сообщений: финансовые (между пользователями системы) и системные (между пользователями и системой).

Все сообщения SWIFT состоят из:

• заголовка
• текста сообщений
• трейлера

Через компьютерный терминал (CBT) осуществляется связь с универсальным компьютером, передача и получение сообщений и управление прикладными задачами. Сообщения собираются в региональном процессоре (RGP), а затем перенаправляются для обработки в соответствующий операционный центр. Там SWIFT обрабатывает сообщения по следующему алгоритму:

• проверка синтаксиса;
• создание новых заголовков для преобразования сообщений в исходящую форму
• добавление трейлеров;
• копирование и шифровка сообщений для хранения.

По результатам проверки отправитель получает уведомление: ACK — положительный результат, NAK — отрицательный. Каждое сообщение автоматически получает входящий номер^[3].

SWIFT и политика

Конфискация переводов в пределах ЕС

В феврале 2012 года датская газета «Berlingske» сообщила, что власти США могут не только просматривать сообщения SWIFT, но даже конфисковывать переводы между странами ЕС, в данном случае Данией и Германией. В данном конкретном случае было конфисковано 137 тысяч датских крон, на которые датский бизнесмен хотел импортировать кубинские сигары из Германии. Транзакция была автоматически направлена ​​через датацентр в США, предположительно, потому что оплата была произведена в долларах США. Под предлогом борьбы с терроризмом министерство финансов США ввело торговое эмбарго против Кубы и переведённая сумма была конфискована^[4].

Похожий случай был в 2008 году, когда датский ритейлер модной одежды купил одежду в Пакистане и его деньги были конфискованы^[5].

Внешнее влияние на SWIFT

После событий 11 сентября 2001 года ЦРУ, ФБР и Министерство финансов США получили доступ к финансовой информации сети SWIFT с целью отслеживания возможных финансовых транзакций террористов. После того, как информация об этом была опубликована в 2006 году в The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal и Los Angeles Times^[6], общество SWIFT подверглось жёсткой критике за недостаточную защиту данных клиентов. Впоследствии, вскоре после ввода третьего дата-центра в Швейцарии в 2009 году,^[7] администрация SWIFT объявила о начале перевода архитектуры всей системы на распределённую архитектуру с двухзонной моделью^[8] хранения всех проходящих через неё сообщений,^[9] европейской и трансатлантической, так что данные от участников европейского SWIFT более не зеркалятся в американский датацентр.

От SWIFT были отключены такие страны, как Иран и КНДР: в ноябре 2018 года ряд иранских банков был отключён от SWIFT^[10]; данное решение было принято SWIFT под давлением правительства США.^[11][12]

В 2014 году, после присоединения Крыма к Российской Федерации, SWIFT предпринял несвойственный ему демарш и выпустил специальное заявление^[13] с требованием прекратить давить на него и с обещанием игнорировать любые отдельные призывы отключать банки^[14].

SWIFT подчеркнул, что он лишь предоставляет каналы связи и не собирается быть инструментом санкций против кого бы то ни было. Единственный способ заставить его отключить банк — это решение Европейского парламента, утвержденное властями Бельгии^[14].

Альтернативы

• Система передачи финансовых сообщений — аналог SWIFT, разработанный ЦБ РФ, которым утверждается, что в систему входят 500 участников из 12 стран; они не раскрываются, что объясняют риском вторичных санкций^[15].
• INSTEX — аналог SWIFT для торговли с Ираном.
• CIPS — китайский аналог SWIFT.

В России

На случай отключения России от международной межбанковской системы Банк России начиная с декабря 2014 года предоставляет кредитным организациям свою систему передачи финансовых сообщений (СПФС) в формате SWIFT^[16] о внутрироссийских операциях. По итогам 2017 года доля внутреннего трафика (передачи финансовых сообщений между российскими организациями) составила 78 % от общего количества сообщений, отправляемых российскими пользователями SWIFT.

Банк России надеется обезопасить банки от возможных проблем в случае отключения от системы международных расчётов SWIFT. ЕС в сентябре 2014 года и в январе 2015 года^[17] призвал к новым ограничительным мерам в отношении России, в том числе к отключению России от системы SWIFT.

Принципиальным отличием от существующей системы SWIFT является изменение топологии передачи данных с топологии «звезда» на топологию «дерево» (иерархическую). В отличие от системы SWIFT, функционирующей в единственном варианте, в мире может работать любое количество CyberFT Exchange Server, поддерживающих между собой прямые связи.

В 2019 году появился аналог SWIFT — Система быстрых платежей (СБП) Банка России.^[18]

В Китае

Основная статья: CIPS

8 октября 2015 года Китай запустил свою систему межбанковских платежей Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS).

В ЕС

Основная статья: Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges  (англ.) (рус.

В июне 2019 года первая транзакция прошла в новой платёжной системе Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). Штаб-квартира системы находится в Париже. Система создана в январе 2019 года для торговли европейских стран с подсанкционным Ираном в обход американских санкций против этой страны^[19].

См. также

• Платёжная система
• APACS
• BACS
• CHAPS
• CIPS
• CHIPS
• FedWire
• ТАРГЕТ
• СПФС
• BIC
• IBAN
• Идентификационные коды банков SWIFT BIC

Примечания

Литература

• Корнелиус Лука. Торговля на мировых валютных рынках = Trading in the Global Currency Markets. — М.: Альпина Паблишер, 2005. — 716 с. — ISBN 5-9614-0206-1.

Ссылки

• Официальный сайт SWIFT.com

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